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Part I
Overview of the issues
and China ’s success

1 Introduction: objectives of and instruments for 
China ’s new presence in Africa
Meine Pieter van Dijk
China is fast becoming a major player in Sub-Saharan Africa ( Jacoby, 2007: 34). 
In 2008 it replaced the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) as 
 Africa’s major trading partner. However, we are not just talking about trade; Chi-
na’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI ) and development aid are also increasing 
rapidly; and aid, investments and trade mutually reinforce each other in the case 
of China (Asche and Schüller, 2008).1 This combined use of aid, investments 
and trade requires political coordination and China has developed a strategy and 
different policies with respect to Africa, which includes migration to Africa and 
buying or leasing land for agricultural purposes (Chinese Government, 2008).
There are few systematic overviews of China ’s involvement in Africa (for 
example, Alden et al., eds, 2008; Asche and Schüller, 2008; Broadman, 2006; 
and Manji and Marks, 2007). The picture can be drawn on the basis of different 
sources such as trade statistics from the World Trade Organization (WTO ), the 
World Bank (2009) and the International Monetary Fund (www.imf.org), statis-
tics on international investments (UNCTAD, 2007) and indicators of develop-
ment cooperation (OECD , 2009). These data need to be complemented by case 
studies and recent case studies are now available and will be used (for example, 
Kragelund, 2007; Large, 2007; Marysse and Geenen, 2009; and Tegegne, 2006). 
This allows us to ask a series of questions.
This introductory chapter presents the background of China ’s involvement 
in Africa. China was present in Africa already in the 1950s and the 1960s. At 
that time the Chinese leaders supported movements for independence and anti-
colonial activities. In the post-colonial era Chairman Mao Zedong supported 
socialist regimes in particular. The support for the destruction and now for the 
reconstruction of the Beguela railroad in Angola is an example of long-term Chi-
nese support to Africa.2 The construction of the TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia 
Railway Authority) railway line took place in the 1960s. It runs from the Zam-
bian copper mines to the Tanzanian capital and main port Dar-es-Salaam. It was 
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built by the Chinese because no other donor was willing to provide the necessary 
support to the socialist government of Tanzania.
After the end of the cold war in 1989 the Western nations and the former So-
viet Union no longer had to compete for the favors of African governments. In 
fact the presence in Africa of Russians and Eastern Europeans vanished and new 
actors came to the scene, among them China , a country that is now very visibly 
present. It must be said that currently Russia, India and Japan are also all trying 
again to increase their presence in Africa (Winters and Yusuf, eds, 2007).3
Currently the focus of China ’s presence is much more on trade and invest-
ments. Examples are the Chinese involvement in the oil sector in Angola , Nigeria 
and Sudan (since 1995) and its activities in the mining sector in Congo and Zim-
babwe (copper, cobalt, platinum, etc.). China is also looking for cheap food and 
Chinese State Farms have invested in the agricultural sector in several African 
countries, including Senegal and Zambia .
To explain their current presence in Africa, the Chinese government likes to re-
fer to this earlier presence in Africa. Th is common history often facilitated the ne-
gotiations to get a foot in the door in the 1990s. China still has a lot of goodwill in 
numerous African countries because of its involvement in the past. However, the 
nature of their presence has changed a lot in these last 50 years, as will be shown 
in this book. Africa has also changed. According to OECD (2008) the economic 
growth in this continent was at a record high of 5.5 percent per year in 2007. It 
increased steadily between 2000 and 2009. It was expected that this growth would 
continue, in particular in the mineral-exporting countries. Some of the experts 
expect a number of these African countries to become middle-income countries in 
the next ten years. However, as some of the following chapters will discuss, the glo-
bal ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008 will also have an impact on African trade and growth.
After making an effort to measure China ’s presence in Africa, we will go deep-
er into the underlying policies and development model. What are the objectives 
behind this new presence of China in Africa and what can we say about the earlier 
presence in the 1960s and 1970s? The model underlying China’s presence will 
be coined “the Beijing consensus” (Rano, 2004) and will be compared with the 
so-called “Washington consensus” (Williamson, 2002).4 Different actors will be 
distinguished and their motives to act will be listed. In particular, the strategy of 
the Chinese government with respect to Africa will be analyzed by looking at the 
main instruments used. The instruments analyzed in Part II of the book are de-
velopment aid, investments and trade policies, including different types of loans 
and debt relief. In this introductory chapter we will first give an overview of the 
major actors and go deeper into the objectives of the Chinese government. In this 
chapter we will also provide an overview of Chinese aid to, trade with, and huge 
investments in Africa.
Objectives of and instruments for china’s presence
 Th e Chinese actors
The main Chinese actors are listed in Table 1.1, where we also provide an impres-
sion of their motives for being active in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Table 1.1 Main Chinese actors active in Africa
Main actors Main motive
The Chinese government Tries to implement the government’s strategy with 
respect to Africa and it coordinates the activities of 
diff erent actors
State-owned enterprises Go to Africa as part of the offi  cial Go out policy (to be 
discussed below) to assure the supply of raw materials
Private Chinese companies Go to Africa because they see opportunities there and 
fear cut-throat competition in the Chinese market
The Chinese Embassy in the 
country concerned
Informs Chinese fi rms in the country concerned and 
coordinates activities of diff erent actors
Chinese people Have diff erent interests, but are driven by strong 
economic motives to go and work in Africa
Originally, mainly Chinese state-owned companies entered into joint ventures 
with Sub-Saharan Africa state-owned companies to secure the supply of com-
modities from Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, it is not only the large state-owned 
enterprises that invest in Africa. Recently Chinese private companies have also 
become active in Africa. Furthermore, smaller and privately owned Chinese com-
panies are active in this market and sometimes individuals move to Africa and 
start a business, or do so after their work for a Chinese state-owned enterprise 
has come to an end.
 Eight diﬀ erent objectives behind China ’s presence
China ’s strategy with respect to Africa is based on at least eight different objec-
tives and results in specific policies:
1. Assure the supply of raw materials for China , including agricultural products
2. Create a market for Chinese products and services
3. Obtain land for agricultural purposes
4. Channel migration of Chinese people to Africa
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5. Gain diplomatic support from African countries
6 Present an alternative to the Western development model
7. Provide an alternative to Western development cooperation
8. Emphasize China ’s status as a superpower
We want to find out how China is achieving these objectives, to what extent the 
Chinese government has a strategy leading to its increasing presence in Africa 
and how we should look at this new phenomenon. The first two objectives men-
tioned for China’s involvement in Africa were assuring the supply of the necessary 
raw materials and selling its products in Africa. China is not only selling cheap 
labour-intensive products like textiles and shoes, but also more sophisticated 
products such as different consumer electronic devices and mobile telephones. 
China has been very successful in this respect, as will be seen by some of the trade 
indicators presented below.
China is using product differentiation to promote its exports. It exports prod-
ucts to Africa especially for low-income consumers. Not only the quality of the 
product, but the price is also adjusted to the market. Chinese shoes, which would 
fetch fifteen Euros in Europe, can be bought (albeit of slightly different quality) 
for five Euros on the streets of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia . On top of that the Chi-
nese companies use different marketing channels. The Chinese have developed 
a network of small Chinese traders, which assures sales in regions where other 
salesmen don’t come anymore. This helps them to capture these African markets 
for consumer products.
Concerning the third objective, China has also decided to expand its presence 
abroad by buying and leasing land, as will be discussed in Chapter 6 in the case of 
Zambia and in Chapter 8 in more general terms. Subsequently, Chinese people are 
sent to till the land (objective 4). Th is implies that these farmers and all the other 
Chinese that have moved to Africa have to be protected, a huge responsibility in a 
continent with more than 50 countries and almost a million Chinese people.
Another important objective for China ’s presence in Africa is to gain political 
influence (objective 5). Examples will be given below. To outweigh the influence 
of the US and the EU, China is playing the card of being a successful develop-
ing country itself, but following a very different development model (objective 6) 
than the model pushed by Western donors, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF ), known as the “Washington consensus”. The theory be-
hind the two models will be discussed below.
China wants to provide developing countries with development assistance in 
a different way (objective 7) and it considers stability of the political system as 
more important than good governance. Stability is important for China itself 
and it requires continuing economic growth and assuring a constant supply of 
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raw materials for the rapidly growing Chinese industry and hence the Chinese 
government wants stability in Africa as well. It also means that other objectives, 
like respecting human rights and protecting the environment, are considered less 
important for the moment in both China and Africa.
Finally, China is concerned with Western, and in particular American, hegem-
ony in the world and one of its objectives is to become a political world power 
itself (objective 8), extending its influence to other parts of the world, like Latin 
America and Africa.
 Diﬀ erent ways to measure the presence of China in Africa
There are different ways to measure the presence of China in Africa. These will 
now be discussed briefly. Its presence can be measured in terms of:
1. The number of Chinese people living and working in Africa
2. The goods and services rendered to African countries
3. Chinese aid going to Africa: grants, soft loans and debt relief
4. The role of Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa
5. Other financial flows between China and Africa: normal loans and export 
credit facilities
1. Th e number of Chinese people living and working in Africa
There are no data on the exact number of Chinese people currently working 
in Africa. However, figures are sometimes mentioned for individual countries.5 
Zambia , with a population of twelve million inhabitants, counts at the moment 
30,000 Chinese inhabitants in the capital and up to 80,000 in the country in 
2006, compared with 300 in 1992 (Asche and Schüller, 2008: 30). South Africa 
would count 200,000 Chinese, many of whom have entered the country illegally 
(Pretoria News, 24 August, 2007). If these figures are treated as representative, 
the total number for recent Chinese settlers in Africa (for 53 countries) would 
be about 1.5 million, which seems like a very high figure. The figure of 750,000 
to one million Chinese living in Africa is mentioned regularly, and Asche and 
Schüller (2008: 30) provide details for a total of 929,000 Chinese people in fif-
teen African countries, if the average figure in their table is used, which seems to 
be a realistic estimate. The presence of so many Chinese people in Africa is not 
always without problems. Recently the Chinese withdrew 400 Chinese workers 
from Equatorial Guinea because of protests against its activities there.
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2. Th e goods and services rendered to African countries
African countries export a range of products, in particular many natural resources.6 
China , for example, buys wood in Congo Brazzaville and iron ore in South 
Africa . China is a center of manufacturing activities, which require these raw 
materials, and it wants to export an important part of its production to other 
countries, being part of all kinds of global value chains (Schmitz and Messner, 
eds, 2008).
Broadman (2006) suggests, however, that both China and India’s south-south 
commerce with Africa is about far more than natural resources. He is optimistic 
that this opens the way for Africa to become a processor of commodities and a 
competitive supplier of goods and services to these countries. This would be a 
major departure from Africa’s long-established relations with the North. How-
ever, countries like Tanzania find it difficult to compete in an international or 
global context, while their markets are flooded with cheap Chinese products (see 
Box 1.1). It is also difficult for Tanzania to compete with the other countries in 
the region, for example South Africa , which is considered to have a very advanced 
economy.
Box 1.1 An example of global competition: tailors and waste in Tanzania
Informal tailors no longer compete with modern textile and garment industries in Tanzania. 
They have to produce at lower prices than Chinese textile and garment industries and have 
to come up with more attractive products than the second-hand clothing from Europe, 
which is available almost everywhere nowadays.
 Scrap metal has already become valuable in Tanzania for exports, and the hope is that 
people will recover plastic in the future. Currently most of the plastic bottles are compressed 
and exported to China ! Hence, it is important that there will be a plastic recycling plant in 
Tanzania soon.
Source: Van Dijk (2008)
China ’s trade with Africa has risen more than tenfold in a decade to 55 billion 
US$ in 2006 (Financial Times, 17 May, 2007) and reached 100 billion in 2008. 
The composition is somewhat one sided. Mainly raw materials go to China and 
industrial products are coming back. China is the most important trade partner 
for Africa, bigger than the EU and the United States. Trade statistics show trade 
between China and Africa has increased fourfold in the first five years of this 
century (Internationale Samenwerking, September 2006: 38). African exports to 
China increased from some three billion US$ in 2000 to nineteen billion US$ 
in 2005 and 26.7 billion in 2006. Jacoby (2007: 34) notes a 30 percent annual 
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growth since 2000 and points to the fact that this is now one-fifth of Africa’s ex-
port. Most of these exports are fuels and raw materials. Imports from China are 
mainly manufactured products. Imports increased in value terms from 3.5 bil-
lion US$ in 2000 to over thirteen billion US$ in 2005 and 28.8 billion in 2006, 
about 15 percent of total Sub-Saharan African imports. China’s trade policy with 
respect to Africa will be discussed in Chapter 5. Chinese construction firms are 
also very active in Africa. Their market share is currently more than 50 percent 
of all construction activities according to the OECD (Financial Times, 17 May, 
2007).
China has built up an important foreign currency surplus because it exports 
more than it imports. It earned almost 2,000 billion US$ in reserves by the 
end of 2008. That money needs to be used and will be used also in Africa to 
create Chinese jobs and to see to it that the Chinese economy is not hindered 
by a shortage of raw materials or a lack of markets. China presents itself as a 
developing country that has not come to exploit Africa, but rather wants to cre-
ate win-win situations, while following a different approach than the European 
model.
3. Chinese aid going to Africa: grants, soft loans and debt relief
China is an important source of aid, soft loans and cheap products for Africa; 
Chapter 3 provides the details. This development assistance certainly helps to 
build the necessary infrastructure in Africa, although the quality of the infra-
structure may be low and the operation and maintenance are not always organ-
ized. Infrastructure is a necessary condition for successful economic develop-
ment, particularly in a continent which is very densely populated. Aid can flow 
in the form of grants (section 3.1) or interest-free and preferential loans (with a 
subsidized rate of interest; 3.2), or as debt relief (3.3).
3.1. grants
Recently Chinese aid going to Africa has increased substantially. China has set 
up a five billion US$ development fund for Africa. The Africa aid package will be 
tied to Chinese projects, however (Financial Times, 26 June, 2007).7 Aid will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Existing loans and credit lines were estimated to 
total about nineteen billion US$ in 2006. The countries that receive most of this 
money are Angola , Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo and Nigeria 
( Jacoby, 2007: 34). One notes that these are all oil-producing or other commod-
ities-exporting countries. OECD (2009: 140) puts total Chinese aid at 1 to 1.5 
billion US$ in 2006.
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3.2. interest-free loans and preferential loans (with a 
subsidized rate of interest)
In 2005, China announced in the General Assembly of the UN that it would 
mobilize an additional ten billion US$ in three years for concessional loans. In 
December 2006 in Beijing , during the conference of heads of states from Africa, 
China announced it would probably be Africa’s biggest donor by 2010 (La lettre 
des économistes No. 15, January 2007).
Th e loans given are conditional in the sense of being tied to Chinese companies, 
which are obliged to use Chinese products for the projects. Jacoby (2007: 35) notes 
that repayment of the loans has also sometimes been tied to the export of local 
commodities. He gives the example of Angola , where Chinese loans are tied to 
the supply of oil. However, China puts no macroeconomic conditions on its pref-
erential loans, in a part of the world where many countries have just overcome the 
debt crisis with the help of the Bretton Woods institutions. In this way China does 
not support the Washington consensus achieved by the World Bank , IMF and 
a number of donors, and may undermine their eﬀ orts. Th e two Bretton Woods 
organizations have raised concerns that China’s unrestricted lending undermines 
years of painstaking eﬀ orts to arrange conditional debt relief (International Her-
ald Tribune, 3 November, 2006). Th e Chinese approach goes against the good gov-
ernance philosophy, which Western donors pushed in the 1990s and which stresses 
democracy, accountability and the need to ﬁ nd a consensus to avoid conﬂ icts.
3.3. debt relief
The International Monetary Fund has not yet been restructured in a way that 
eliminates the possibility that the Fund will have to bail out private banks again 
in case of an international financial crisis. Instead of going bust, the debts of Af-
rican countries are usually rescheduled over a longer period, during which they 
find it difficult to obtain new loans. There is, however, an important development 
with China coming on the scene as a major lender to developing countries. The 
country does not work in accordance with the way the other international lend-
ers operate in Africa. Some Western interests say the generosity of the Chinese 
aid programs, its low-interest loans, debt relief and other gifts, undermine their 
efforts to foster good governance in Africa (International Herald Tribune, 3 No-
vember, 2006). The Financial Times (23 April, 2007) warns that some African 
leaders can try to use Chinese loans to avoid the conditionalities of the World 
Bank and the IMF , or to avoid having to hold elections. Also, the donor-con-
structed notion of accountability could be threatened.
China has provided substantial debt relief already. Besides announcing it 
was going to double aid by 2009 (to about one billion US$), China has also 
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cancelled one billion Euros of African debt and has announced it will cancel a 
further one billion Euros (Financial Times, 17 May, 2007). It took the Bretton 
Woods institutions more than two decades to restructure the debt of most Afri-
can countries. However, currently countries like Ghana and Nigeria are coming 
back into the international market by issuing sovereign bonds again (Financial 
Times, 22 March, 2007). Markets seem to forget quickly and the number of 
parties involved in international finance has increased, making it easier to issue 
bonds internationally.
4. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa
The role of the Chinese FDI in Africa is the subject of Chapter 4. Examples of 
planned Chinese investments in Africa are a commitment to invest 2.5 billion 
US$ in Egypt , together with the promise to increase trade from two to five bil-
lion US$ per year ( Jeune Afrique, 24 March, 2007). Similar promises were made 
in other countries visited by Prime Minister Wen and President Hu during their 
missions to Africa in 2006.
Since the Chinese government initiated the “go global” strategy for Chinese 
enterprises in 1998, FDI has been increasing. China ’s “go out” policy is an impor-
tant factor in explaining China’s investments in Africa. The Chinese government 
also actively stimulated Chinese private entrepreneurs to start up businesses in 
Africa. By the end of 2006, China had invested more than ten billion US$ in Sub-
Saharan Africa (UNCTAD, 2007). The investments focus on building the neces-
sary infrastructure to explore oil or gas (Financial Times 6 February, 2007), but 
also serve to develop agricultural, telecommunication and manufacturing activi-
ties. In 1991 only 4 percent of the Chinese FDI went to Africa. That percentage 
has increased to 16 percent in 2001, but fluctuates strongly. Chinese FDI is the re-
sult of the rapid economic development in China, the important stock of foreign 
exchange or reserves China has obtained, and a reorientation of its strategy to 
invest in industries providing the raw materials for China’s manufacturing sector.
It is estimated that only 3 percent of China ’s total outward FDI stock (or 2.19 
billion US$) is spread over 500 FDI projects in 48 African countries. Most FDI 
in Africa went to Egypt , Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia in 2006 and the first three 
are certainly very important for the Chinese. Figures by country will be given for 
several cases, but unfortunately they come from different sources, which may af-
fect their accuracy and recent nature.
FDI flows to Africa in general have increased substantially since 2000, as 
shown in Table 1.2. The table gives an impression of the growing importance of 
capital flows to Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Latin America and 
Africa. Also, informal flows of money between and within countries have become 
 Meine Pieter van Dijk
more important. They are often not captured in the official statistics; it is also not 
incorporated in the International Institute of Finance (IIF) figures. Recently at-
tention has also focused on the importance of these remittances for Africa.8 This 
is partially grant money for consumption purposes, but some of the money is also 
used for investments in development. These figures would have to be added to the 
figures provided in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Comparison of capital fl ows by region over time (US$ billion)
Region 1991 1995 2004 2005 2006 2007
Latin America
Eastern Europe
Africa/M.East
Asia/Pacifi c
33.1
-6.6
7.4
26.6
1.3
10.3
9.9
60.4
 40.8
130.7
 7.7
165.8
70.9
204.0
25.2
218.1
 40.4
228.2
 29.8
254.5
54.9
236.1
 30.9
223.0
Total private fl ows 70.5 81.9 345.1 518.1 552.9 544.9
Source: Van Loon and Van Dijk (1995) and more recent data IIF (2007)
More recent information from the IIF (www.iif.org) on the flows per region 
shows the distribution of the international capital flows to emerging economies 
over the four major regions, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and the Mid-
dle East, and Asia and the Pacific. It shows a strong increase in the total flows 
and an unequal distribution of the growth over the four regions, with Africa and 
Latin America lagging behind the other two regions. In this period of sixteen 
years the flows to Asia and the Pacific increased by almost nine times, while the 
amount going to Africa and the Middle East went up fourfold. The most spectac-
ular growth has been registered in Eastern Europe, however. FDI is considered a 
stable source of foreign finance since it has a long-term goal. It usually also brings 
technology and access to international markets.
Total FDI inflows in Africa were 30 billion US$ in 2006, twice the 2004 level 
(UNCTAD, 2007: xvii).9 These investments mainly go to South Africa and often 
concern Africa’s natural resources. In fact 90 percent of these FDIs are concen-
trated in ten countries, which shows the concentration of these flows. The impor-
tance of FDI from China is increasing rapidly.
Chinese FDI flows comprised 12.5 percent of total investments in Africa in 
2005 and accumulated Chinese FDI comprised 10.5 percent of the total inflow in 
a country like Zambia (UNCTAD, 2007). In that country the stock of Chinese 
investments in 2005 was 316 million US$ and the flow 41 million US$. China ’s 
total capital outflow increased by 32 percent in 2006 and reached sixteen billion 
Objectives of and instruments for china’s presence
US$ (UNCTAD, 2007: 44). Its outward FDI stock reached 73 billion US$ ac-
cording to the same source. Although we don’t know exactly how much of these 
investments went to Africa, UNCTAD (2007: 40) notes that China is the fourth 
largest Asian investor in Africa after Singapore, India and Malaysia.
The China Daily (23 April, 2008) notes that 1,400 Chinese companies employ 
about 11,000 local people in Africa and have “trained 54,000”. They would be ac-
tive in 49 African countries. The article in The China Daily quotes the Chinese 
deputy director of the commerce ministry’s foreign economic cooperation depart-
ment as saying that Chinese investors should be aware of risks “such as problems 
brought about by a slowdown in the global economy, trade protectionism as well 
as security incidents involving Chinese businesses”.
5. Normal loans and export credit
The value of existing Chinese loans and credit lines to African countries is es-
timated to total about nineteen billion US$ in 2006. The loans given are condi-
tional in the sense of being tied to Chinese companies, which are obliged to use 
Chinese products for the projects.
Box 1.2 An example: Chinese presence in Zambia 
China is already present and quite active in Zambia since its independence in 1964. There 
were only 300 Chinese living in Zambia in 1992. That number has increased to maybe 80,000 
Chinese in 2006. There are currently some 200 Chinese enterprises active in Zambia, the 
largest number of them on two industrial zones created exclusively for the Chinese. Zambia 
is also the third country as far as Chinese investments in Africa is concerned. China only 
invested more in Sudan and Angola . In this case the investments concern mainly the mineral 
sector. China exports copper and cobalt from Zambia.
 Chinese investments were 10.5 percent of all Foreign Direct Investments in Zambia in 
2006. China was number eight in that country in investments in 2006. These investments are 
related to Zambia’s mining sector, in particular copper mining investments (UNCTAD, 2007). 
President Hu Jintao visited Zambia in February 2007 to open the fi rst Africa Economic and 
Trade Co-operation Zone. Chinese investments in Zambia could increase during the next 
three years to 800 million US$, according to the China Daily (2007).
 A Chinese agribusiness group has invested heavily in Zambia , where they lease more than 
3,000 hectares, producing chicken and pigs and with an annual turnover of three million US$ 
(Internationale Samenwerking, September 2006: 37; also in Chapter 6).
 Van Pinxteren (2007) attributes the anti-Chinese mood in Zambia to the way “China 
mistreats and exploits local workers in Zambia” (Financial Times, 8 February, 2007). When an 
opposition leader wanted to make this a theme of his campaign, the Chinese warned that 
they would leave Zambia if this man was elected president. Many Zambians considered the 
Chinese statement to be interference in local politics.
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An analysis of the effects of Chinese investments in Zambia is given in a case 
study by Kragelund (2007; also Chapter 6). He studied the effects of Chinese 
investments in Zambia using an interesting classification of these investments. 
They can serve to build up local production capacity, or result in enterprises com-
peting with local companies, or Chinese investments can play a role as a cata-
lyst. In his opinion investments in the construction sector are competing. Local 
companies could have done the work, or international companies that employ 
many more local subcontractors and workers. Catalyzing is the role of Chinese 
investments in the copper sector in Zambia. That sector had been privatized in 
the 1980s and declined subsequently. It was revived in the 1990s, but China seems 
to be retrenching in 2009 ( just like the Indian mining firm in Zambia) because 
copper prices have fallen strongly.
Finally Kragelund (2007) considers that the textile and garments industries 
are examples of building up local capacity. This industry is important for Zam-
bia because about 18 percent of the national income is generated by its activities 
and about 140,000 farmers grow cotton, although currently of a very low quality. 
The Chinese are good for two-thirds of the textile and garments sector. There 
are some positive effects of these Chinese investments for Zambian farmers and 
local textile and garments companies in Zambia. However, after finishing the 
Multi-Fibre Agreement in January 2005, China started to export directly from 
China and the biggest Zambian textile factory is currently closed because of “re-
structuring”.
 China ’s government strategy with respect to Africa
During the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation, a conference of heads of states 
from Africa in Beijing in November 2006, it became clear that China seeks deeper 
ties with Africa. The meeting was attended by 47 heads of state out of a total of 
53 African countries that have diplomatic relations with China.10 It resulted in a 
plan pledging that China will double its aid to Africa and set up a China-Africa 
development fund to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa. The Fo-
rum on China-Africa Cooperation resulted in a Three-year Action Program.11 
It promised, for example, to train 15,000 African professionals and to build 30 
hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centres and 100 rural schools!12 The document 
is full of phrases expressing China’s good intentions in Africa, like: “peace and 
development remain the main themes of our times”.
The policy note for Africa (Chinese Government, 2008), which was the back-
ground document for the Forum on China -Africa Cooperation, shows a system-
atic approach to improving relations with African countries. The main elements 
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of this strategy are that China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history 
of interchange:
Sincerity, equality and mutual beneﬁ t, solidarity and common develop-
ment are the principles guiding China -Africa exchange and cooperation 
and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations.
The Forum strengthened the ties between the government of China and the Afri-
can nations that were represented. It consolidated plans to continue cooperating 
in all areas of trade and development. Media attention focused on the economic 
and political consequences of this new partnership. Annual conferences with Af-
rican leaders were announced. Five billion US$ were promised in the form of new 
loans.
China uses a number of principles when dealing with African countries. 
China emphasizes the role of institutions like the African Union (earlier the 
Organization for African Union), the New Partnership for African Develop-
ment (NEPAD, an organization to speed up development in Africa) and regional 
(trade) organizations. The emphasis is on peaceful cooperation and mutual in-
terests. The policy note puts a coherent vision on the table and develops a strat-
egy to achieve its goals. The goals mentioned explicitly concern the supply of raw 
materials and the creation of a market for Chinese products and services and to 
provide an alternative development model for the Washington donor consensus, 
which is a consensus among Western countries on the preconditions for devel-
opment.
 Th e model underlying the Washington and the Beijing 
consensus
For a better understanding of China ’s approach to Africa it is useful to compare 
the consensus reached in Beijing during the Forum on China-Africa Coopera-
tion, with what is commonly known as the Washington consensus. In Table 1.3, 
the Washington consensus is put against the Beijing consensus developed in 2006 
during the Forum. Such a comparison is very schematic and is only presented to 
illustrate the different ways of thinking. It cannot be said, for example, that the 
Chinese government has made the same systematic effort to spread the Beijing 
consensus as the World Bank and IMF have made to introduce the economic part 
of the Washington consensus.
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Table 1.3 Washington versus Beijing consensus for achieving economic development
Washington consensus versus Beijing consensus
In economic terms
1.  Free markets and an important role for 
the private sector
2.  Loans, but under strict conditions
3.  Projects: use local companies to create 
employment
4.  Transfer of technology, knowledge and 
experience (capacity building)
1.  Important role for the government in 
the economy
2.  No conditions for soft loans
3.  Use Chinese companies, employment 
and technology
4.  No transfer of knowledge and 
experience
In political terms
1.  Democracy
2.  Liberalization
3.  Limited time for political functions (2 
times 5 years for example)
1.  No recognition of Taiwan 
2.  Political support for China in the United 
Nations and other fora
3.  Stability is important
The two approaches are very different concerning the role of government and the 
view on political issues. Also Chinese companies active in Africa are not so much 
interested in transferring knowledge and experience, and the Chinese govern-
ment is not putting up a lot of conditions for obtaining soft loans. The Chinese 
government wants a more important role for the government in the economy, 
but also communist China recommends the use of the market in general and of 
private (Chinese) firms in particular. It has experienced that the private sector 
contributes strongly to economic development in China.
Th ere are some contradictions in the table, to which we will come back in the 
last chapter of the book. On the one hand China shows Africa how a develop-
ing country can beneﬁ t from globalization, on the other hand Chinese companies 
invest in Africa, but keep control over their technology. Also the Chinese govern-
ment may not impose conditions on Chinese loans, but their aid is tied and needs 
to be spent in China on Chinese goods and services. Th e fact that the Chinese 
companies use mainly Chinese labor is a disadvantage for the African country 
concerned. It means no local employment is created and also that no knowledge 
and experience are transferred. On top of that the Chinese government sometimes 
supports regimes that are not supported by the West, like in the case of Zimbabwe.
The critical question is whether this unconditional aid by China is undermin-
ing the good governance concept pushed by Western donors and leading to a 
number of conditionalities for the development assistance the Western donors 
provide. The World Bank and the IMF were not happy with the Beijing consen-
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sus and have indicated that it undermines their policy. The European Investment 
Bank (EIB) complained that it has to compete with Chinese government banks 
(Financial Times, 28 June, 2007). Just like the World Bank and the IMF, the EIB 
complains that the Chinese apply lower moral and environmental standards in 
their loans, which can lower credit standards.
However, China has a lot of goodwill in Africa. This goodwill is based on the 
fact that China is a developing country itself and that it also helped Africa in 
the 1960s and 1970s and the fact that the Chinese are not seen as lecturing the 
Africans on how to behave and telling them what they should do. However, the 
debate is also whether China is the last in a series of exploiters of Africa’s raw 
materials, or whether China will really help the Africans “to free themselves from 
the tyranny of the neo-liberal policies” (Manji and Marks, 2007). In this book we 
hope to shed some light on these issues and contradictions.
 China ’s instruments used in Africa
The policy note for Africa, which was the background document for the Forum 
on China -Africa Cooperation, shows a systematic approach to improving the 
relations with Africa (Chinese Government, 2008). The main instruments for 
achieving this strategy, as mentioned in the document, are:
1. Provide more aid and loans
The facts were given before. President Hu Jiantao announced during the Africa-
China Cooperation Forum in November 2006 that China would double its 2006 
assistance to Africa by 2009. He also announced that China would provide five 
billion US$ in preferential credits (of which two billion US$ would be buyers’ 
credit; Jacoby, 2007). Finally it would provide assistance to the social and health 
sectors and build a conference centre for the African Union. A detailed analysis 
of China’s aid to Africa is the subject of Chapter 3.
2. Promote trade and investments
During the Forum, commercial contracts worth 1.9 billion US$ were concluded 
in various sectors ( Jacoby, 2007). The intention was expressed to double bilat-
eral trade to 100 billion US$ by 2010, which was achieved already by 2008. Trade 
and investments figures of the Chinese in Africa are already impressive, but to 
increase those it was announced that China would establish three to five more 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Zones in Africa, comparable to the ones ex-
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isting already in Zambia (see Chapter 6). Building Trade and Economic Coop-
eration Zones is also an important instrument of China in its cooperation with 
Africa. China has also announced an intention to build such zones in Ethiopia 
and Tanzania. The objectives are twofold. On the one hand to help the country 
concerned, on the other to make it easier for Chinese enterprises to invest in 
that country.
3. Forgive debts
China has launched an initiative for debt relief. In Beijing , during the Africa-
China Cooperation Forum, President Hu Jiantao announced that China would 
cancel all interest-free government loans due at the end of 2005 that were owed 
by the poorest and least developed countries in Africa with diplomatic relations 
with China ( Jacoby, 2007). The latter notes that it is important that the volume 
and terms of loans provided by China to an African country should be compatible 
with its borrowing capacity. This is determined by the low-income country debt 
sustainability framework, which usually results in an agreement between these 
countries and the IMF and World Bank on what they can borrow.
4. Eventually work to a Free Trade Area
China ’s goal is to create Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with African countries or 
groups of countries. This intention is modeled on the European approach of sign-
ing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with its former colonies in Africa, 
which are WTO compatible and are based on reciprocity (Van Hoestenberghe 
and Van Dijk, 2007). These FTAs will be discussed in Chapter 5.
 An overview of the book
The first part of the book provides an overview of China ’s activities in Africa and 
the background of China’s economic success. In this book we focus on a limited 
number of countries and sectors. Part II deals with the three major instruments 
China uses in Africa: Chinese aid, its investments going to Africa, and its trade 
policy with respect to the continent. Each one will be discussed in a separate 
chapter, before presenting three chapters with case studies. Part III provides a 
number of case studies, and Part IV the conclusions. The conclusions start with 
a chapter addressing the extent to which social corporate responsibility can be 
expected from Chinese companies and a chapter on what can be learned from 
China’s experience in Africa.
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After the overview given in this first chapter, the causes of China ’s success are 
analysed in Chapter 2 by De Beule and Van den Bulcke. China has a vast army of 
cheap labor. The agricultural sector contributes only 25 percent to China’s GDP, 
while still more than half of China’s 1.3 million people are living in rural areas. It 
is expected that in the next ten years 200 million people will leave the rural areas 
and employment will have to be created for them in the cities (Van Dijk, 2007). 
China has opted for an export-oriented development model and built up a huge 
production capacity, which it is still expanding to create more employment. It re-
sults in a need for more and more energy and other raw materials, much of them 
coming from Africa. Finally it points to the need for China to conquer foreign 
markets, to be able to sell its products.
Part II starts with Chapter 3 by Chaponnière about China ’s aid. Th e geographi-
cal distribution of China’s oﬃ  cial aid is not really known because China provides 
no systematic data on aid, only press releases. China may ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to sell to 
its own poor that so much money is spent on assistance in other developing coun-
tries. Chaponnière provides an historical overview and points to the institutions 
involved. He analyzes the diﬀ erent forms in which aid is provided and its approxi-
mate geographical distribution. Th en he identiﬁ es and discusses the major issues 
concerning aid to Africa, in particular to what extent Chinese aid will converge 
towards Western practice or remain an alternative way of dealing with developing 
countries. Th e Chinese government considers that Western aid has failed and it 
proposes a diﬀ erent model of providing aid and achieving development.
Latecomers in international markets have the choice of replacing existing 
supply or developing new markets (green fields). The Chinese government has 
chosen the last approach with respect to Africa and the main factors that seem 
to explain their huge investments in Africa are its energy needs, its search for 
new markets and the possibility of using its huge balance of payments surplus 
to invest abroad. To some extent China is globalizing itself, after having ben-
efited so much from globalization during its development process (Van Dijk, 
2006)
In Chapter 4, Kragelund and Van Dijk deal with China ’s investments in 
 Africa. Chinese companies are investing heavily in Africa. Chinese investments 
in Africa are important and increasing rapidly. It is concentrated mainly in oil-
producing countries like Angola , Nigeria and Sudan, or in countries with a lot of 
raw material, such as Zambia . These investments are made not only by the large 
state-owned enterprises, but increasingly by the smaller and privately owned 
ones. This chapter analyzes the importance, the distribution and the effects of 
these investments, but it is difficult to predict what the long-term impact of these 
investments is going to be and how China’s investment behavior may change be-
cause of the current financial and economic crisis.
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The effects of foreign investments in general depend on the mode of entry 
(through direct investments, portfolio investment or loans to local firms), on the 
local absorption capacity, on the motives of the investors to make the investment 
and on the policy of the receiving country to accept FDI and on which terms. 
China ’s policy with respect to investments in Africa is closely related to the devel-
opment of its aid and trade policies with regard to Africa. In Chapter 4, China’s 
policy with respect to investments in Africa is summarized. Subsequently differ-
ent (sometimes conflicting) estimates of Chinese FDI to Africa are presented. 
The figures tell a story of the increasing importance of FDI as a vector of influ-
ence in African economies.
The authors then seek to compare Chinese FDI in Africa with FDI from other 
sources. It is argued that though similarities exist there are also qualitative dif-
ferences that warrant a new approach to the study of these investments. An ana-
lytical framework to further our understanding of the local consequences of this 
phenomenon is presented. This framework only deals with effects of Chinese 
FDI on the domestic private sector, but the consequences of Chinese FDI to 
Africa are not limited to this sector. Kragelund and Van Dijk question to what 
extent we can approach Chinese FDI with the same analytical frameworks as the 
more “traditional” FDI and to what extent we need new analytical frameworks.
Finally trade policies as an instrument are analyzed by Van Dijk in Chapter 
5. He compares the trade advantages provided by the EU, the US and China in 
terms of tariffs, non-tariff barriers, rules of origin and the required reciprocity. 
Do the EU and the US trade policies compare favorably with China’s trade policy 
with respect to Africa?
In Part III of this book we go deeper into these issues by studying some con-
crete examples. Chinese investments may impact both positively and negatively 
on local companies depending on, amongst others, the motives and strategies of 
the investments. In Chapter 6, Bastholm and Kragelund examine the main mo-
tives and strategies of Chinese investments in the following three sectors of the 
Zambian economy: mining, construction and agriculture. They scrutinise how 
and to what extent the Chinese state provides advantages for Chinese companies 
in Zambia as well as in China . They find that the Chinese state is a central player 
in driving Chinese investments. Chapter 6 also concludes that the majority of 
Chinese investments in Zambia target either mining, or mining-related activities 
and that the Chinese state directs and assists these investments at the highest 
political level. Lastly, the authors hint at how the Chinese state makes use of 
investments in other sectors to render investments in the mining sector possible.
In Chapter 7, Van Dijk analyzes the involvement of China in Sudan, showing 
how China operates politically in Africa. This chapter also tries to assess the 
impact of the Chinese presence in Sudan. First a short review of the history of 
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the cooperation between China and Sudan will be given. Then an overview of 
recent economic relations will be provided before discussing some of the real is-
sues like the developments in Darfur and to what extent China’s arms deliveries 
have contributed to the current crisis and whether China’s diplomacy has helped 
to find a solution.
The question of the extent to which China did or did not use conditions when 
providing aid and investing in Sudan is discussed. Finally, the issue of whether 
China is an alternative for the Western development model will be taken up by 
looking at the strategic objectives and trade policies of China, the EU and the US 
with respect to Sudan.
In Chapter 8, a number of other countries are discussed by Van Dijk and the 
impact of the Chinese presence in specific sectors will be assessed. The chapter 
brings together the experiences with China ’s presence in five other African coun-
tries and goes into some detail for sectors in which Chinese investors are active. 
The presence of China in Angola , Congo , Ethiopia , Tanzania and Zimbabwe 
will be discussed and the experiences in agriculture, textiles, the financial, the 
construction and the mining sectors will be analyzed.
In Part IV, drawing some conclusions, Knorringa deals in Chapter 9 with re-
sponsible production in Africa. Knorringa asks the question whether it is also 
possible for China to go for socially responsible production in Africa. He first 
provides a working definition of responsible production by outlining a typol-
ogy that distinguishes between compliance, risk minimization and value creation 
strategies, and then adds the Norm Life Cycle model to make this typology more 
dynamic.
Before using this typology to position existing case studies from Africa, Knor-
ringa introduces the context and looks at private sector development and com-
pany social responsibility (CSR) in Africa. In particular he focuses on the role of 
China in these developments. Subsequently he brings in some additional sober-
ing thoughts to the idea that responsible production will be the way of the fu-
ture, by showing how the rise of China as a center of global production and con-
sumption may well limit the reach of responsible production. He then concludes 
by presenting the main findings and outlining suggestions for further research. 
There is clearly a need for socially responsible production in Africa and a number 
of useful lessons can be learned from Chinese economic success and from a dec-
ade of increased Chinese presence in Africa.
In Chapter 10, Van Dijk draws some conclusions concerning China ’s activities 
in Africa. China has different and sometimes conflicting objectives. Also the dif-
ferences in perception between Western and Chinese researchers on key issues 
will be analyzed. Van Dijk distinguishes at least four different levels of presence 
or involvement in Africa. Moreover, Chinese actors change and they play differ-
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ent roles over time. He concludes that China benefited from globalization but 
does not really help other countries to also benefit, for example from the oppor-
tunities provided by higher food and raw material prices. Secondly, he makes the 
point that the Chinese model is not an alternative for Africa.
 Notes
 Marysse and Geenen () make a convincing case that the Sino-Congolese cooperation 
agreements cover “all economic relations between the two countries in one text”: Chinese 
aid is part of a larger package of investments and trade deals.
 The Chinese supported the independence movement in Angola against the Portuguese. 
According to Internationale Samenwerking (September : ) the Chinese are cur-
rently repairing the Benguela railroad in Angola, which Mao helped to destroy in the 
s.
 The Russian aluminium giant Rusal, for example, has plans to expand into new parts of 
Africa after reviving a smelter in Nigeria (Financial Times,  April, ).
 He mentions ten points: fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax 
reform, liberalizing interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, lib-
eralization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation and property 
rights as the ten reforms originally presented.
 When I lived in Senegal (-) the country counted , inhabitants of “Lebanese” 
descent on five million Senegalese, and also a large number of people of Mauritanian 
descent (the Moors). Not all Senegalese were happy with this and during a conflict most 
Mauritanians left, while the Lebanese community has gradually become less important.
 The Netherlands mainly exports used papers and scrap to China , using the empty con-
tainers used for exporting Chinese products to the European Union (NRC, July ).
 In a letter to the Financial Times ( June, ), D. Brautigam argues that the Chinese 
do not tie aid but promote a different approach to economic cooperation. It is not aid, 
but rather something of mutual benefit that Chinese companies are promoted to invest 
in Africa. She concludes that investments in Africa could provide more jobs, tax revenues 
and economic pay-offs than the uncertain experiments that have characterized the foreign 
aid from the West.
 According to some IMF estimates informal remittances would be another  billion US 
(www.imf.org).
 Although UNCTAD provides figures on international investments, the investments of 
China in Africa are not given separately (UNCTAD, ).
 China also hosted the annual meeting of the African Development Bank in  in 
Shanghai.
 The next China -Africa summit will take place in South Africa in .
 The weight Tanzania attached to the Africa-China Forum in Beijing is proven by the fact 
that the president and the minister of foreign affairs attended, plus some other Tanzanian 
ministers.
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2 China ’s opening up, from Shenzhen to Sudan
Filip de Beule and Daniël Van den Bulcke
 Introduction
At the end of the 1970s, after years of economic and political isolation, China 
started an enormous systemic transformation to turn around one of the world’s 
poorest countries. At the beginning of reform, we now know that China was sub-
stantially poorer than Sub-Saharan Africa (Dollar, 2008). At that time, China’s 
real gross domestic product per capita was behind all Sub-Saharan countries, 
except Ethiopia and Tanzania (CICUP, 2008).
Already in the early 1970s Zhou Enlai devised a plan to modernize China ’s ag-
riculture, industry, defense, and science and technology; but it was not until Deng 
Xiaoping’s resurgence –after Mao Zedong’s death– that the necessary political 
will and social stability were created to make it possible. Although its liberaliza-
tion policies were very gradual, in less than three decades China has indeed gone 
through a metamorphosis from one of the most isolated economies in the world 
to a global economic powerhouse.
Opening to the world and domestic reforms were two complementary policies 
that succinctly describe the post-1978 period (Naughton, 2007), and both policies 
were indeed geared towards the modernization of China . This chapter will focus 
primarily on China’s international opening and its inward and outward trade and 
investment activities, and will also discuss some of the consequences and chal-
lenges of these open policies for Africa. In the first section, the open door policy 
will be briefly analyzed. This section specifically discusses China’s policy towards 
foreign direct investment and trade, and the role of economic development zones. 
A second section looks at the economic, social and environmental consequences 
and challenges of China’s economic boom. The third section tackles China’s in-
ternationalization steps in Africa, both in terms of direct investment and trade. 
The final section draws some conclusions on the impact of China’s internation-
alization, both for the domestic economy and Africa.
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 Open door policy
Since 1978, the Chinese government has gradually opened up its economy and in 
1979 embraced foreign direct investment (FDI ) as a vehicle to obtain advanced 
technology and assistance in achieving its objectives of modernization. FDI in 
China has expanded enormously, reflecting the evolving changes in economic 
conditions, investment environments and especially government policies. On 
the one hand, China’s market size and growth, its natural and human resource 
endowments, its physical, financial and technological infrastructure, have made 
China into an increasingly attractive investment site for multinationals. On the 
other hand, China has relied on explicit conditions – many of which were gradu-
ally released later on, such as joint ventures, export targets, local content require-
ments and insistence on technology transfers, to maximize the benefits of FDI to 
the host economy. The Chinese government thereby systematically tried to strike 
a balance between the need to attract foreign direct investment (to acquire tech-
nology, conquer export markets and earn foreign exchange, and thereby maximize 
the positive fall-out to the host economy) and the concern to safeguard China’s 
autonomous decision-making authority and direct and control the changeover 
from a centrally planned to a market economy.
China ’s first opening step took place when Hong Kong businesses were allowed 
to sign export-processing contracts with Chinese multinational companies in 
the Pearl River Delta. Rather than tackle the enormous task of transforming 
the whole foreign trade system, Chinese policy-makers initially took modest 
but innovative steps to open up new trade channels in the southern provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian. A Hong Kong firm would ship, for example, fabric to a 
Chinese rural firm and have it sewn into shirts. These Chinese firms would be 
paid a processing fee. The fabric and shirts were considered to be owned by the 
Hong Kong firm at all times, which allowed them to avoid the then restrictive 
foreign trade system (Naughton, 2007).
In today’s global economy, trade and investment are increasingly closely 
linked phenomena. In China as well, the growth of trade has been driven by 
foreign investment that has itself, to a large extent, been due to the Asian eco-
nomic boom. Taiwan and Hong Kong very successfully developed labor-inten-
sive manufactured exports during the 1960s and 1970s. From the very beginning 
of the economic reforms, this success had an important demonstration effect 
on China because its policy-makers often sought to emulate and repeat these 
successful examples through economic reform. Later on, the export success of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong had a more direct effect when their increasing wages 
and costs pushed production to lower-wage locations on the Chinese mainland. 
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Proximity, aided by common language, customs and roots, made doing busi-
ness in the southern coastal provinces of the mainland easy and cheap, after the 
opening up of the economic system in this part of the country proved to be a 
permanent policy change.
Initially, four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were set up in Guangdong 
and Fujian. These SEZs provided a secure initial footprint for the expansion of 
export-processing trade. These zones were large regions in which foreign invest-
ment was encouraged by lower tax rates, as well as fewer and simplified adminis-
trative and custom procedures. Also, investors were allowed duty-free imports of 
components and supplies, as long as these were used within the zone to produce 
exports. This system was particularly powerful in Southern China because trans-
action costs for firms from Hong Kong, Macao and later on Taiwan to operate 
in the People’s Republic China (PRC) were low. For the next fifteen years, ex-
ports from Guangdong and Fujian grew twice as rapidly as those from the rest 
of China. Consequently, those provinces were fundamentally transformed from 
economic backwaters into crucial nodes in the global trade economy, warranting 
Guangdong’s Tiger status.
None of the provisions of the Chinese export processing trade regime were 
novel. All had their counterparts elsewhere in Asia and, indeed, around the globe. 
However, the SEZs served as test beds for domestic economic reforms. For in-
stance, wholly owned foreign subsidiaries were permitted in the SEZs long before 
they were allowed elsewhere. The SEZs had a great impact on China ’s economic 
reform, as they exemplified the pattern of Chinese dual-track policy-making by 
launching a new system alongside the existing one that either could be merged or 
could downright replace the old one, once it had proven its worth.
One of the main goals was China ’s desire to absorb foreign technology, man-
agement methods, foreign exchange and foreign capital (Wu, 1989). Another set 
of objectives was the expected impact on Chinese human capital, such as the 
provision of employment and training. In the 7th Five-Year Plan, reference was 
made to the goals and objectives of SEZs, which included the expansion of for-
eign trade, especially the export of more refined manufactured and processed 
goods, the acquisition of foreign exchange, and the development of China’s own 
industries to lessen imports. From the very beginning, a major objective was also 
“the attraction of foreign investment, particularly in technological intensive and 
export oriented (or foreign exchange earning-oriented) industries”. Accordingly, 
the SEZs were expected to lead in technological importation, to increase exports 
and to create more foreign exchange earnings for China.
As the first and foremost preoccupation of the Chinese government to open 
up the economy was the search for technology, it wanted foreign multinationals 
to set up supply-oriented joint ventures with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
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in these zones. The government enforced the balancing of foreign exchange ac-
counts in order to promote exports, on the one hand, and avoid excessive imports, 
on the other hand. The authorities also tried to increase backward linkages by 
enforcing localization of supplies. They believed that the SOEs could exploit the 
MNEs’ strengths.
Although Chinese administrators from the outset of the liberalization initia-
tive tried to attract high technological activities to their country in line with their 
modernization policy, this was not always as successful as originally anticipated. 
In fact, the SEZs were not immediately successful. In relation to the high hopes 
they had inspired, they got off to a slow start. Foreign investment from West-
ern firms, especially high-tech investment, was initially disappointing, and the 
construction of infrastructure was expensive. Although many world-class manu-
facturers were courted, most of the early incoming investments were low value-
adding, labor-intensive, export-oriented screwdriver plants by Overseas Chinese. 
Contractual, rather than equity, joint ventures and even subcontracting were the 
preferred mode of “investment,” as these emerging multinationals wanted to mini-
mize the risk for the invested capital.
In order to jumpstart reforms, Deng Xiaoping made his first visit to Shenzhen 
SEZ in 1984, during which he was able to convince his peers that Shenzhen was 
indeed a successful experiment. While China ’s SEZs are currently regarded as 
one of the first important steps towards the liberalization of China’s economy, 
it is generally forgotten that they were once very experimental and that initially 
there were serious doubts by certain conservative members of the communist 
party that they would serve the socialist purposes of the country.
The Chinese government subsequently announced that fourteen coastal cities 
would open to foreign investment, expanding the open door policy from the ini-
tial SEZs to other coastal regions. These new “Open Cities” – including Shang-
hai – were situated along the coast, and all set up Economic and Technological 
Development Zones (ETDZs) that offered many of the same provisions as the 
SEZs. Local authorities were authorized and encouraged to bargain aggressively 
with potential foreign investors to facilitate investment flows. Shanghai quickly 
approved the application of the American multinational 3M Corporation to set 
up a wholly owned subsidiary, even though there was no provision in Chinese 
law for foreign ownership outside the SEZs at that time. Starting from 1985, 
China listed the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and the South Fu-
jian Triangle as open economic zones, thus forming an extensive open economic 
coastal belt. This belt was later extended further to include the Bohai Sea Rim, 
Shandong Peninsula, Liaodong Peninsula, Hebei and Guangxi as open economic 
 areas. In essence, China created one gigantic export-processing zone in the coast-
al provinces.
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Figure 2.1 clearly shows the impressive flight that export processing took as 
a result of these improvements in the economic environment. Before the re-
forms, only twelve national foreign trade companies were granted monopolies 
over both imports and exports. Once export-processing firms were allowed to 
import for export purposes, their share in the Chinese exports dramatically 
increased over the years towards 50 percent. Similarly, the role and importance 
of foreign invested enterprises proved vital as an engine of Chinese export 
growth.
Figure 2.1 Importance of export by export-processing fi rms and by foreign invested fi rms
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
Although export structures have been upgraded since the 1980s, China ’s trade re-
mains largely based on export processing. The share of primary products, such as 
foodstuffs, agricultural products and mineral fuels, has been reduced from half of 
the total in 1980 to less than 10 percent, while the share of manufactured exports 
increased to more than 90 percent. Intermediate goods still make up the lion’s 
share of China’s imports, while exports are evenly distributed between intermedi-
ate goods and consumer products; although capital goods have slowly increased 
their share (see Figure 2.2). The share of high-tech products gradually went up 
from virtually zero in 1985 to about 15 percent of international trade in 2005.
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Figure 2.2 Share of diff erent categories of goods in China’s imports and exports 
(2000-2005)
Source: International Trade Centre
The expansion of international trade was facilitated by favorable policies and 
became more and more driven by FDI and trade within global value chains. 
For products of buyer-driven chains such as apparel, footwear and toys, Chi-
na became the preferred global manufacturing location. While many of these 
goods are produced in factories owned by Taiwanese or Hong Kong investors, 
some are produced by Chinese-owned firms via subcontracting relationships 
(Zheng and Sheng, 2006). Yet, the consumption largely takes place in North 
America and Europe. In producer-driven industries such as computer and IT 
products, exports are mainly manufactured in factories owned by Western and 
Taiwanese investors. The share of exports by foreign affiliates in technology-
intensive industries rose from 59 percent in 1996 to 81 percent in 2000. It was 
reported that more than 60 percent of high-tech exports were produced by 
fully foreign-owned firms and more than 20 percent by partly foreign-owned 
enterprises (Gu and Lundvall, 2006). For example, high-technology products, 
such as computers and telecommunications equipment, accounted for 23 per-
cent of China’s total exports (China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Tech-
nology, 2006). This reflects overall trends in China’s innovation system char-
acterized by easy access to foreign technology, while remaining weak in local 
innovation.
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In 1988, the so-called Torch program was launched to encourage the establish-
ment of new technology enterprises as spin-offs from existing R&D institutes 
and universities. New and high-technology industry development zones were 
created that became incubation bases for start-ups (Gu and Lundvall, 2006). 
These zones were introduced at national and lower levels. On the national level, 
more than 50 high-tech zones have been set up in major cities since 1992. Provin-
cial and other lower-level governments imitated the national level practices and 
set up their own development zones.
While China is not yet a technological superstate by any means, it is focusing 
more and more on R&D activities by giving priority to, for instance, integrated 
circuits and biotechnology. China also granted multinational firms special ad-
vantages if they decided to establish high-tech subsidiaries and R&D centers in 
China in order to promote the transfer of technology. Some 750 foreign-affiliate 
R&D centers had been established by the end of 2005 (Sun et al., 2007).
Following Deng Xiaoping’s grand tour of the Southern provinces in 1992, the 
central government adjusted its economic policy in order to speed up economic 
reform and to further open the economy. It announced the adoption of the social-
ist market economy strategy and began to create a legal framework to standard-
ize market operations. In addition, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
and the lowering of tariff duties on imports were important measures in further 
liberalizing the Chinese economy and setting the stage for high economic growth 
rates and a favorable business environment (Chen et al., 1995).
These policy changes towards a more market-oriented economy also permit-
ted foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) to increasingly sell their products in the 
domestic market. In 1995, more than 60 percent of the one trillion RMB sales 
from FIEs were sold on the local market. This represented a 15 percent share of 
China ’s market for domestically produced manufactured products. Sales of FIEs 
were concentrated in transport equipment, electronics and telecommunication 
equipment, food processing, electrical machinery and equipment, textiles, and 
chemicals. Together these six industries accounted for more than half of the FIEs’ 
total domestic sales. However, operations by foreign investors in sectors such as 
retailing, trading, transport, finance and banking (Hirano, 1993) were still limited 
to certain specific activities and locations. In fact, liberalization of the service sec-
tor was still conditional, restrictive and incomplete. China’s accession to WTO in 
2001 has done much to speed up this process, however.
Since it acceded to the WTO , China has further relaxed various restrictions 
and regulations governing FDI and MNE operations (Pingyao, 2002). Industries 
that were restricted to local firms have either been gradually opened up, or the 
pace of liberalization has been accelerated by the implementation of the country’s 
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WTO commitments. Restrictions on foreign ownership and geographical areas 
in which foreign enterprises can provide services have been loosened (OECD , 
2000). Foreign equity restrictions were relaxed further to allow fully owned oper-
ations by foreign investors in selected services that were still subject to ownership 
restrictions. By 2006, most service industries were partially opened, as foreseen 
in China’s WTO commitments. However, according to the EU and especially the 
US, the Chinese government is dragging its feet in its commitments, leading to 
some trade disputes, which are fuelled by the increasing trade surplus of China 
with the EU and again, especially, the US.
Figure 2.3 Geographical distribution of China’s import and export (2000-2005)
Source: International Trade Centre
 Domestic eﬀ ects of China ’s open policy
While China ’s export-driven policy has contributed to its record economic 
growth figures, it has resulted in some pretty detrimental economic, social and 
environmental effects. First, the incremental nature of reforms has led to eco-
nomic divides between coastal and interior provinces but especially urban and 
rural areas. The income gap has widened dramatically and is rapidly approaching 
socially dangerous levels. For instance, the rural-urban income divide is stagger-
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ing – the average annual income of urban residents in China is well over RMB 
10,000, which is more than three times that of their rural counterparts. East-
ern provinces along the coast outperform the national average by almost 14,000 
RMB, as the other regions are all significantly less well off.
Figure 2.4 Geographical comparison of per capita income of rural and urban households 
(2005)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
China ’s countryside counted over 25 million people living in absolute poverty, 
50 million with low income and over 22 million urban residents covered by sub-
sistence allowances in 2005 (People’s Daily, 2005). International statistics on 
poverty estimates in China have recently been updated on the basis of new data 
on prices. Instead of the World Bank estimates of 64 percent of the population 
below the dollar-a-day poverty line, the number at the start of transition was 
more likely to be higher than 75 percent. China has made enormous strides in 
lifting its population out of poverty. Yet, the task was perhaps more gargantuan 
than most people thought. Although the updated data indicate that 59 percent 
of the population has been lifted out of poverty, current estimates imply a two-
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fold increase in the poverty headcount from 100 to 200 million people (World 
Bank, 2008a).
In spite of its, admittedly increasingly leaky, one-child policy, an additional ten 
million people have to be fed every year. However, in the last decade, more than 
20 percent of arable land was diverted to non-agricultural uses, chiefly highways, 
industries and development zones. Moreover, the opening of so many develop-
ment zones inevitably implied that local officials would compete against each 
other to attract foreign investors and offer competing packages of preferential 
policies. According to incomplete statistics from the Ministry of Land and Re-
sources, 70 percent among the 6,866 development zones across the country were 
found to have illegally acquired land or were left unused (China Daily, 2004). 
China subsequently decided to rationalize this proliferation of so-called zones 
that did not offer sufficient infrastructure and had only resulted in forced dis-
placement of large groups of farmers, often by corrupt officials. More than 4,800 
so-called development zones were cancelled, either by suspending the establish-
ment of new zones or quashing already built ones.
As more arable land is taken over for urbanization and industrialization, is-
sues related to changes in land use have become a major source of dispute between 
the public and the government. Protests against land acquisition and deprivation 
have become a common feature of rural life in China . Social instability has be-
come an issue of serious concern. The government has reported 74,000 mass inci-
dents, or demonstrations and riots in the countryside in 2004, compared to only 
10,000 ten years ago. Excessive and arbitrary taxation was the peasants’ foremost 
complaint a few years ago. Resentment over the loss of farmland, corruption, 
worsening pollution and arbitrary evictions by property developers are the main 
reasons for unrest more recently (Goswami, 2007). For instance, although the 
 Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 were assumed to bring substantial improve-
ments to human rights, China’s leadership has not done much to accommodate 
Chinese workers and citizens. Adding insult to injury, the Olympic Games them-
selves have led to forced evictions, resettlements, and the like. Economic progress 
seems to take priority over political, environmental and social progress.
Chinese statistics indicate that there are almost 500 million rural workers. 
Although more than 300 million farmers are still engaged in agricultural pro-
duction, their number and share have dropped in favor of employment in indus-
try, construction, services and trade. According to the Rural Research Network 
in China , there are currently about 200 million surplus rural laborers, most of 
which are migrant workers in Chinese cities. About one in three of these surplus 
rural workers are landless peasants. Estimates put the number of landless peas-
ants at 60 million by 2010 (Lu, 2007).
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Figure 2.5 Population distribution in rural China in millions (2000-2004)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
The mindless pursuit of growth has also seriously impacted the environment. 
Environmental degradation has imposed serious costs on the Chinese econ-
omy and reduced the well-being of the Chinese population. Environmental 
problems are the cause of some 100,000 people dying each year (Naughton, 
2007). Estimates of the environmental degradation in China vary from about 5 
to 18 percent of its GDP (US Embassy, 2000). Despite a tremendous improve-
ment in its energy efficiency since opening up, China is a significant contribu-
tor to the problem of global warming. China is the second-largest source of 
greenhouse gases, after the US, and its carbon emissions are growing rapidly 
(World Bank , 2007). In an effort to cut down on air pollution and also mining 
accidents, the central government has closed thousands of coal mines. Coal 
nonetheless remains the main source of fuel for China’s economic engine (see 
Figure 2.6).
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Figure 2.6 China’s energy production
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
To diversify its energy sources, China tried its hand at developing national oil and 
gas fields. Joint exploration projects were an important aspect of initial inflows 
of FDI into China. To this day, however, the Maoist industrial role model of 
Daqing remains the largest field and production site of oil in China. China has 
subsequently built up relationships with oil-exporting countries for the import of 
oil, and also tried to set up and acquire energy companies abroad. For example, in 
2002, China’s state-owned company CNOOC successfully acquired the Indone-
sian assets of Repsol, a Spanish energy company. Similarly, Petrochina, a subsidi-
ary of CNPC, bought the Indonesian oil and gas assets of US-based Devon En-
ergy Corporation. And in 2005, CNPC itself acquired the North Buzachi oilﬁ eld 
in Kazakhstan through its purchase of the Canada-based PetroKazakhstan. Even 
mergers such as the unsuccessful attempt by CNOOC to buy Unocal – the eighth 
largest oil company in the US with extensive oil and gas assets in Asia, reﬂ ect the 
increasing frequency with which Chinese companies are turning to acquisitions to 
penetrate global markets and achieve global scale (UNCTAD, 2007).
The predominance of deals in the energy sector does not mean that other in-
dustries have not become increasingly international as well. The Chinese govern-
ment has aggressively created national champions through domestic consolida-
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tions that are quickly becoming strong enough to compete globally. The Chinese 
government’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), charged with restructuring China ’s most important state-owned com-
panies, is overseeing some 170 companies with combined revenues in excess of 
500 billion US$. SASAC’s portfolio includes leading companies in major indus-
tries such as telecommunications, energy, automobiles, and steel. This new gen-
eration of Chinese firms wants to break out of the Chinese home market, and has 
found many a Western multinational company willing to shed underperforming 
business units, of which Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s personal computer divi-
sion is best known (BCG, 2006).
Figure 2.7 Geographical distribution of outward direct investment from China, in 
particular in Africa
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
Note: Data for Hong Kong and tax havens has not been taken into account
Similarly to inward FDI , most of China ’s outbound FDI goes to Hong Kong. 
When abstracting from Hong Kong and Caribbean tax havens’ role as a conduit, 
an analysis of China’s outbound investment flows reveals that Asia is the pre-
ferred region of destination. Unlike global patterns of investment flows, Africa 
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has become a surprisingly attractive destination for Chinese multinationals, on 
an equal footing with Europe and the US. Most of the investment has gone to 
Sudan and to a lesser extent to South Africa and Nigeria, where the energy sector 
again rears its “ugly” head.
 Out of Africa
The first Chinese encounters with the African continent date back to the fif-
teenth century, when the Chinese Hui-ethnic, Muslim-faith admiral Zheng He 
made seven expeditions to Asia and Africa, as far as Malindi in what is now 
Kenya . Throughout his travels, Zheng He liberally gave Chinese gifts of silk, por-
celain, and other goods. In return, he received unusual presents from his hosts, 
including African zebras and giraffes that ended their days in the Ming imperial 
zoo in Beijing .
It wasn’t until the Bandung Conference in 1955 that China reconnected with 
Africa. This crucial period for African independence provided fertile ground for 
China’s political agenda. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, China profiled 
itself as a leader of the Third World. During the 1960s and 1970s China support-
ed its infant Sino-African relations by providing medical aid, technical expertise 
and political support in multilateral organizations. The Chinese also built enor-
mous infrastructural projects, such as railways, roads, hospitals, and stadiums in 
African countries such as Tanzania and Rwanda.
Throughout the 1980s, when the cold war nations were pulling out of Africa 
and Western development aid halved, China kept up its contacts (Servant, 2005). 
Once China re-entered into the world economy, a different approach to Africa 
was needed. Consequently the Sino-African relationships moved from an ideo-
logical and political approach to a more pragmatic and economic stance, fostering 
external trade and foreign investment. China had turned itself into the workshop 
of the world and set its eye on Africa’s raw materials.
The economic importance of Africa for China is twofold. On the one hand, 
Africa possesses substantial deposits of raw materials and oil that China desper-
ately needs to fuel its tremendous economic growth. On the other hand, Africa 
represents unexplored market possibilities for Chinese manufactured goods. On 
the whole, Africa boasts a trade surplus with China, although there are enormous 
differences among African countries. Some have a positive trade balance due to 
the export of their raw material deposits, while many of the other countries suffer 
from an influx of cheap consumer products from China.
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Figure 2.8 China’s trade with African countries
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
Note:  Both axes are on a logarithmic scale. Countries above the line have a trade surplus, while 
countries below the line have a trade defi cit. The size of the bubbles indicates the size of 
the trade balance.
African countries also import strategically important goods such as arms. Selling 
arms to African countries helps China strengthen its relationships with African 
leaders and helps offset the costs of buying oil from them. In return, China gains 
African allies in the United Nations for its political goals, including prevent-
ing Taiwanese independence and diverting attention from its own human rights 
record. The Chinese believe that human rights are relative, and that each country 
should be allowed their own definition and timetable for reaching them. Besides, 
China’s not unique in cutting deals with bad governments and providing them 
with arms (Pan, 2007).
Besides its economic and commercial offensive in Africa, China has engaged in 
intense diplomatic activity. Since late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s three visits 
to Africa in the 1960s, there have been over 800 exchanges of visits between sen-
ior Chinese and African leaders. Since the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) was established in 2000, economic and trade cooperation between 
China and Africa has entered a new era of increased interaction. FOCAC laid the 
foundation for economic cooperation between Chinese and African governments 
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and companies. The Forum acts as a go-between for ministers, diplomats and 
businessmen. The action plan of FOCAC covers areas such as African exports of 
agricultural products to China, the participation of Chinese companies in infra-
structural works in Africa, the reduction of trade tariffs on raw materials, and the 
investment of Chinese firms in the African continent. The Chinese government 
called 2006 the Year of Africa and hosted the annual meeting of the African De-
velopment Bank in China in 2007. 
China ’s strategic partnership with Africa was consolidated during the FOCAC 
top conference in November of 2006. This strategic alliance between China and 
Africa is based upon the principles of equality and mutual benefit, and focuses on 
harmonious development and cooperation in economic, political, cultural, and fi-
nancial domains. It was agreed to increase the volume of trade, which had already 
grown tenfold between 1995 and 2005 to approximately 40 billion US$, to 100 
billion US$ by 2010.
Furthermore, it was decided that a China -Africa Development Fund be set 
up to assist Chinese companies to invest in Africa. Chinese direct investment in 
Africa has grown during the last fifteen years to almost one billion US$ a year. 
Beijing also signed trade and investment agreements, worth about two billion 
US$, concerning raw materials, textiles, banking, communication and technology. 
Although much of what China has done in Africa qualifies under aid-for-trade, 
flows are increasingly put on a commercial footing instead of operated as pure 
aid channels. Also non-state Chinese firms play an increasingly important role 
(Wang, 2007).
By 2007, there were more than 800 mainland Chinese companies operating in 
Africa; some 700 of these were run by private individuals and the rest were medi-
um to large state-owned ﬁ rms. Although Chinese investments in natural resources 
have gained more attention, manufacturing ﬁ rms are an important part of this in-
vestment (Brautigam, 2007). Chinese companies see Africa as an excellent market 
for their low-cost consumer goods, such as shoes or electronics. Some textile man-
ufacturers, for example, are reportedly investing in African factories as a way to 
get around US and European quotas on Chinese textiles (Pan, 2007). China also 
intended to establish several special industrial zones in Africa. For instance, the 
Zambia -China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone was set up to boost the 
development of Zambia’s light industry and the sectors of construction materials, 
home electrical appliances, pharmacy, and food processing, and also to increase the 
country’s exports and create job opportunities for locals. Th ese state-sponsored 
zones will join other industrial parks established by Chinese provinces and private 
companies in South Africa , Sierra Leone, and other countries (Brautigam, 2007).
The Chinese state-owned companies involved in Africa have invested not only 
in booming sectors such as mining, fishing, precious woods and telecommuni-
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cations, but also in activities that the West has neglected, even abandoned, as 
not sufficiently profitable. In 2004 Chinese investments represented almost one 
billion US$ of the fifteen billion US$ of foreign direct investment in Africa. In 
Ethiopia , China is involved in telecommunications; in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo it has done work for Gecamines, the state-owned mining company; in 
Kenya it has repaired the road linking Mombasa and Nairobi; and it has launched 
Nigeria’s first space satellite. As an incentive to Chinese nationals, eight African 
countries have been officially designated tourist destinations (Servant, 2005).
 Conclusion
Over the past few decades, few developments in the world economy have been 
more important and influential than the sudden change of China ’s policy to open 
up to the rest of the world. China’s economic progress during the reform era 
that began in 1978 has been one of the great economic success stories of the last 
three decades. Starting from an almost completely isolated economy in the mid-
1970s, China has gradually and systematically liberalized its international trade 
and investment policies. Since it launched the economic reforms and called for 
foreign capital participation in its economic development, China has received an 
extremely large part of the international direct investment flows. While FDI in 
China experienced rapid growth, its expansion has been subject to certain fluc-
tuations. At particular times Chinese policy-makers have used a system of carrots 
and sticks to entice and curtail foreign direct investment by gradually adapting 
and changing the conditions for particular modes of entry, sectors and regions. 
Yet, the overall trend was one of continued liberalization.
Since the early 1990s, actual FDI inflows into China have averaged more than 
50 billion US$ per annum. Although a large number of countries have made in-
vestments in China, the primary sources of FDI have been highly concentrated 
among a small number of investor countries (Chen, 1997a). The largest propor-
tion of the FDI received by China does not come from the so-called Triad econo-
mies, namely the US, Japan and EU countries, but from “Chinese” in Hong Kong 
and other Asian countries. And although the authorities succeeded mainly in at-
tracting overseas Chinese business to the mainland, investors from the Triad have 
gained some ground over the years.
Foreign, and especially Western-invested firms have performed relatively well 
in China (Van den Bulcke et al., 2002). These good results for Western multina-
tionals are based on their strong presence in most of the high-tech and capital-
intensive industries, such as pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and the au-
tomotive sector; their rapid penetration into consumer markets by establishing 
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joint ventures with but also taking over existing Chinese companies, especially in 
sectors such as food, detergents and consumer electronics; their growing access 
to service sectors, such as business consulting, finance and insurance, and retail-
ing; and their high export orientation and increasing integration of the Chinese 
subsidiaries in the regional Asian and global economy. In contrast to Western 
subsidiaries, overseas Chinese investors from the Asian newly industrializing 
economies, especially from Taiwan and Hong Kong, have relocated (part or even 
all of ) their export-processing activities to China in order to benefit from the 
supply of unskilled and cheap manpower in labor-intensive and export-oriented 
activities, such as textiles (Van den Bulcke and Zhang, 1998).
Foreign affiliates accounted for less than 5 percent of total Chinese exports 
in 1985, while their share jumped to 60 per cent in 2005. In 1985, exports of pri-
mary products represented half of all exports, while in 2005 their share had re-
ceded to less than 10 percent and that of manufacturers went up to more than 90 
percent. This surge was even more remarkable in technology-intensive products. 
The share of high-technology industries in total trade increased strongly over the 
years, inducing a rapid industrial upgrading of the country.
China ’s performance is all the more remarkable in that its reforms have been 
gradual and its development has occurred despite extensive, though declining, 
state ownership and intervention in the economy. Contrary to many other tran-
sition economies, China did not opt for quick privatization of its state-owned 
companies, but followed the gradual approach of stimulating the development of 
private enterprises, including foreign-invested ones. This gradual approach was 
also typical for the way in which the liberalization process and the development 
zones spread out over the country. After having launched its SEZs in the coastal 
area, the Chinese government set up smaller and more focused economic and 
technological development zones, first in coastal provinces and later on more in 
the inland and in the western region. Not only were more zones being estab-
lished, there was also a proliferation in the type of zones.
The proliferation of the zones in China resembled international locational 
tournaments, where zones in different countries are competing against each other 
and the only winners are the companies which succeeded in obtaining extra ad-
vantages from such bidding up among potential locations. Although most Chi-
nese administrators understand that such competition has sometimes gone too 
far, the decentralized system of state, provincial, municipal and local industrial 
zones is not making life any easier for them. The decision by the national govern-
ment to cut the number of zones dramatically to avoid inefficient and costly use 
of land and infrastructural investment is therefore understandable.
While the establishment of special economic zones at the beginning of China ’s 
open door policy was a careful attempt to open China’s door to the outside world 
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and abandon its isolationist policy, the Chinese leadership today is undoubtedly 
very proud of these achievements. Almost thirty years after the establishment of 
the first four SEZs, however, development zones represent not only the good, but 
also the bad and the ugly in China. Shenzhen, for instance, has transformed itself 
from a rice paddy to a hotspot in the global economy. It has, in the process, also 
become a global environmental hotspot, suffering rapid environmental degrada-
tion. It has, like most Chinese cities, also attracted millions of migrant workers 
that have virtually no rights. The new labor law, which makes a labor contract 
compulsory for all workers in China, will hopefully bring some improvement to 
their dire situation.
In the countryside, agricultural laborers still represent the majority of work-
ers, albeit less and less so. Some 200 million workers have fled to the cities in 
search of a better life, some of whom are landless peasants. Estimates put the 
number of landless peasants at 60 million by 2010. After almost three decades of 
unprecedented growth, the number of people earning below one dollar a day has 
fallen dramatically. Using the Chinese government’s figures, the number in pov-
erty went down to 42 million by the turn of the millennium. However, as a gauge 
of a household’s standard of living, consumption is often a more telling indicator. 
Using that measure, well over 200 million Chinese still live on less than one US$ 
a day, often without access to clean water, arable land, or adequate health and 
education services (World Bank , 2008b; Shimada, 2005).
China has also become an outward investor, both as a market seeker and a 
resource seeker. Especially since the turn of the millennium, Africa has received 
much attention from Chinese state-owned firms in search of natural resources 
through the promotion of the government-induced “go-global” policy. In its search 
for sources of fuel for its growing engine of production, China has targeted Africa 
for its raw materials. China’s booming economy, which has averaged almost ten 
percent growth per year for the last two decades, requires massive levels of natu-
ral resources to sustain its growth. China seems to have adopted an aid-for-trade 
strategy that has resulted in increasing supplies of oil and other raw materials 
from African countries. China’s demand for energy to feed its booming economy 
has led it to seek supplies from African countries including Sudan, which has led 
to severe international scrutiny due to its suspected role in the Darfur genocide. 
China mainly imports materials from Africa to fuel its economy, such as oil, gas, 
minerals, and wood. Although trade between Africa and China is limited, at least 
for China, China’s import from Africa is important strategically.
As more African countries open their economies to foreign investment, Chi-
nese companies seem to drive a hard bargain. There are concerns over how China 
operates in Africa, attaching no conditions to aid, paying bribes, underbidding 
local firms and not hiring Africans. It undermines local efforts to increase trans-
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parency and good governance and international efforts at macroeconomic reform 
by institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Pan, 
2007). The Washington consensus could well be supplanted by the so-called Bei-
jing consensus. However, the (rail)roads, bridges, dams, and schools built by Chi-
nese companies are low cost and completed in a fraction of the time such projects 
usually take in Africa (Servant, 2005). The Chinese have also set up several “com-
fort” zones to develop local industrial infrastructure and help Chinese firms in-
vest in Africa. The infrastructural improvements could help African countries 
secure other loans and investment opportunities. Also everyday life is changing 
for millions of Africans. Cheap Chinese imports mean that – for the first time 
ever – they can afford new clothes, shoes or radios (Alden, 2007). It seems that 
the Chinese presence in Africa is contributing to an atmosphere of development, 
similar to the one which transformed China some three decades ago. This trans-
formation is a welcome, even if unintended result of China’s presence in Africa to 
secure raw materials as well as its search for new markets.
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Part II
Instruments

3 Chinese aid to Africa, origins, forms and issues
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 Introduction
China has been one of the engines of the world economy since the beginning 
of the present decade. Its appetite for raw materials has driven up commodity 
prices and thus helped to boost growth in Africa (Goldstein et al., 2006; Broad-
man, 2006, 2008). Trade between China and Africa increased seven-fold between 
2000 and 2007, from ten billion US$ to 70 billion US$, making China the leading 
supplier of the African continent and its second-largest trading partner after the 
United States. This spectacular growth has halted the marginalization of Africa 
in world trade that began in 1980. Africa is of course only a modest trading partner 
for China, but it does have a larger share in China’s external trade (3.5 percent)1 
than in world trade. Although trade between China and Africa comes under the 
heading of South-South trade, in structure it is closer to a North-South pattern 
of trade as China imports natural resources (oil and ores) and exports manufac-
tured products. As the trade surpluses of the oil-exporting countries (Guinea, 
Angola , Nigeria, Sudan) are greater than the deficits of the 41 non oil-exporting 
countries (according to Chinese sources), Chinese-African trade has generated a 
surplus for Africa up to 2006. In 2007, while prices of natural resources’ surged, 
China ran a surplus in its trade with Africa.
Chinese firms have an increasingly strong presence in Africa. They have gone 
international only recently (Accenture, 2005), and according to Chinese statistics, 
Hong Kong is currently the destination for two-thirds of their foreign invest-
ment, far ahead of the Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands (20 percent). Chinese 
firms often use these destinations as investment bridges. This statistical bias can 
be circumvented by monitoring the international business activity of large Chi-
nese companies (OCO Consulting, 2006) or by using host-country data. The 
stock of Chinese investment in Africa has been estimated at 1.6 billion US$ as 
at year-end 2005 (according to UNCTAD, 2007), which amounts to ten percent 
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of total foreign investment in Africa. Around 800 Chinese firms are in Africa, a 
number close to that of US firms in South Africa . They are primarily present in 
the oil and mining sectors, as well as textiles, household appliances, bicycle as-
sembly, electronics and telecommunications.2 State-owned enterprises were the 
first to move into Africa, and they have been followed by private firms as well as 
by small ventures. Chinese investment is diversifying into services: in October 
2007, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) invested five billion 
US$ to buy 20 percent of Standard Bank, the largest South African bank with 
subsidiaries in eighteen African countries.
If little is known about the geographical distribution of China ’s FDI , that of 
its Official Development Aid (ODA) remains wholly obscure: China provides 
no statistics on its aid, simply issuing press releases after ministerial visits and 
conferences. These announcements suggest that China is already a substantial 
provider of aid to Africa. At the occasion of the third China-Africa Cooperation 
Forum that was preceded by the first summit meeting, which brought 43 African 
heads of state to Beijing , the Chinese government announced that its aid to Af-
rica would double between 2006 and 2009, via an increase in soft loans and many 
social projects. However, although it stressed the growth of its commitment to 
Africa, the government did not provide any data on the actual amount of its aid 
in 2006.
Apart from these announcements, it is difficult to obtain hard information on 
China ’s aid to Africa. One of the aims of this chapter, which starts with a histori-
cal review of Chinese aid from its beginnings in the late 1950s, is to circumvent 
the lack of robust data and provide an estimation of Chinese aid to Africa. It de-
scribes the Chinese institutions involved and the forms in which they deliver aid. 
After an analysis of the geographical distribution of aid, the chapter discusses the 
main issues related to Chinese aid to Africa, its evolution in the context of the 
world recession and its possibilities of either convergence or divergence with aid 
provided by OECD donors.
 A historical view of Chinese aid to Africa
The OECD countries have held a monopoly position in ODA since the 1960s. 
This position has been shaken by the appearance of new aid organizations in 
both the North (the NGOs and private foundations such as Bill Gates) and the 
South. In the 1970s, several Middle Eastern countries entered the donors club, 
and thirty years later, the OECD created the category of “emerging donors”. This 
category comprises a number of countries – South Africa , Brazil, the CIS coun-
tries, China , Korea, India, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey – that, with the excep-
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tion of Korea, receive international aid while at the same time providing devel-
opment aid to other countries. Within this group, not only is China by far the 
largest donor but it also stands apart from the others in two respects: the amount 
of aid it continues to receive and its long experience as a donor.
Figure 3.1 ODA to China and Africa in 
2003-2005 (in millions of US$ 
and % of GDP)
Figure 3.2 Number of cooperation 
agreements signed between 
China and African countries
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee (2006) Source: Bräutigam (1998)
China still receives considerable aid, 1.7 billion US$ annually on average (2000-
2006). This amount is comparable to that received by several large African coun-
tries such as Sudan, Congo , Mozambique and Tanzania (Figure 3.1). Though large 
in absolute value, this aid makes only a very small contribution (0.1 percent of 
GDP) to the Chinese economy. China has traditionally been reticent with regard 
to aid, as it suffered considerably from the withdrawal of Soviet advisors after the 
Sino-Soviet split. Japan provides half of all aid to China (Takamine, 2006), but 
its aid will come to an end in 2008 whereas that of the World Bank will continue. 
Other significant donors include Germany and France. Western donors are eager 
to provide concessional loans to China in order to enhance their influence.
Where China is concerned, the term “emerging donor” is not appropriate as 
Chinese ODA dates from the 1950s. After a first experience with Cambodia, 
China signed an agreement with Egypt in 1956 at the onset of the Suez canal 
crisis3 and later on with Algeria. Four years later, Beijing inaugurated its first 
embassy south of the Sahara and offered assistance to Guinea under President 
Sékou Touré and to Ghana under N’Krumah. In 1964 and 1965, during two dip-
lomatic rounds that took him to ten African countries4, Premier Zhou Enlai 
made a speech in Accra that laid the foundations for Chinese aid by setting forth 
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the “eight principles”: equality between partners, mutual benefit, respect for sov-
ereignty, the use of grants or zero-interest loans and easy rescheduling, emphasis 
on building the self-reliance of the beneficiary and respect for obligations. Finally, 
the experts dispatched by China to help in construction in the recipient countries 
will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. They 
are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities. Al-
though these principles still govern China’s aid policy, their interpretation has 
changed over time.
Figure 3.3 GDP per capita of China and Sub-Saharan Africa (at purchasing power parity) 
1960-2005
Source: CHELEM database, Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales
In the 1960s and 1970s, per capita income in China , on a purchasing power parity 
basis (Figure 3.3)5, was well below that of Sub-Saharan Africa. During this pe-
riod, aid was the main tool of Chinese diplomacy, which used its “soft power” in 
its rivalry with Taiwan for representation on the UN Security Council and with 
the Soviet Union over the legitimacy of its ideological positions. While China’s 
engagement in Africa stressed political objectives, one should not forget that it 
did have an economic component (Kwesi Kwaa Prah, 2007). In the sixties, total 
Chinese exports were small (half of African exports) and as China was adamant 
to run into debt, it tried to compensate its trade deficit with Western countries by 
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running a surplus on developing countries. Larkin (1971) wrote that the opening 
of diplomatic relations with Egypt (1959) was rapidly followed by the establish-
ment of a commercial office in Cairo in order to look at the opportunities of the 
promising Egyptian market. China’s aid continued during the turbulent years of 
the Cultural Revolution and was stepped up in the 1970s. In 1975, China had 
more programs in Africa than did the United States. The culminating point was 
reached in 1976, with the completion of the railway link between Zambia and 
Tanzania to transport Zambian copper to Dar Es Salaam. The building of this 
very large-scale project6 employed 15,000 Chinese workers and it has made China 
one of the main donors to Africa. At the time, China’s aid to Africa was larger 
than its trade with Africa.
After 1978, the Four Modernizations that shook the Chinese economy did not 
leave aid policy untouched. The government gave priority to modernizing China , 
and hence the number of projects in Africa decreased, with greater attention be-
ing paid to feasibility. Beijing requested more participation by African countries, 
and as a result the latter were obliged to pay the Chinese doctors. These changes 
were explained by Zhao Ziyang during a visit to Africa in 1982. He set forth 
“four principles” that indicated a slight modification of Zhou Enlai’s position and 
gave more weight to mutual benefit.7 Although several African countries were 
resuming relations with Taiwan at the time, political considerations were sub-
ordinated to economic considerations. The attitude of the Chinese towards Af-
rica had changed, as the Chinese discovered the opportunities created by market 
opening (a result of structural adjustment programs) and realized that Africa was 
an outlet for their consumer goods. This change of course was helped along by 
the introduction of concessional loans in 1995. After the visit of President Jiang 
Zemin (1996), the Chinese government decided to help Chinese firms establish 
themselves in Africa.
China ’s involvement in Africa increased from the year 2000 with the organiza-
tion of the ﬁ rst China-Africa Forum and the creation of a development fund to 
ﬁ nance vocational training, as well as the China-Africa Joint Business Council. 
On this occasion, China announced the cancellation of 1.2 billion US$ of debt. 
Th e second forum was held in Addis Abeba in 2003. In January 2006, the Chinese 
government published a white paper on China’s Africa policy that emphasized the 
need for a win-win attitude in development cooperation. Th e holding of the third 
forum coincided with the summit of heads of state in October 2006, where China 
announced the doubling of its aid between 2006 and 2009, the creation of a ﬁ ve 
billion US$ fund comprising three billion US$ in soft loans and two billion US$ 
in commercial loans, the cancellation of 1.4 billion US$ in debt, the construction 
of 30 hospitals and training for 15,000 Africans. In addition, it announced the 
construction of several manufacturing free zones for Chinese investors.
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 Chinese aid institutions and instruments
China refuses the label of “donor,” considering its aid rather as mutual assistance 
between Southern countries. China presents itself as the largest developing coun-
try, while Africa is the continent that contains the greatest number of developing 
countries. Its solidarity with Africa is based on a shared feeling of humiliation 
at the hands of the Western powers, which carved up the Chinese empire in the 
nineteenth century, and of Japan, which occupied China in the twentieth. On the 
strength of this common experience, China considers that it can empathize more 
readily with African aspirations than Western countries can.
While Europe perceives Chinese presence in Africa as a new phenomenon, 
Chinese insist on their anteriority and they are fond of recalling the contacts 
made in the early fifteenth century by Admiral Zheng He, thirty years before 
the Portuguese came to East Africa. In addition to their political and histori-
cal legitimacy, the Chinese can point to their economic success: between 1978 
and 2007, economic growth increased per capita income by a factor of seven and 
reduced the number of people living on less than a dollar a day by 500 million.8 
This spectacular performance cannot be attributed to the “money doctors.” Chi-
nese authorities did not follow the advice of international organizations as they 
adopted “heterodox” strategies. China learned from the economic experience of 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan as well as the political experience of Singapore which 
proved since 1965 that economic openness can co-exist with a single-party system.
China still faces development problems despite its spectacular growth. These 
problems are particularly acute in the western provinces. Since China itself is still 
an ODA beneficiary, it is more sensitive to the expectations of African countries 
than Western donors are.
China ’s development aid was placed under the authority of the State Council 
and was initially administered by the Ministry of External Economic Relations, 
whose minister sometimes held the post of Vice-Premier. In 1982, this ministry 
was folded into the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and aid management 
was assigned to a division of MOFCOM. Each year the Ministry of Finance is in-
structed to allocate funds to foreign aid that will be disbursed as grants (in kind), 
interest subsidies for interest-free loans or soft loans. A unit from MOFCOM 
prepares for bilateral negotiations, administers aid, draws up plans for receiving 
countries and analyzes projects; it is represented in embassies by the economic 
advisor. MOFCOM is not the only public institution involved. All of the techni-
cal ministries have development aid departments, making some 30 separate bod-
ies. There are also the provinces: the Chinese government is highly decentral-
ized, and some provinces – particularly the coastal provinces – have sufficient 
resources to open offices abroad (several have done so in South Africa ). Following 
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various interviews with government officials and think tanks on the subject, Mar-
tin Davies (2008) concludes that Chinese aid spending is quite disorganized and 
lacks effective coordination.
Established in 1994, the Exim Bank has assets comparable to those of the US 
Ex-Im Bank as it manages both commercial loans and soft loans. Other banks 
involved in Chinese overseas aid include the China Construction Bank, which 
manages the five billion US$ investment fund for Africa, and the People’s Bank 
of China, which is in charge of China’s participation in multilateral institutions. 
China participates in the Bretton Woods institutions and the African Devel-
opment Bank (AfDB); the annual meeting of the AfDB was held in Shanghai 
in May 2007. It has also taken equity interests in two regional African banks 
(those for West Africa and Central Africa) and in the African Development Bank 
(AfDB). Although it is taking a more active role in these bodies, China has a 
preference for bilateral aid.
Since the Beijing summit, the foreign affairs ministry has been tasked with 
monitoring commitments in Africa. These commitments are very difficult to co-
ordinate because of the number of institutions involved. China ’s ODA system 
may be headed for change. The government is planning a reform that should lead 
to the establishment of a national development aid agency. This body would be 
placed under the supervision of one or more ministries that are apt to have diver-
gent goals: for example, the trade ministry wants support for exports, while the 
foreign affairs ministry is sensitive about China’s image in the world.
Until 1995, China provided aid only in the form of grants – made in kind in 
the case of health and education projects – and no-interest loans for construction 
work. Since that year, it has added loans at concessional rates. The weight of no-
interest loans and concessional aid has led China to carry out regular remissions 
of debt.9
Aid is delivered with hardly any financial transfer to the recipient country. The 
African government submits a request to the Exim Bank, and after an evaluation 
by MOFCOM, the governments sign a framework agreement. When the projects 
provided for in the agreement have been completed, the Chinese firms present 
their invoices to the project owner, which passes them on, via its government, to 
the Exim Bank for payment. The African government’s payments of interest and 
principal are made to the Exim Bank. These financing procedures limit corrup-
tion problems. Exim Bank has also innovated by proposing an infrastructure de-
velopment finance package (“the Angola Mode”). In such a package, the Chinese 
government mandates a Chinese construction company to build infrastructure 
projects which are financed by Exim Bank. Simultaneously, the African govern-
ment offers a Chinese mining or oil company the right to mine natural resources 
(either by offering equity stakes in a national company or mining licenses). The 
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revenues of the mining operation will first reimburse the investment and later on 
the infrastructure-related loan. By implementing this scheme, Exim bank hedges 
the country sovereign risk.10
Whereas Western countries are turning towards program aid and budgetary 
supports,11 China finances projects only. Major projects such as the Tanzam rail-
way, large public building complexes and sports stadiums have long been the ex-
ceptions, as China has emphasized small projects such as introducing rice farm-
ing or horticulture and building bridges, roads and hospitals in rural areas. This 
situation could change with the announced increase in aid.
China also has provided technical assistance for health. According to the Chi-
nese Ministry of Health, by 2005, 15,000 Chinese health workers were active in 
Africa and these had attended to about 170 million patients in 47 African coun-
tries. In 2007, China pledged to build 30 anti-malaria centers in Africa by 2009 as 
part of a broader health sector training and cooperation scheme.
Chinese teachers are engaged in training African professionals in different 
fields and in 2006, China pledged to double their number from 7,000 to 15,000 
by 2009. In addition, China has pledged to double the number of scholarships 
offered to African students to 2,400 in 2009; it has also become more active cul-
turally through the creation of the Confucius Institutes.
 Th e scale and geographical structure of Chinese aid
Measuring development aid, be it Chinese or Western, has always been a delicate 
task. In donor meetings, each participant announces its commitment for the com-
ing year, and the sum of these commitments is made public at the conclusion of 
the meeting, giving an idea of the amount of support provided by the internation-
al community. The problem is that this sum is calculated by adding components 
that are not comparable, from either the donor or recipient standpoint. A 100 
million US$ grant has a budget cost of 100 million US$ for the donor, whereas a 
100 million US$ loan has a higher cost for the recipient – as it has to reimburse 
– and a lower cost, which varies with interest rates, the length of the grace period 
and the maturity.
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is responsible for 
checking whether the assistance offered by DAC member countries is properly 
classified as ODA. To be considered as ODA, aid must: i) come from an official 
institution; ii) benefit a developing country; iii) be intended to foster develop-
ment, and iv) include a minimum concessional element if it is not a grant. This 
“grant element” is measured by the difference between the face value of the loan 
and the discounted value (using a fixed rate of 10 percent) of the borrower’s re-
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payment flows (interest and principal); the ratio between this difference and the 
face value of the loan is the grant element. To qualify as ODA, a loan must have 
a grant element of at least 25 percent, which rises to 35 percent when the aid is 
tied to purchase of goods and services produced by the donor. A thirty-year loan 
of 100 million US$ at the concessional rate of 2.5 percent, with a ten-year grace 
period, contains a grant element of 60 percent.
 Estimates of the amount of Chinese aid
Although the “emerging donors” have not joined the DAC (even though some of 
them belong to the OECD ), they publish data – in many cases detailed data – on 
their aid. China , in contrast, provides no statistical data. China’s lack of a culture 
of transparency does not wholly account for this attitude, and other explanations 
may be put forward. First, the government faces a real problem: to centralize 
its aid statistics, it must overcome the resistance of a highly compartmentalized 
public administration as aid is given by different ministries as well as by provinces 
and cities.12 Second, if such statistics were published, the government may fear 
that they would provoke a domestic backlash against aid. Why should the Chi-
nese government provide aid to Mali instead of Anhui province?13 Not only are 
China’s western provinces poorer than the coastal provinces, but up to 2005 the 
central government made their situation worse by withdrawing from the social 
sectors and leaving the provinces to cover their own education and health spend-
ing. In a country where civil society is playing a more active role, the government 
might thus be reluctant to publish data on aid. Lastly, the Chinese government 
may wish to avoid publishing statistics that indicate the breakdown by benefi-
ciary country, as this would reveal inequality of treatment and raise questions 
from aid recipient countries.
In the absence of statistics, the only easily available information comes from 
the statements to the press that close official visits and summits. For example, 
at the third China -Africa summit in Beijing (October 2006), China promised 
that aid would double between 2006 and 2009, without specifying how much 
aid had been provided over the three previous years. These announcements are 
not accompanied by a disbursement schedule or any breakdown into grants, no-
interest loans, soft loans and commercial loans. In some cases the announced 
“package” comprises both loans and investment intentions. Given the lack of 
official statistics, a number of authors have attempted to evaluate the amount 
of China ’s aid:
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– Bräutigam (1998) estimates that China provided 4.9 billion US$ in aid to Af-
rica from 1957 to 1989. This amount is estimated to be equal to half of total 
Chinese aid over the period and a low percentage of OECD aid to Africa. 
According to Bräutigam (2007), bilateral project aid amounted to 1.6 billion 
US$ from 2000 to 2006, an amount that includes loans and grants as well 
as technical and medical assistance valued at one billion US$ (though worth 
much more in “volume” terms). Next in order of size are concessional loans (1.5 
billion US$) and debt cancellation.
– Kurlantzick (2006), working from African data, estimates Chinese aid to Af-
rica at 2.4 billion US$ in 2004 and considers that a substantial share of it was 
ODA as defined by the DAC.
– Working from central government budget data, Qi Guoqiang (2007), who is af-
ﬁ liated with the MOFCOM, ﬁ nds that aid to Africa rose from 300 million US$ 
a year in 1998 to nearly one billion US$ in 2007. Th is estimate, which focuses on 
the “cost to the state” of grants and loans, takes account of neither the provinces’ 
aid activities nor the subsidies granted to Exim Bank for its soft loans. Accord-
ing to one senior oﬃ  cial, quoted by Martin Davies (2008),it is estimated that 
approximately 4.5 billion US$ in aid had been disbursed in 2006.
Figure 3.4 Aid to Africa
Source: Jian Ye Wang (2007)
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In an IMF working paper, Jian Ye Wang (2007) finds that Chinese aid to Africa 
is greater than in most previous estimates. This evaluation seems the most cred-
ible (see below). Chinese aid could amount to 10 percent of total aid to Africa if 
debt relief, which accounts for half of European aid (Figure 3.4), is not taken into 
consideration.
Other estimates have attempted to determine the terms of Exim Bank loans, 
which are not published in either Chinese or English. By and large, Exim Bank 
finance export trade activities of Chinese firms in Africa.14 Hubbard (2007) iden-
tifies 87 projects financed by Exim Bank from 2002 to 2007 on terms that are 
judged to be concessional; twenty of these projects, representing a total of 500 
million US$ in loans, are in Africa. The maturity of such loans is ten to twenty 
years, the grace period three to seven years and the average interest rate 2.85 per-
cent. Examining an Exim Bank loan, Reisen and Ndoye (2007) show that it met 
ODA standards and contained a grant element of 40 percent.
 Th e geographical structure of aid
In contrast to the other “emerging donors”, China does not limit its aid to its 
neighbors. China has provided grant and interest-free loans as well as soft loans 
to North Korea, and South-east Asian countries (Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, 
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines), but the coverage of its aid is broader 
and Africa has always been one of its priorities.
China provides aid to 53 African countries, among which are countries that 
have not adhered to the “one China” principle. Which countries receive the most 
aid from China? The available statistics do not allow us to answer this question 
directly. MOFCOM publishes statistics on what it calls “international coopera-
tion”, which show a total of 21 billion US$ in 2004, of which ten billion US$ went 
to Asia, four billion US$ to Africa and 0.8 billion US$ to Latin America. Under 
the heading of international cooperation, MOFCOM aggregates all contracts – 
mostly construction and civil engineering contracts – obtained by Chinese firms 
in foreign countries, providing a breakdown into capital expenditure, wages paid 
to Chinese workers and consulting services. These statistics aggregate construc-
tion projects that are financed from very different sources and that, for the most 
part, do not constitute aid. Private financing is used when the work is performed 
by a Chinese company on behalf of a non-Chinese company;15 multilateral or 
bilateral financing is employed when a Chinese firm carries out a project for the 
World Bank , the African Development Bank or a bilateral donor; and there is 
Chinese financing as well, in the form of either aid or loans from the Exim Bank. 
These statistics therefore cannot be used as such. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
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get round this difficulty by working with the data published for each of the Afri-
can countries by the international development banks. These data specify the na-
tional origin of the companies carrying out the projects, which makes it possible 
to measure the value of projects conducted by Chinese enterprises using multilat-
eral financing (Chaponnière, 2007) for individual African countries. The results 
show that 25 percent of the African Development Bank’s projects (in 2005/2006) 
and 15 percent of the World Bank’s projects in Africa were carried out by Chinese 
firms. When the value of projects financed by multilateral bodies is subtracted 
from total international cooperation as measured by MOFCOM, we obtain the 
amount representing projects financed by Chinese loans plus private projects.
Although we have no way of determining which projects are financed by pri-
vate firms, we may assume that, in certain countries such as South Africa , Bot-
swana, Mauritius and Nigeria, such projects play an important role, whereas in 
the poorest countries this is not the case. For the latter countries, the difference 
between “international cooperation” and the data provided by the multilateral or-
ganizations gives a good proxy of Chinese aid.
Our method leads to an estimate of two billion US$ for total Chinese aid to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, a figure that is fairly close to those of Kurlantzick (2006) 
and the IMF . This estimate is corroborated by the results of a survey conducted 
by Goldstein (2007) on Chinese construction firms in Africa. The survey shows 
that 40 percent of the contracts executed by these enterprises are financed from 
Chinese funds. According to MOFCOM data, these contracts were worth a total 
of six billion US$ in 2005, which means that 2.4 billion US$-worth were funded 
by China .
This approach also gives an idea of the geographical distribution of Chinese 
aid to Africa. This is shown in Table 3.1 (column 4), which indicates the seventeen 
largest beneficiaries of “Chinese international cooperation” in 2005, i.e. the figure 
for international cooperation published by China less multilateral financing.
Have China ’s geographical priorities in Africa changed? The first two columns 
of Table 3.1 show Bräutigam’s (1998) data for the seventeen main beneficiaries of 
Chinese aid from 1959 to 1998: in Nigeria, Angola and Botswana, the figures for 
international cooperation probably include private financing, whereas those for 
other countries indicate cooperation financed by China.
Th is admittedly imperfect comparison shows that China ’s aid and international 
cooperation to Africa are becoming increasingly concentrated (the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve coun-
tries received 38 percent of the total over the 1959-1989 period and 68 percent in 
2005). Of the seventeen countries receiving the most aid in 2005, only seven were 
among the top seventeen in the earlier period (Tanzania, Congo , Sudan, Egypt , 
Mali, Ethiopia and Algeria). Th ere is thus considerable turnover in the ranking. 
Countries entering the top seventeen in 2005 include Angola ,16 Nigeria and Bot-
Chinese aid to Africa, origins, forms and issues
swana, indicating that countries which export oil or raw materials are among the 
priorities of Chinese cooperation. Due to the spectacular announcements made in 
2007 and early 2008,17 the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) will probably 
rank among the ﬁ rst beneﬁ ciary of Chinese international cooperation.
Table 3.1 China ’s priorities in Africa
Aid per country “International cooperation” 
excl. external fi nancing in 
2004/05; in millions of US$
1959-1998 2004-2005
Tanzania
Zambia 
Congo DR 
Mauritania
Sudan
Somalia
Congo 
Egypt 
Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Mali 
Madagascar
Burundi
Cameroon
Mozambique
Senegal 
Algeria
534
372
303
239
230
220
205
193
161
155
148
144
125
124
116
108
100
Sudan 
Algeria
Nigeria
Angola 
Egypt 
Botswana
Tanzania
Mali 
Libya
Zimbabwe
South Africa 
Ethiopia 
Mauritius
Eq. Guinea 
Ghana
Congo 
Tunisia
1 342
1 065
787
305
276
265
181
169
132
89
82
77
76
75.6 
69
68
65
Sources:  Columns 1 and 2, Bräutigam (1998); columns 3 and 4, author’s estimates based on 
MOFCOM statistics and data from the World Bank and the African Development Bank
Note: Countries where cooperation includes projects fi nanced by private fi rms are in italics.
 Issues relating to Chinese aid
As OECD countries will probably be unable to meet the pledge made at the Glen-
eagles summit to double their aid, the rise of a new donor should be welcomed 
by traditional donors, as it increases the aid to Africa. This is not the case and 
Chinese aid is considered with suspicion. China is accused of having imperialistic 
aims, trying to impose a new colonial pact on Africa.18 Its scramble towards Afri-
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can raw materials is regarded as a threat to the West and some observers think it 
could lead to conflict (Navarro, 2006).
What are the main issues raised by Chinese aid to Africa? Is it in competition 
with or complementary to Western aid? Is China engaging in free-rider behavior 
by further indebting countries that have just been granted debt relief, or is Chi-
nese aid in line with the Washington consensus? How effective is its aid and do 
the Chinese share the Western definition of effectiveness?
 Is it Competition ?
In the sixties and seventies, China ’s aid strategy put an emphasis on agriculture and 
Africa has been the continent that has proﬁ ted the most from China’s agricultural 
assistance (Mahmoud, 2008). Chinese aid has built pilot farms in more than 40 Af-
rican countries, engaged in 200 cooperation programs, and sent over 10,000 agro-
technicians over the years to train local farmers and provide technical consultancy. 
Amount wise, Chinese aid is geared towards the construction of infrastructure 
(which accounts for 70 percent of aid according to Chinese declarations), and the 
major projects announced recently (railways in Angola , Congo and Gabon, revamp-
ing of the Tanzam) will increase the share of this sector in total spending. As stated 
by one South Africa n observer, quoted by Martin Davies (2007), “even Africa’s nu-
merous colonial powers did not have the commitment to invest so substantially in 
the continent infrastructures and probably were unable to aﬀ ord it anyway.”
Whereas the poor state of Africa’s infrastructure is widely recognized to be a 
major constraint on its development, only a small proportion of Western aid is 
devoted to infrastructure improvement. This is illustrated by Figure 3.5, which 
shows infrastructure expenditure financed by the DAC countries from 1970 
to 2005 as a share of total development overseas aid. After the excesses of the 
1960s, when they participated to the financing of many “white elephants”, donors 
became increasingly reluctant to finance this type of project. During the early 
nineties, DAC countries (the Helsinki group) agreed to stay away from projects 
that could eventually be realized by the private sector (Paquement, 1998). How-
ever, while Western governments have restrained from financing infrastructure 
projects, the private sector has failed to engage in such projects. This market fail-
ure has opened a window of opportunity for Chinese aid. The OECD ’s attitude 
has changed since the early years of the present decade, leading to a slight upturn 
in ODA spending on infrastructure: in 2005, the amount of such spending had 
returned to its level of 30 years earlier in current dollars. Thus if one considers 
its sectoral distribution, Chinese aid appears to be complementary rather than in 
competition with the OECD countries’ aid.
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Figure 3.5 Share of infrastructure in ODA to Africa
Source: based on OECD Development Assistance Committee data
Beyond the fact that China is engaged in countries such as Sudan or Zimbabwe 
which DAC countries are reluctant to assist, what can be said about the geo-
graphical distribution of Chinese aid in regard to that of DAC countries? Us-
ing the proxy of international cooperation (adjusted by subtracting the amounts 
represented by multilateral projects) as a percentage of African countries’ GDP, 
Figure 3.6 shows that, here again, the distribution of Chinese aid is more com-
plementary with that of DAC countries than competing. This complementarity 
is due in part to the fact that China operates in some countries that the OECD 
countries avoid, namely Guinea-Bissau, Togo and the Central African Republic 
(CAR). In other African countries, China’s international cooperation accounts 
for a much lower percentage of these countries’ GDP than OECD aid.
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Figure 3.6 ODA from OECD countries and China ’s international cooperation, as a 
percentage of African countries’ GDP
 How eﬀ ective is its aid?
China , which remains a major aid recipient (Figure 3.1), is a signatory to the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which stresses local ownership, alignment, har-
monization, results-based management and accountability. Does China adhere to 
the Paris declaration when it acts as a donor?
Harmonization starts with the participation at donors meetings. In such 
events, China ’s chair has traditionally been empty. This is slowly changing. Chi-
nese start to participate in these meetings where they seldom participate in the 
debates. As its projects answer to the demand from the governments, China con-
siders that its aid meets both the ownership and the alignment requirements of 
the Paris declaration. However they do not align their assistance with the Poverty 
Reduction Strategies (PRSs) launched by the World Bank and IMF in 1999.
 Chinese consider their aid as effective if it finances concrete projects 
such as buildings and roads (Pennies, 2007). From the Chinese point of view, 
effectiveness should be appreciated at the project level. They view their aid as 
more effective than Western aid as their projects are carried out quickly and at 
lower cost than those financed by other donors, and the financing methods they 
use (see above) obviate corruption problems. Chinese contractors have regularly 
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achieved many of their infrastructure projects with dizzying speed and, as an 
application of the 8th principle,19 Chinese experts are paid much less than their 
Western counterparts and are willing to work in more difficult environments. 
Chinese argue that, since their projects are achieved on time and at a lower cost 
than DAC’s projects, they meet the effectiveness criteria. This is by and large 
true, even if they have met with problems in the case of large projects, as has been 
the case of railway projects in Angola .20 China does not conduct systematic evalu-
ations of its projects, and while there have been successes (Mamhoud, 2008), 
discussions with Chinese officials suggest that projects often run into difficulties 
once the Chinese experts have left.
The Chinese are fond of the adage says that it is better “to teach a man how to 
fish than to give him a fish” and they have emphasized technology transfer by train-
ing.21 Nevertheless, by giving the emphasis to turnkey projects, they have given 
less emphasis to local capacity building than Western donors. The latter con-
sider the strengthening of the recipient country’s institutional capacity to handle 
a project as a factor of efficiency and ownership.
Among the issues raised by the question of harmonization, is the elaboration 
of international norms as the Chinese (as donor countries) have not participated 
in the discussion that led to the Paris declaration on harmonization.
There are some issues to be raised when tied aid is provided. Until the early 
1990s, bilateral aid was regarded as a tool for supporting donor exports. This 
practice has become less common and, according to DAC data, tied aid accounted 
for only 9 percent of bilateral aid in 2004, while an increasing number of bilateral 
donors now issue international tender offers, like the multilateral banks. This 
average figure masks large variations from one country to another, and technical 
assistance, food aid, and transport of food aid are still often provided by donor 
countries.
China , like all the other emerging donors,  ties its aid to the use of Chinese 
equipment (according to Chinese sources, 70 percent of China’s aid is spent on 
Chinese goods and services). Given China’s level of development, designing its 
aid to have positive repercussions for the Chinese economy is a justifiable prac-
tice. MOFCOM and the Exim Bank issue calls for tender which are restricted 
to Chinese firms and the basic criteria for soft loans is that Chinese enterprises 
should be selected as contractors and no less than 50 percent of equipment, ma-
terials, technology or services should be sources in China. While, through their 
Chinese subsidiaries, some Western firms have been selected as subcontractors 
(such as procurement of turbines or designing of airport facilities) of Chinese-
financed projects, a larger number of Chinese firms benefit from the untying of 
aid, because they regularly submit the lowest bids in response to the tenders of 
multilateral and bilateral donors.
 Jean-Raphaël Chaponnière
The competitiveness of Chinese construction firms is well documented. Ac-
cording to a study (DGPTE, 2007), Chinese enterprises control over half of the 
African market for major construction and civil engineering projects. A survey 
conducted by Goldstein (2007) shows that Chinese firms operate in a large 
number of African countries. Their extensive presence is a partial explanation 
of their success as it reduces the cost of transporting equipment to project sites 
and, moreover, it is believed that they invoice only the depreciation of their heavy 
equipment retained in Africa. This explains why they can offer much lower prices 
than their competitors (one-third of competitors’ bids on average). Under these 
competitive conditions, the untying of Chinese aid and the use of international 
calls for tender would probably have little impact on the position of Chinese 
firms in responding to the calls for tender. The speed of Chinese firms in  Africa 
contrasts with the slower pace of a large number of Western-financed infra-
structure projects in Africa. However, Chinese contractors have begun to face 
problems, and in Nigeria and Angola , several large projects have fallen behind 
schedule.22 There have been critics of the quality of Chinese workmanship. This 
depends on the rigor of the inspection system of the host countries. Also, while 
there are many cases of low standards of Chinese work, equally there are cases of 
world-class building.
Thirty years ago, Korean companies succeeded in breaking into the Middle 
Eastern construction market by using Korean labor, in some cases young con-
scripts doing their military service. Chinese firms use Chinese laborers for the 
same reasons. This is probably an important factor in their competitiveness, al-
though a survey by the Centre for Chinese Studies of the University of Stellen-
bosch (2006) on China ’s involvement in Africa’s construction and infrastructure 
sectors in four countries concludes that Chinese companies examined were usu-
ally found to employ a large amount of local labor, 85 to 95 percent of the total 
workforce. Locals were predominantly employed as low-skilled labor, but there 
were also many instances of locals in more senior positions. This shows that the 
perception of Chinese companies bringing their own workers is not always true. 
The survey shows it varies from country to country; the local employment rate 
is higher in Tanzania and Zambia , where Chinese companies have a longer pres-
ence, compared with Sierra Leone and Angola where they employ very few local 
workers. Given the competitiveness of Chinese construction firms, China could 
agree to untie its aid. This decision could be politically very rewarding for the 
Chinese and international calls for tender would probably have little impact on 
the position of Chinese contractors in Africa. However, adopting international 
tender managed by the recipient country may create difficulties within China. 
Indeed, this transparency mechanism could be detrimental to Chinese firms that 
used to be selected by MOFCOM or the Exim Bank on unknown criteria.
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Some of these workers stay on once their contracts are up, increasing the Chi-
nese presence in Africa. Estimates of the number of Chinese established in Africa 
are often somewhat fanciful, ranging from 100,000 to one million. A Chinese 
diaspora already existed in several African countries,23 and fears over Chinese 
emigration to Africa are nothing new: the authorities in Guinea and Madagascar 
were concerned about it as early as 1960.24 This fear has been revived by recent 
comments made by the chairman of the Exim Bank about the possibility of ex-
tending loans to Chinese farmers wishing to settle in Africa. Fujian and Zhejiang 
provinces have encouraged emigration to Africa as a source of remittances and of 
new jobs (Alden, 2007). However it remains to be seen if Chinese rural dwellers 
will be candidates.25
 Is China engaging in free-rider behavior?
In March 2007, the former president of the World Bank accused China of fol-
lowing a “free rider” strategy in Africa by lending to countries that had just been 
granted debt relief. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
launched during the 1990s has reduced Africa’s external debt from 80 percent of 
GDP (1995) to 35 percent (2006), at a cost of 64 billion US$ to the international 
community. Of the 31 countries eligible for this initiative,26 eighteen have ben-
efited from debt relief. Concern for avoiding a resurgence of indebtedness that 
could lead to another crisis has led the IMF and World Bank (2004) to develop a 
Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF). This framework sets a debt ceiling above 
which the risk of default can become very high; separate ceilings are established 
for three groups of countries according to their CPIA ranking.27 The categories 
of risk (low, moderate and high) determine the appropriate proportions of grants 
and loans. The DSF is intended as an instrument for coordinating the terms of 
financing. It has prescriptive force for the IDA (World Bank Group), but it is 
merely indicative for the other organizations: for example, some have chosen to 
lend only to low-risk countries, while others are willing to lend to medium-risk 
countries.
The DSF applies only to those donors that accept its legitimacy. If China 
refuses to cooperate, the collective effort of the other donors will be much less 
effective, and this is indeed a criticism that is often raised regarding China’s aid 
policy. However (see Table 3.2), the estimated breakdown of its aid by country 
shows that the countries to which China provides the most assistance are not 
those that have enjoyed the largest debt remissions.
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Table 3.2 Chinese aid and the HIPC countries
HIPC debt relief Chinese cooperation
Millions of USD % of GDP % of GDP
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Ethiopia 
Ghana
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Uganda
Rwanda
Senegal 
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Zambia 
1 096
1 160
1 298
3 217
3 823
2 323
2 227
1 915
850
1 992
1 048
3 397
530
2 392
870
3 728
2 687
24.80
20
7.80
25.20
35.70
49.30
107.30
36.40
45.00
29.80
30.70
39.00
24.80
28.70
71.60
30.70
37.30
0
0
0
0.9
0.7
0.3
0
3.2
3.2
0.1
0.6
0
0
0.3
0
1.5
0.4
Sources:  Djoufelkit (2007) and Chinese statistics on international cooperation minus projects 
fi nanced by multilateral bodies
The Democratic Republic of Congo is in a different situation. This country, clas-
sified as being between the decision and completion points, may hope for forgive-
ness of some of its debt (eight billion US$), but such a decision could be compro-
mised by the announcement of a five billion US$ loan from China (September 
2007) to finance major infrastructural projects that is secured by the granting of 
mining leases.28 As copper prices plummeted in 2008, DRC is in a dire need of a 
debt relief from Western donors and the latter want a renegotiation of the China 
DRC deal. The focus of concern is that the deal would give the Chinese con-
sortium state financial guarantees including some that earmarked government 
revenues and make China a privileged creditor.29
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 Th e Washington consensus and the Beijing consensus
Adhering to the principle of non-intervention, China imposes no conditions for 
its aid, but there are two exceptions to the rule. Breaking off diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan has long stood as a prior condition for aid from China. This is no 
longer really an issue, since owing to its economic success, China has “won the 
war” over UN representation. It now has cooperation agreements with countries 
that maintained relations with Taiwan. Beijing does, however, expect support for 
its positions at the United Nations: for example, it requests African support for 
its opposition to a Security Council seat for Japan or to elect a candidate to a 
top job in a United Nations organization (a recent example is the World Health 
Organization). Moreover, the strict secrecy surrounding the publication of data 
on aid and credit terms to Africa suggests that Chinese authorities may require a 
contractual undertaking not to publish the data.
Apart from these points, China ’s aid is not subject to conditionality, in contrast 
to that of the OECD countries. As long as African countries do not express their 
willingness for social and environmental responsibility (SER), Chinese firms face 
no requirements for SER and their method can lead to abuses, as in the example 
of the Merowe dam in Sudan. It does not comply with international standards, 
and its construction caused the displacement of the local inhabitants to distant 
locations where the land was not suitable for farming. The Chinese government 
recognizes these abuses but, on grounds of non-interference, refuses to take the 
initiative of requiring SER clauses in contracts.
China ’s attitude has led Rano (2004) to propose the concept of a “Beijing con-
sensus” as opposed to the Washington consensus. According to Rano, both pursue 
the same goals but in a diﬀ erent order of priority, with Beijing giving priority to 
stability and development while the Washington consensus views reforms as a 
pre-condition for stability and development. Leonard (2008) wrote that the Beijing 
consensus could be the worst ideological menace to the Western world since the 
collapse of communism. While the Washington consensus favors privatization, the 
Beijing consensus encourages the use of public money and a push to protect public 
property. Th ese diﬀ erences contribute to the positive image of China in Africa where 
Asian heterodox strategies have long been regarded with deep interest.30 Chinese 
aid is attractive to the countries that are most resistant to reform, such as Angola , 
which was granted a loan of two billion US$ at a time when it was being called on 
to account for the disappearance of four billion US$ from the public treasury. It 
is also attractive to countries that have suﬀ ered from instability caused by overly 
mechanical application of reforms designed according to the Washington consensus.
The 2008 world crisis that led the Western countries to proceed to large-scale 
nationalization has weakened the ground of the Washington consensus. On this 
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occasion, Chinese vice Prime Minister Wang Qishan said the “teachers have some 
problems”.31 Nevertheless, while the crisis will reinforce the appeal of the Beijing 
consensus, this new paradigm does not translate into practical measures. As time 
passes, circumstances may lead China to change its practice. Loans by the Exim 
Bank account for a rising share of China’s aid commitment, and being more 
concerned about repayment, it pays closer attention to country risk and becomes 
more attentive to countries’ indebtedness. As a larger number of countries facing 
difficulties will flock to Beijing, the Chinese government may have to take a closer 
view of their economic prospects and to differentiate between them.
 Conclusion: convergence or divergence?
China ’s aid to Africa has a long history. In the early 1960s, the first overviews of 
the subject32 displayed the same surprise that we see today, though sometimes for 
different reasons. After decades of turmoil, China was a poor country, where the 
excesses of the Great Leap Forward caused a famine and millions of deaths in the 
late 1950s. It was much poorer than the Maghreb countries with which it signed its 
first aid agreements and than Sub-Saharan Africa, to which it started providing 
aid in 1960. China, just emerging from the embargo caused by the Korean War, 
exported very little. Its aid to Africa was greater than its trade with Africa, and it 
made no investments. Today, trade with Africa is larger than aid and investment. 
In February 2007, President Hu Jintao announced that trade between China and 
Africa would amount to 100 billion US$ in 2010 and, thanks to the surge in raw 
material prices, bilateral trade has exceeded this objective in 2008. This trade may 
diminish in value as prices have tumbled, but nevertheless China will probably 
become the largest trade partner of Africa, and one could expect that this will be 
followed by more investment and that investment will outstrip aid.
At the 2005 Gleneagles summit, the G8 countries gave a commitment to dou-
ble their aid to Africa, and China made the same promise in Beijing in November 
2006. Three years later, it appears that OECD countries are not on track to meet 
their targets. As they are confronted with the severest crisis since 1929, OECD 
countries would need to make unprecedented budgetary efforts to reach their ob-
jective, since debt cancellations, which account for nearly half of the aid, come to 
an end. While OECD will not achieve their target, China will probably encoun-
ter less difficulty in achieving its objective, even though China may experience a 
hard landing in 2009.
The fall of raw material prices will directly impact trade relations between 
China and Africa.33 Nevertheless, as China will continue to grow and OECD 
economies will contract, the share of China in African exports will increase in 
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volume while in value it will diminish. Thus the bilateral trade may intensify 
at a lower level. The world recession has not changed the Chinese view on the 
strategic importance of Africa. Economic and social problems in China have not 
prevented Hu Jintao from undertaking a fourth trip in Africa in February where 
he visited Mali, Senegal , Tanzania and Mauritius. His choice illustrates a sense of 
continuity (Zhou En Lai visited Mali and Tanzania in the sixties) and by choos-
ing to visit countries that are not primary commodities exporters, he showed that 
Chinese interest goes beyond the procurement of raw materials. Chinese are pre-
paring for the next Sino-African summit to be held in Cairo in November 2009, 
and, on this occasion, Beijing will promise to double its aid to Africa between 
2009 and 2012. Thus at the end of the present decade, China will eventually be 
the largest donor to Africa.
China emphasizes the fact that its relations with Africa are distinct and 
substantively different from those of the West. Nevertheless, the nature of its 
trade relations with Africa is North-South and this may lead Beijing to adopt 
Western practices instead of maintaining a friendship between most unequal 
equals.34 Will China position itself as an alternative to the OECD or will West-
ern efforts aimed at socializing China as a “responsible” power in Africa influ-
ence currently prevailing standards (Alden, 2008)? There is clearly a debate in 
China between those who think that European aid to Africa has failed and that 
there is nothing to be learned from the DAC countries’ experience and those 
who take a less black-and-white view both of the Western experience and of 
the overall results of Chinese aid to Africa. The probable outcome is a trend 
towards convergence between Chinese and Western practice. World Bank and 
bilateral donors are discussing MOU with ExIm banks and some have started 
to cooperate in joint projects with China. This trend will benefit from changes 
in Chinese practices. On the issue of social and environmental responsibility, 
for example, an official of the People’s Congress stated in January 2007 that 
Chinese firms could face sanctions if they committed abuses abroad. In March 
2007, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) removed 
Sudan from the latest list of countries with preferred trade status and China 
will no longer provide financial incentives to Chinese firms investing in Sudan 
(Gill et al., 2007).
The pace of convergence will depend on the quality of the dialogue estab-
lished between China and the traditional donors. Chinese embassies have al-
ready begun to attend donor round-tables. This dialogue could be improved if 
all parties made their objectives clear. The Chinese are accused of having a hid-
den agenda in their “march to Africa” and of assisting African countries only to 
better strip them of their resources, whereas Western aid is held to be directed 
exclusively to the well-being of the people. The Chinese make the same criti-
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cism in return. If China has an agenda in Africa, so do the United States and 
European Union, whether that agenda concerns security of supply or migration. 
Acknowledging these agendas and discussing them would be a first step towards 
dialogue and cooperation.
 Notes
 Africa accounts for a fairly high percentage of oil ( percent), several ores and timber 
(Chaponnière, ).
 If we consider only those investments made since , China would be the second largest 
foreign investor in Zambia and Madagascar, and the fourth largest in Kenya and Angola . 
Its oil companies (China National Petroleum and China Petroleum and Chemical) have a 
strong presence in Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo , Maurita-
nia and Niger. ZTE, one of China’s most internationalized industrial firms, has directed 
one-third of its projects to Africa.
 China reacted to Egypt ’s requirements by providing a large amount of food, emergency 
facilities, equipment and munitions and offered  million Swiss francs to buy needed 
goods and materials. Chairman Mao said this about Egypt’s requirement: “We in China 
are also ready to do what we can to help Egypt, and our assistance is without any strings at-
tached. If you can pay, you may do so; if you cannot, let it be; we shall provide assistance free 
of charge. Of course a country with national pride, Egypt may wish to pay back our assistance. 
An account may be kept for future repayment, or repayment after  years... we can do our 
best to help Egypt.” Quoted in Gountin ().
 Including Egypt , Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Ghana and Somalia.
 In , the International Comparison Program of the World Bank lowered significantly 
(- percent) Chinese per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity. 
 The cost of the project amounted to  million US, or  percent of the combined GDP 
of the two African countries at the time.
 China carried out its first debt-equity swaps with textile firms in Mali at this time.
 It was China ’s experience with poverty reduction that led the UNDP to establish the 
International Poverty Reduction Centre in Shanghai in .
 At the China -Africa Forum in , China cancelled . billion US in debt for  coun-
tries. In , President Hu Jintao announced that China would participate in the Heav-
ily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, and in , MOFCOM granted debt 
relief for  African countries (Davies, , p. ).
 Th us in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): i) a loan of three billion 
US ﬁ nances the construction of a , km railway between Matandi and Sankya, a , 
km road between Lulumbashi and Kisangani, as well the building of several hospitals and 
two universities and ii) a two billion US copper-mining investment is made by a joint ven-
ture between Gecamines, the state copper-mining company and Chinese ﬁ rms ( percent). 
 According to the Paris Declaration, they are supposed to allocate half of their aid in these 
forms.
 Levy () lists over  bilateral accords between Chinese and African cities. However, 
there are conflicting views on the origins (provinces or Ministry of Finance) of the funds 
provided by provincial governments.
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 Whereas the human development indicator (HDI) for China as a whole (.) is higher 
than that of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the HDI for Sichuan and Anhui prov-
inces is equal to that of Cape Verde; that of Gansu province is close to that of Equatorial 
Guinea; and those of Yunnan, Guizhou and Tibet are close to those of Gabon, Namibia, 
Sao Tome and Principe, and the Comoros.
 According to the Financial Times (, January, ), the Exim Bank had authorized a total 
of thirteen billion US for African projects by June  and disbursed half of that amount. 
Th e bulk of this amount has assisted the trade activities of Chinese ﬁ rms in Africa. 
 This explains why a very large share of China ’s “international cooperation” goes to Hong 
Kong.
 China had previously aided the adversaries of the ruling MPLA.
 China announced two financial packages, with a total amount of twelve billion US to the 
DRC in The Economist: “A ravenous dragon.”  March, .
 The Economist: “The new colonalists, report on China ’s thirst for resources.”  March, 
.
 According to the th principle of the Accra declaration of Chou en Lai “experts who are 
dispatched by the Chinese government to help recipient countries carrying out construc-
tion, should be paid the same as their own experts of recipient countries.” Quoted from 
Goutin ().
 A. Russell, “Infrastructure : Big projects fall behind schedule.” Financial Times,  January, 
.
 Quoted by Gountin (), the seventh principle of Chou En Lai’s speech states: “While 
providing technical assistance, Chinese government assures to teach recipients to fully 
master this kind of technology.” Chinese train technicians and management personnel. 
Through the African Human Resources Development Fund, set up with the purpose of 
sharing skills, China has trained over , African professionals in various fields.
 In early  the Angolese government cancelled plans for an oil reﬁ nery to be built by the 
Chinese outside Lobito and the planned airport outside Luanda has run into diﬃ  culties (A. 
Russell, “Infrastructure : Big projects fall behind schedule.” Financial Times,  January, ).
 South Africa and Madagascar, where the Chinese took part in railway construction dur-
ing the colonial period.
 Charbonnier ().
 Field surveys in Senegal and Mali revealed that Chinese immigrants were not former 
peasants but former traders in Chinese cities who benefited from their contacts with a 
Chinese contractor to emigrate to Africa (Kernen and Vuilllet, ).
 To be eligible for the HIPC Initiative, a country must: i) have borrowed from the IDA; ii) 
have accumulated an unsustainable debt burden; iii) have implemented good macroeco-
nomic policies as part of IMF or IDA programmes; iv) have produced a poverty reduc-
tion strategy paper (PRSP). When these criteria are met, the IMF and the IDA decide 
whether the country is eligible for debt relief (decision point). After at least one year of 
PRSP implementation, the country reaches the completion point (Djoufelkit, ).
 The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) grades the quality of policies 
and institutions according to sixteen criteria, grouped under four equally weighted head-
ings: (i) economic management, (ii) structural policies, (iii) social cohesion and equity 
policies, (iv) public administration and institutions. 
 In this way, the Chinese are seeking to limit their risk. The Exim Bank finances the infra-
structure, and the loan granted to Congo will be repaid by the Chinese firms operating the 
mining concessions.
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 Barney Jopson, “Congo pressed over China deal.” Financial Times,  February, .
 In -, the Reverend Ravelojoana in Madagascar advocated taking Japan as a mod-
el; in the s and s, at the time of the first structural adjustment programmes, 
African leaders took an interest in the experience of the newly industrialised economies.
 Quoted by Roger C. Altman, “The Great Crash, .” Foreign Affairs, January – Febru-
ary, .
 Far Eastern Economic Review, “China as a Foreign Aid Donor.”  January, .
 According to Chinese statistics, imports from Africa fell by  percent from December 
 and January  – an evolution comparable to that of the total imports of China .
 As Nyerere once described China -Tanzania relations. From Alden () and quoted 
from Yu (), p. .
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4 China ’s investments in Africa
Peter Kragelund and Meine Pieter van Dijk
 Introduction
The Chinese presence on the African continent takes a multiple of (interwoven) 
forms ranging from migration, development aid (including tariff exemptions and 
debt relief ), trade, and investments (both state and privately driven). Hence, even 
though this chapter essentially seeks to unpack Chinese Foreign Direct Invest-
ments (FDI ) in Africa, it will also mention other aspects of Chinese involvement 
in the continent as the lines between the forms of intervention are blurred (Mc-
Cormick, 2008).
The recent upsurge in Chinese FDI to Africa is important for several rea-
sons. Firstly, Chinese FDI is much needed. According to Asiedu (2004), Africa 
needs to fill an annual resource gap of 64 billion in order to meet the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs). Part of this gap will probably be filled with 
increasing remittances from African migrants to Europe and other destinations, 
another with increasing FDI. Secondly, Chinese FDI occurs in a period of abso-
lute progress, but of relative decline of FDI to Africa (Kragelund, 2007). Even 
though absolute FDI flows to the continent reached a historical height in 2005, 
other parts of the world – including other developing regions – received rela-
tively more FDI (UNCTAD, 2006). Thirdly, FDI is considered a stable source of 
finance since it by definition has a long-term goal. It usually also brings technol-
ogy and access to international markets. Fourthly, FDI to Africa has until now 
been highly concentrated in a few sectors and a few countries (Kragelund, 2007; 
Mlambo, 2005). Albeit, the lion’s share Chinese FDI also targets the primary 
sector in resource-rich economies, Chinese FDI also targets other sectors of the 
African economies (Burke, Corkin and Tay, 2007). Fifthly, preliminary evidence 
suggests that Chinese FDI is qualitatively different from other sources of FDI 
into Africa (Henley, Kratzsch, Külür and Tandogan, 2008). Lastly, Chinese FDI 
may turn out indeed to be very important – even for non-resource-rich African 
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economies – when accounted for as a proportion of annual investments in Africa 
(Sumner, 2005). Hence, not only the absolute size of the flows, but also the size 
relative to domestic investments and savings is important.
In this chapter we will first summarize China ’s policy with respect to invest-
ments in Africa. As hinted at above, the investment policy is closely related to 
other policies with regard to Africa. Section three presents different (sometimes 
conflicting) estimates of Chinese FDI to Africa. It tells a story of the increasing 
importance of FDI as a vector of influence in African economies. Section four 
then seeks to compare Chinese FDI in Africa with FDI from other sources. It ar-
gues that even though similarities exist there are also qualitative differences that 
warrant a new approach to the study of these investments. Section five presents 
an analytical framework to further our understanding of the local consequences 
of this phenomenon whereupon it adopts this framework in an analysis of three 
sectors of the Zambian economy. This framework only deals with effects on 
the domestic private sector of Chinese investments. The consequences of Chi-
nese FDI to Africa, however, are not limited to this. Therefore, we also present 
a broader research program, entitled “Development cooperation and the private 
sector in Africa,” which is undertaken at the Maastricht School of Management 
in the Netherlands. Section six draws some conclusions.
 China ’s policy with respect to investments in Africa
Th e China Africa Policy published in January 2006 brings together existing policies 
that deal with all aspects of the Sino-African relationship. It includes a wide range of 
policies and strategies concerning politics, economics, education, culture, and health, 
as well as within military cooperation. It states that the Chinese government encour-
ages and supports Chinese enterprises’ investment and business in Africa and will 
continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end. Th e Chinese 
government is ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting invest-
ment cooperation with African countries, and will continue to formulate and improve 
relevant policies, provide guidance and service and oﬀ er convenience. It continues:
African countries are welcome to make investments in China . Th e Chinese 
government will continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the agree-
ments on bilateral facilitation and protection of investment and the agree-
ments on avoidance of double taxation with African countries. Th e two sides 
should work together to create a favourable environment for investment and 
cooperation and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors from 
both sides (Government of China, 2006).
China’s investments in Africa
Albeit the China Africa Policy is very weak on how the activities are to be fi-
nanced, who will initiate them, and how they are coordinated, it hints at the im-
portance China currently gives Africa in economic and political terms. The Bei-
jing Action Plan (2007-2009), successor of the Addis Ababa Plan (2004-2006), 
builds upon the Africa Policy but the Action Plan includes a number of concrete 
initiatives. In regard to FDI , the African countries and China pledged to encour-
age mutual investments, they agreed to conclude Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BIT) and to the extent possible, avoid double taxation.1 Moreover, the partners 
have established a China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry that 
shall facilitate further trade and investment between the partners. Of great im-
portance, China stated that it will set up a China-Africa Development Fund to 
support “well-established and reputable Chinese companies in making investment in 
projects in Africa”. Lastly, the Chinese government will set up three to five Eco-
nomic and Trade Cooperation Zones in Africa (FOCAC, 2006).
China applies several different modalities in order to finance these activities, 
including grants (in kind – not in cash), loans (ranging from soft loans to loans on 
purely commercial terms) and debt relief to the recipient countries (see Box 4.1 
for an example from Ethiopia ). Moreover, the Chinese state provides long-term 
low-interest loans to the Chinese state-owned companies that invest in African 
economies (see also Chapter 6 for an example of Chinese support to Chinese 
companies in Zambia ).
Box 4.1 Ethiopia, an example of China’s fi nancial activities in Africa
Ethiopia will receive unconditional support from China consisting of:
1. 500 million US$ in concessionary loans
2. 1.5 billion US$ investments in telecommunication and infrastructure
3. 1.5 million US$ for short-term export credits
Most of this is soft loans, loans on favorable terms (low rates of interest) and without the 
kind of conditionalities that the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) 
impose.
Source: Financial Times (6 February, 2007)
Several Chinese institutions are involved in implementing the policy with respect 
to Africa. While the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) is a central actor in Chinese 
aid, it is not the only actor – 23 line ministries and decentralized agencies also 
provide aid. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the overall responsibility 
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for Chinese foreign policy and the Ministry of Finance administers the overall 
budget while MOC has the overall responsibility for China’s bilateral aid. Within 
MOC, the Department of West Asia and African Affairs is responsible for overall 
aid policies; the Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation controls Chinese 
companies overseas; the Department of Foreign Aid administers Chinese aid 
projects; and the Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s office acts as MOC’s 
extended arm locally. Most development projects, including essential infrastruc-
ture to the Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones are financed by the Chinese 
Export Import Bank that was established a decade ago – first and foremost to 
back international economic cooperation by providing preferential loans. More-
over, four Chinese Banks, most prominently, the Bank of China, provide cheap 
loans to Chinese state-owned enterprises in Africa (Kragelund, 2008).
Due to this complicated setup and the lack of clear guidelines, it is no surprise 
that Chinese aid (and loan) figures are highly disputed. For instance while the 
Chinese foreign aid in 2005 amounted to 731 million US$ according to the China 
Official Yearbook (Glosny, 2006), the EU reckons that Chinese aid reaches five 
billion US$ yearly (Altenburg and Weikert, 2006), and we have quoted OECD 
in Chapter 1 as 1 to 1.5 billion US$ in 2006.2  Similarly, data on Chinese loans are 
flawed. Nevertheless, there is hardly any doubt that the Chinese loans are large 
and increasing. The Financial Times estimates that Chinese loans to Africa in 
recent years have reached ten billion US$ per year (Financial Times 6 February, 
2007). In 2005, China announced in the General Assembly of the United Nations 
(UN) that it would mobilize an additional ten billion US$ in three years for con-
cessional loans. In total, in 2006, existing loans and credit lines were estimated to 
total about nineteen billion US$. The countries that receive most of this money 
are Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo and Nigeria ( Jacoby, 
2007: 34). One notes that these are all oil-producing or commodity-exporting 
countries.
However, the loans given are conditional in the sense of being tied to Chinese 
companies, which are obliged to use Chinese products for the projects. Loans, for 
instance, from the Chinese Export Import Bank to finance development projects, 
are only given to Chinese firms and rules stipulate that at least half of the pro-
curement has to come from China (Corkin, 2008). Jacoby (2007: 35) notes that 
also repayment of the loans has sometimes been tied (he gives the example of 
Angola) to the supply of oil. However, China puts no broader conditions (for 
example relating to the desired macro-economic and development policies of the 
country) to its preferential loans, in a part of the world where many countries 
have just overcome the debt crisis and are used to highly restrictive structural 
adjustment and other donor support programs.
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 Chinese investments in African economies – an overview
Total FDI in Africa doubled between 2004 and 2006. Table 4.1 gives the total 
picture for different African regions, which shows the increase in North Africa is 
four times the 2004 level, while the West Africa region also did better than the 
other regions. In fact, in the Southern Africa region the effects were negative in 
2006, due to substantial outflows in Angola and South Africa. In South Africa 
this happened after 2005, the year the country received a record inflow of 6.2 bil-
lion US$.
Table 4.1 Net FDI fl ows to/from Africa, 2004-2006 (million US$)
Regions 2004 2005 2006
North Africa
West Africa
Central Africa
East Africa
Southern Africa
6,616
3,743
2,712
1,318
3,629
13,528
4,997
3,716
1,205
6,202
23,324
6,841
3,786
1,789
-195
Total 18,018 29,648 35,544
Source: UNCTAD (2007b: Annex table B.1)
The table also shows that FDI to Africa has increased substantially, reaching 35.5 
US$ billion in 2006. In terms of countries, the biggest receivers of FDI inflows 
in 2006 were Egypt (ten billion US$), Nigeria (5.4 billion US$), and Sudan (3.5 
billion US$). In fact, ten countries – all important producers of natural resources 
– received three-quarters of all investments (see Table 4.2). The increase in FDI 
to Africa is very much linked to the rising commodity prices and suggests that 
FDI is still concentrated in a few sectors of a few African economies (Kragelund, 
2007).
Table 4.2 disaggregates these data. Thereby, it points to two important char-
acteristics of FDI to Africa. Firstly, in contrast to the orthodox dogma of stable 
capital flows, FDI flows to African economies are highly unstable on a year-by-
year basis. South Africa, for instance, ranked eight in 2004, one in 2005, and 
53 in 2006. Tunisia, albeit on a smaller scale, also experienced big changes in 
FDI flow: it ranked nine in 2004, ten in 2005, and four in 2006. Several reasons 
account for the unstable FDI flows. First and foremost, African economies are 
relatively small. Hence, year-by-year fluctuations are often caused by one or a 
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few investments. The sharp rise in FDI to South Africa in 2005, for instance, 
is caused largely by one cross-border merger and acquisition, namely Barclays 
Bank’s acquisition of the Amalgamated Bank of South Africa. Similarly, mergers 
and acquisitions play a significant role in other African economies. In Tunisia and 
Nigeria in 2006, respectively 70 and 52 percent of total FDI flows came as merg-
ers and acquisitions. Secondly, FDI flows to African countries are stable in the 
longer run, that is, the same resource-rich African economies get the lion’s share 
of FDI to Africa. Hence, the top ten receivers of FDI in 2004 received 71 percent 
of all FDI to Africa. Even though the rank has changed slightly, these very coun-
tries received almost 80 percent of all FDI to Africa in the two subsequent years. 
This makes FDI to Africa much more concentrated than in any other region in 
the world (UNCTAD, 2005, 2007b: Annex table B.4).
Table 4.2 FDI infl ows 2004-2006, ten most important African countries in 2004
2004 2005 2006
Country US$ mn rank US$ mn rank US$ mn rank
Egypt
Nigeria
Equatorial Guinea
Sudan
Angola
Morocco
Algeria
South Africa
Tunisia
Chad
2157
2127
1651
1511
1449
1070
882
799
639
495
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
5376
3403
1873
2305
-1303
2946
1081
6251
782
613
2
3
6
5
54
4
7
1
10
12
10043
5445
1656
3541
-1140
2898
1795
-323
3312
700
1
2
8
3
54
5
6
53
4
8
Top-ten total 12780 23327 27927
Africa total 18018 29648 35544
Share of total FDI 71% 79% 79%
Source: UNCTAD (2007b: Annex table B.1)
No doubt, most investments to Africa originate in Europe, the United States, and 
South Africa, but recently Asian countries have emerged as powerful investors in 
Africa (and elsewhere). Not only do Asian countries account for the majority of 
global inward FDI, they also increasingly dominate global outward FDI. While 
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the majority of Asian FDI still targets nearby countries, they have recently be-
come a major player in African economies. Throughout the 1990s, transnational 
corporations from Asian countries invested heavily in a few textile- and garment-
producing countries in South and East Africa in order to overcome trade restric-
tions. Since then, especially Chinese companies have taken advantage of the fact 
that a number of resource-rich African countries have been avoided by Western 
investors due to political instability and bad governance. This has made large-
scale investment in resource extractive activities possible (Kaplinsky and Mess-
ner, 2008; UNCTAD, 2007a).
Today, China ranks fourth among the Asian investors in Africa in terms of FDI 
stock (after Singapore, India, and Malaysia) (UNCTAD, 2007a). FDI stock data, 
however, do not take the most recent upsurge into account. Although data on Chi-
nese investments in Africa are indeed ﬂ awed,3 there is hardly any doubt that Chi-
nese FDI to Africa is increasing rapidly – probably more rapidly than FDI origi-
nating from any other place. Corkin (2008) makes a similar argument in relation 
to the future size of South African and Chinese investments in Africa. Whether 
one examines the approved Chinese investments by national investment centers 
on the African continent, which is displayed in Table 4.3, or the totals based on 
news bulletins and other unoﬃ  cial sources, displayed in Table 4.4, the trend is the 
same: Chinese investments are becoming ever more important in Africa.
Table 4.3 Approved Chinese FDI fl ow to the African continent (US$ million)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
FDI 1.5 7.7 14.5 28 17.7 NA NA NA 42.3 85 24.5 30.1 60.8
Source: UNCTAD (2006: Box table II.1.1)
Table 4.4 also hints at the growing importance of smaller (partly private) Chi-
nese investments in Africa. While the average size of investments in the year 
2000 was almost two million US$, this figure decreased to approximately 1.4 
million US$ in 2006. Hence, even though Chinese investments in the oil sector 
get the lion’s share of public and academic coverage, Chinese FDI increasingly 
dominate investments in all sectors in many African countries.4 Based on figures 
from approved investments in Ghana as well as from the World Bank’s recent 
survey of 450 companies in four African countries, it seems that these companies 
concentrate their activities in the manufacturing, construction and service sectors 
(Broadman, 2007; GIPC, 2005).
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Table 4.4 Chinese companies in Africa, 1988-2006 (FDI in US$ million)
1988 1992 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006
Number of 
companies
>80 ND ND ND 499 ND 585 >600 674 900
FDI stock ND 54 91 259 990 607 ND 872 ND 1,250
Average 
size of 
investment 
NA NA NA NA 1,98 NA NA <1,45 NA 1,39
Source:  Africa Research Bulletin (2004, 2006); Broadman (2007); Buckley et al., (2007); Gang 
(1992); Hilsum (2005); Taylor (2006); Wenping, (2006). ND is no data and NA not able to 
calculate the ratio
 Chinese and other FDI in Africa: diﬀ erences and similarities
The sheer magnitude and growth of Chinese investments in Africa indeed war-
rant a more in-depth examination of how and to what extent these flows affect 
the host economy as well as other resource flows. But to what extent are Chi-
nese investment flows different from other investment flows into Africa? As 
pointed out above, Chinese FDI to Africa resemble FDI from other sources in 
its concentration in a few (resource-rich) African economies. Likewise, the mo-
tives for investments mirror these of other companies in Africa, namely to get 
access to markets and resources (Broadman, 2007). Regardless of their origin, 
these resource extraction activities often fail to benefit the population at large 
(UNCTAD, 2005), and, like its Western counterparts, large-scale, state-owned 
Chinese companies have also recently initiated Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) policies to minimize the negative effects of the investments (or maximize 
the positive ones) (Lungu and Mulenga, 2005; Oxford Analytica, 2008). More-
over, these companies’ close linkage to the strategic interest of their home state is 
also mirrored in Western companies’ oil investments (Alden and Davies, 2006). 
Regarding central parameters, therefore, Chinese investments do not differ radi-
cally from other foreign investments in Africa.
Then why do ever more people – academics and practitioners alike – find the 
Chinese investments in Africa so interesting? The argument here is that in spite 
of the fact that FDI to Africa today is very similar to FDI to Africa in the past, 
and, hence, that Chinese investments remind us of other investments, Chinese 
investments differ from other sources of investments in certain respects.
Firstly, the internationalization of Chinese corporations is of a relatively re-
cent origin. Though a few Chinese companies operated outside China in the late 
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1970s, the great wave of FDI originating in China did not take place until after 
2001 when the Chinese government adopted the “Go out” policy, which facilitat-
ed the internationalization process of Chinese companies. Meanwhile, Chinese 
companies developed a distinct business model with a typical transnational cor-
poration that is “...heavily reliant upon political support, receives financial back-
ing from the state and is involved in mining and energy industries” (Alden and 
Davies, 2006: 86).
Secondly, and directly related to the above, the average age of the Chinese firm 
operating in Africa is considerably younger than, for instance, Indian and South 
African companies. They also employ more staff per capital invested and they are 
more widely dispersed (Henley et al., 2008).
Th irdly, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) tend to have a longer-term 
perspective on investments than their (Anglo-Saxon) counterparts. While Anglo-
Saxon companies are governed by corporate ﬁ nancial issues and shareholder value 
doctrine and, hence, of quick returns on capital employed (Gibbon and Ponte, 
2005), the Chinese government allows ﬁ rms to invest strategically, i.e. put long-
term proﬁ tability over short-term proﬁ tability (Corkin, 2008). Th e focus on 
short- versus long-term proﬁ ts aﬀ ects the governance structures of the company. 
Th erefore, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises tend to integrate vertically while si-
multaneously seeking to acquire upstream assets (Alden and Davies, 2006).
Lastly, and linked to it, the Chinese state directly facilitates Chinese com-
panies abroad. Apart from the “Go out” policy and cheap credits, the Chinese 
government puts up institutional structures to support Chinese enterprises in 
Africa.5 Most prominently the Chinese government builds Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zones in order to facilitate further investments on the continent. 
These zones shall act as economic growth nodes – just like the Special Economic 
Zones in China – and will facilitate greater collaboration between Chinese com-
panies on the continent. In order to fulfill this aim, the Chinese state constructs 
the essential infrastructure and erects the needed buildings within the zones fi-
nanced by Chinese development aid and carried out by Chinese companies. As 
mentioned above, the Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009) sets out to establish three 
to five such zones in Africa within the next couple of years. Preliminary evidence, 
however, suggests that Africa will see more zones in the coming years. The first 
zone, exclusively for Chinese companies, is currently under construction. It is 
located a stone’s throw away from the Chinese-owned Chambishi mine in the 
Zambian Copper belt and will attract companies that deal with the production 
and refinement of copper. Due to the criticisms that Chinese actors currently face 
in Zambia, which amongst others relate to the limited positive spillovers from 
their investments, the Chinese government is currently laying the foundation for 
yet another zone – this time in Lusaka and reserved mainly for the light-indus-
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trial sector. In addition, Davies (2008) states that the following zones are already 
planned for: Mauritius (to facilitate regional trade), Dar es Salaam (trans-ship-
ment of mining products from the Copper belt), and Nigeria (manufacturing and 
assembly of Chinese products).
 An analytical framework to assess the eﬀ ects of Chinese FDI
Given these differences, and connected to the resumed academic interest in Chi-
nese (and other Asian) presence in Africa, several frameworks have been proposed 
to analyze the local, regional and global implications of the trend. Among the 
most interesting are Broadman’s (2007) classification of “at the border”, “behind 
the border”, and “between the border” challenges vis-à-vis economic interactions 
between the regions, and Kaplinsky’s (2008) distinction between complementary 
and competitive, direct and indirect impacts of Chinese interaction with African 
economies, which is also useful.6
Similarly to the latter, Kragelund (2007) proposes to distinguish between three 
potential roles of the Chinese investors in Africa, namely that of the catalyst, the 
capacity builder, and the competitor, and two types of impact on the domestic 
private sector, i.e. direct and indirect. This framework facilitates an assessment 
of the variety of Chinese investments that currently flows to African economies. 
Hence, while an investment in, for instance, resource extraction activities may di-
rectly act as a catalyst in an otherwise dormant sector, indirectly the growing de-
mand for resources may influence the value of the local exchange rate and thereby 
affect the competitiveness of the domestic private. In this respect, it is important 
also to keep in mind that importing capital goods may have a negative influence 
on the current-account balance. Investments in a sector characterized by numer-
ous forward and backward linkages and low-tech technology may directly build 
capacity via technology transfer and employment creation and indirectly be in-
strumental in bringing about access to third markets. It is, however, important to 
bear in mind that these benefits depend in particular on the market orientation of 
the transnational company, i.e. export-oriented companies generally play a more 
vital role in providing access to markets and build broad-based export capacity 
in the host country than transnational companies that invest to gain access to a 
local market. Lastly, (state-assisted) investments in sectors characterized by high 
domestic activity may directly displace local operators or indirectly force produc-
tivity to increase.
Even though some investments may readily be classified according to one of 
these headings, most investments will most likely play different roles vis-à-vis 
the domestic private sector, both directly and indirectly. Thus, resource extrac-
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tion activities not only catalyze investments but may also bring about low cost 
infrastructure that may or may not benefit other companies. Moreover, as Kap-
linsky (2008) rightly points out, it is important to distinguish between different 
geographical scales and different groups in society. Furthermore, some impacts 
cannot easily be measured in this framework, such as the indirect impact of large 
financial surpluses in China (and India) that may cause global interest rates to 
rise and, thereby, make borrowing more expensive – especially for less creditwor-
thy African economies (Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008).
Notwithstanding these limitations, Kragelund (2007) applied this framework 
to assess the eﬀ ects of Chinese investment in Zambia. Based on secondary sources, 
three sectors were chosen to illustrate the magnitude and type of potential im-
pacts of the recent upsurge in Chinese FDI. Firstly, Chinese investments in the 
dormant Zambian copper sector in Zambia illustrate the catalyzing role. Sec-
ondly, Chinese investments in the Zambian textile and garments industry were 
an example of building up local capacity. Thirdly, Chinese investments in the 
construction sector are perceived as being of a competitive nature.
The copper mines in the northern part of Zambia have been the backbone 
of the Zambian economy since independence (and prior to that – the backbone 
of the British interest in Northern Rhodesia). However, falling copper prices, 
nationalization, and mismanagement meant that the mines had become a huge 
financial burden for the Zambian economy and, driven by the international 
financial institutions, they were sold in the late 1990s. Among the mines that 
were privatized was the almost dormant Chambishi mine, which was bought by 
a Chinese state-led company in 1998. Since then, the Chinese company has in-
vested heavily in the mine, which now employs 2,000 people and produces 50,000 
tonnes of copper concentrates annually. Moreover, numerous other Chinese com-
panies, private as well as state-owned, have invested in copper production and 
refinement, and hence the Chinese state currently puts much emphasis on build-
ing physical infrastructure in and around the mines. Even more important, how-
ever, the rising Chinese demand for copper has made the mining sector attractive 
for other investors. While the mines earn Zambia much needed hard currency 
(by way of increased demand and increased production),7 this may also lead to 
uncompetitive industrial developments, such as the appreciation of the kwacha. 
Moreover, positive spillovers are probably limited because the sector is charac-
terized by only few linkages to the rest of the economy. What is more, salaries 
are lower and working conditions worse in the Chinese-owned mine than in the 
other major mines in the area.
In contrast to the mining sector, the textile sector has considerable spin-offs 
to other sectors of the society. Like the mining sector, the Zambian textile sector 
is of major economic importance and it is important for employment generation 
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as cotton is the main cash crop for Zambian small farmers (RATES, 2003). The 
textile industry was also privatized in the 1990s. The result was the establish-
ment of six large companies of which one is in majority Chinese hands, namely 
the Mulingushi textile mill (originally built in 1983, financed by Chinese aid and 
inaugurated with an interest-free loan from Beijing). At the time of privatization, 
the Mulingushi textile mill had been shut down for a while due to operational 
problems, but within a couple of years the textile mill had become Zambia’s larg-
est textile company. Until recently, the company directly employed 2,000 employ-
ees. In addition, it had two ginneries and contracted 5,000 farmers controlling 
10,000 hectares of cotton farms. Thereby, it became the only company in Zambia 
that, apart from growing seed cotton, ginning and spinning, also weaved yarn into 
cloth and produced garments.
The facts notwithstanding, the Zambian textile sector is changing rapidly. Al-
beit the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) offers increased prefer-
ential access for African exports to the US market (and therefore incentives to 
invest in the sector), it does not fully make up for the loss of preferences previ-
ously provided by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (Gibbon, 2003; Morris, 2006). 
Thus, even though the Chinese company, in collaboration with the Zambian 
state, seemed eager to take advantage of AGOA, competition from Chinese im-
ports became too fierce and by 2007 the textile mill had stopped its operations. 
The Chinese investment in the Zambian textile industry was thus an example 
of direct capacity building due to its dense network of linkages in Zambia. In-
directly, the investments could have turned out to be very beneficial indeed, as 
it would have entailed Zambia to continue to take advantage of AGOA indefi-
nitely, whereas other African countries, dependent on imports of fabric, yarn and 
thread, will lose preference in a few years.
The construction sector also contributes significantly to Zambia’s Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP). It differs from the other two sectors mentioned. The 
Zambian construction sector is dominated by locally-owned companies – only a 
tiny share of the total of almost 1,300 registered construction companies in Zam-
bia is foreign owned – among these, approximately twenty are Chinese (Centre 
for Chinese Studies, 2006). Domestic small-scale construction companies are 
concerned with the delivery and maintenance of buildings and infrastructure. 
Moreover, they supply the foreign companies with input. Large-scale construc-
tion projects in Zambia are by and large donor-financed. Lately, Chinese com-
panies have won the bulk of the large-scale tenders (Centre for Chinese Studies, 
2006; NCCZ, 2004). These companies do not directly compete with the local 
companies. Lately, however, several Chinese supply companies have been estab-
lished in Zambia. This may radically alter the situation for the local companies 
in the construction sector.
China’s investments in Africa
As hinted at above, this framework only allows us to further our understand-
ing of the effects on the domestic private sector of Chinese FDI. Stated differ-
ently, it does not take all the other vectors of Chinese presence into account. More 
importantly, hitherto it is limited only to Zambia. The effects, however, depend 
to a large degree on local capacities and local regulatory frameworks. It is there-
fore of utmost importance to broaden the scope of the research.
Several other research programs have been set in motion, for instance the 
Asian Drivers project referred to above.8 New research programs are also coming 
up. Among others, the Maastricht School of Management (MSM) in the Neth-
erlands is currently undertaking the “development cooperation and the private 
sector in Africa” research project, which seeks to further our understanding of the 
impact on African economies and in particular the possibilities to develop value 
chains. The program aims to increase the opportunities and eliminate constraints 
for African suppliers to be integrated in the regional and international markets. 
The research focus is on existing value chains to determine their export potential. 
The question asked each time is: what would be the role of the private sector in 
Africa and of China’s export and investments? Are they competing or are there 
complementarities?
This research project takes as the point of departure the limited explanatory 
usefulness of both orthodox theories of international trade, which predicts trade 
flows on the basis of comparative advantage, and more heterodox theories of trade 
that include institutional factors (the efforts to create a level playing field), trade 
in services, and capital flows. These theories point to the importance of political 
stability and local interests. They emphasize the need to liberalize the financial 
sector to create new investment opportunities, or bigger markets as major factors 
explaining capital flows. A lot of the Chinese trade and investments cannot really 
be explained by these theories and requires a different approach.
 Conclusions
There is no reason to believe that Chinese investments alone can fill Africa’s ex-
ternal resource gap in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals or speed 
up economic development. Other sources of finance are needed. This, however, 
does not mean that Chinese FDI to Africa is insignificant. In contrast, this chap-
ter has shown that although data on Chinese FDI are sparse, Chinese FDI is 
certainly becoming increasingly important – not only on its own terms, but above 
all because it is closely linked to other flows from China to the African continent. 
Moreover, the chapter has pointed to the differences and similarities between 
Chinese and “Western” FDI in Africa and thus hinted at the extent to which we 
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can approach Chinese FDI with the same analytical frameworks as more “tradi-
tional” FDI and to what extent we need new analytical frameworks.
We argue that even if Chinese investments in Africa resemble its Western 
counterparts in some very important respects, for instance, its focus on primary 
goods, its motives to invest, and its close links to its home country’s geopolitics 
are different. These are key differences requiring a broader analytical approach. 
Two approaches have been proposed.
The first approach takes its point of departure in the FDI literature that 
distinguishes between two different roles vis-à-vis the domestic private sector, 
namely crowding in (the development and upgrading of private firms to benefit 
from linkages with Trans National Corporations, TNCs) or crowding out (the 
distortion of growth of the domestic private sector either directly via competi-
tion on the market or indirectly via limiting access to finance and skills (Kumar, 
2003). This distinction between capacity builder on the one hand and competitor 
on the other, however, does not take the catalyzing role of FDI into account: FDI 
may catalyze domestic private sector development directly through investments 
in dormant sectors of the economy or by improvement of infrastructure and indi-
rectly via, for instance, increased attention to the domestic market.
The second approach links investments to another vector of interaction, 
namely trade. The point of departure is general economic theories (this time 
regarding trade), but due to the interconnectedness of investments and trade 
with other flows of capital, traditional trade theories cannot fully explain the 
phenomenon and its consequences for the development of Africa’s private sector. 
The solution suggested by the Round Table Africa project of MSM is to foster 
a structural cooperation between international businesses, local companies and 
policy-makers. The market opportunities as identified in the value chain stud-
ies will be tabled at value-chain, specific multi-stakeholder consultations. This 
should lead to new and improved sustainable economic activities in the region 
through the involvement of international and national investors, civil society 
and public sector actors.9
Notes
 In order to create a secure investment climate for its investors overseas, China signs BITs 
and double taxation treaties with African countries. These treaties protect and promote 
FDI by clarifying the terms for FDI between the signatories. In fact, China has concluded 
more BITs with African countries than any other economy (Broadman, ). 
 Besides the complicated aid setup, the following facts tend to make an accurate aid fig-
ure less likely: ministries are understaffed; the Chinese government fears that greater 
transparency simultaneously may lead to greater demands for aid by recipient countries 
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(because they are aware that other recipients receive more) and domestic critique due to 
the widespread poverty in China (Davies, ; Lancaster, ; Wang, ).
 In general, FDI data do not distinguish between overseas Chinese, state-led Chinese FDI 
and private investments. Moreover, data from national investment centres do not show 
actual FDI stocks nor FDI flows, but only investment commitments from investors who 
obtain investment licenses at these centres. Nevertheless, in most cases it is the only disag-
gregated FDI data from Africa.
 Figures by country will be given for several cases, but unfortunately they come from very 
different sources, which may affect their accuracy and recent nature. 
 For a description of how the Chinese state facilitates and supports Chinese enterprises in 
Zambia , see Chapter .
 This distinction first saw the light of the day in regard to Asian influence in Africa in 
Schmitz (). A number of more specific frameworks have also been proposed. For 
instance in the study of trade (Stevens and Kennan, ), and of aid (McCormick, 
).
 Currently, the development agreements between the major mining companies and the 
state are being renegotiated. Due to the low world market prices for copper in the late 
s, the mining companies were able to sign exceptionally profitable deals with the 
Zambian government. The marked increase in copper prices has made the Zambian gov-
ernment demand a windfall tax on copper (see also Fraser/Lungu). 
 See http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/research-teams/globalisation-team/research-themes/asian -
drivers for a description of the program. 
 www.roundtableafrica.net. More information can be obtained from the Sustainable De-
velopment Centre (SDC) of MSM, PO Box ,  BE, Maastricht, or the African 
partner, the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI) PO Box 
, Arusha, Tanzania.
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5 Competing trade policies with respect to Africa
Meine Pieter van Dijk1
 Introduction
European countries have been active in Africa for centuries. In the 1950s while 
preparing the Treaty of Rome, the beginning of the European Union (EU), it was 
France that insisted on special treatment for its former colonies. This resulted 
in the subsequent Yaounde, Lomé and Cotonou conventions between Europe 
and the so-called ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. The origi-
nal group of French and British former colonies has been extended to almost all 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, a number in the Caribbean and in the Pacific 
Ocean. Through the agreements, the EU gave non-reciprocal trade advantages to 
all ACP countries. Products from these countries, if certain conditions are met, 
have free access to the EU, meaning no tariffs or custom rights can be imposed. 
This is a kind of super-preferential system, providing the preferences of the GSP 
(General System of Preferences) to ACP countries.2 The problem is that the fa-
vorable treatment for Africa has not really increased trade very much and this is 
one of the reasons for the EU to change its trade policy with respect to Africa, as 
discussed below.
China ’s trade with Africa is expanding swiftly. It has increased ten times in 
the last ten years. South Africa n diamonds, Egyptian marble, Ethiopian sesame, 
Ugandan coffee, Gabon’s lumber and tobacco from Zimbabwe are often men-
tioned as products exported to China (Ethiopian Herald, 7 February, 2007). Chi-
na’s traditional exports to Africa (like textiles, clothing and furniture) keep in-
creasing, while electrical home appliances, cell phones, motor vehicles and other 
electronic and high-tech products have begun to pick up.
China is rapidly becoming the main trading partner of Africa (exports plus 
imports), bypassing the US, and the EU. Although total trade with Africa is only 
2.8 percent of China’s trade, China’s investments in Africa are 3.3 percent of Chi-
na’s total foreign investments (China Statistical Yearbook, 2007: 740). In 2008 
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China’s trade rose to 100 billion US$ (Effect, 21 February, 2009), which is more 
than one-third more than the year before. And 2008 was the seventh consecutive 
year of such rapid growth. Europe’s share has dwindled from 44 to 32 percent of 
the continent’s foreign trade within a decade (Mold, ed., 2008).
In this chapter we want to find out to what extent China ’s trade policy is dif-
ferent from the trade policies of the EU or the United States (US) with respect to 
assuring trade advantages to Africa. The Chinese approach of selective exemption 
of import duties will be compared with the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) of the EU and the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) of 
the US. Do the trade policies of the EU and the US compare favorably to those of 
China in Africa? To what extent is China in Africa following a different approach 
than Europe and the US? The comparison is complicated, because China has 
promised advantages, which are not yet in place and we don’t yet have the data to 
analyze whether these trade policies have really changed the trade flows.
One complication in this comparison is the role of the rules of origin.3 They 
specify when a product is accepted as a product originating in a certain country. 
The EU, US and China have different rules of origin, which is sometimes a real 
hazard. However, the EU is undertaking a long-overdue review of its rules of 
origin for all developing countries, which should lead to simplification.
Finally, there is the risk that the current international crisis leads to more pro-
tectionism.4 The current international financial and economic crisis has affected 
trade with Africa, if only because of lower demand due to lower world trade and 
because the prices of the raw materials have gone down. Hence the volumes ex-
ported are decreasing and there are signs that China is considering closing some 
of its African mines, like the copper mines or smelters it owns in Zambia .
 China ’s trade policy with respect to Africa
When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO ) at the end of 2001 
it indicated that it wanted to diversify its foreign trade flows. This also meant 
expanding trade with African countries. As far as these countries are members of 
the WTO, trade is based on what has been agreed during the different rounds of 
trade negotiations in the framework of the WTO and its predecessor (Van Dijk 
and Sideri, eds, 1996). This implies that China has agreed most-favored-nation 
(MFN) clauses with 41 African countries. It also has its own preference system 
for partner countries, like, for example, South Africa . This country alone is good 
for about 25 percent of China’s trade with Africa and is involved in negotiations 
on free trade agreements. Such agreements have been concluded already with a 
number of other African countries.
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The Forum on China -Africa cooperation in 2006 in Beijing consolidated 
plans to continue cooperating in all areas of trade and development. A number of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) were concluded with African countries and 
lower tariffs for products exported from Africa to China were promised (Berger, 
2008).5 Broadman (2007: 37) notes that high Asian tariff rates on some African 
products discouraged African exports. China has already introduced a zero tariff 
on 45 percent of its imports and plans to further lower its tariffs by the end of 
2007.6 At the same occasion in Beijing, China promised to boost trade access 
for the poorest and least developed African countries by raising the number of 
their export items that receive zero-tariff treatment. In the three-year action plan, 
China promised to reduce tariffs on selected African imports, to create more fa-
vorable access to China’s big market for African countries. All tariffs for Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) would eventually be reduced to zero, just like the 
EU does already with respect to LDCs.
According to the China Daily (14 November, 2007) the number of duty-free 
product lines has grown in 2007 to 454. Trade is supposed to contribute to the 
development of a country, but there are all kinds of evidence that Chinese compa-
nies are also engaged in the illegal export of tropical timber from Africa and that 
they are not always complying with local labor and environmental standards, for 
example in Congo (see Chapter 8). Unrest in the copper mine in Zambia (Chap-
ter 6) owned by the Chinese has been documented, while labor problems have 
also been reported in Chinese textile factories in Mauritius. These labor issues 
have been researched and documented by the International Labour Organisation 
(www.ilo.org).
China ’s goal is to create Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with African countries. This 
intention is modeled on the European approach of signing Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). In Box 5.1 the trade incentives promised by China to African 
countries are summarized.
Box 5.1 Trade incentives promised by China to African countries
China promised that import tariff s for products from Africa would be reduced. The number 
of products for which the zero tariff  applies will be increased from 190 to 440. This would 
make it easier for Africa to export to China. In return the country also wants better access to 
the markets of these African countries. Finally, China wants to apply the reciprocity required 
by the WTO and this is one of the reasons for the EU to negotiate the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with its ACP partners. China promised to help to develop Free Trade 
Areas (FTAs), where a very low, or no import tariff  applies. This idea of reaching an 
agreement with diff erent Free Trade Areas is a model inspired by the European EPA policy.
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In January 2005, the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) ended. It limited exports of 
textile and garments from developing countries to developed countries by imposing 
quotas (Van Dijk and Sideri, eds, 1996). We knew twelve years in advance that the 
MFA would run out, but China was one of the few countries anticipating this event 
by investing heavily in its local production capacity. Earlier Chinese companies had 
invested in textiles and garments industries in several African countries, which did 
not use up the textiles export quotas to which they were entitled under the Multi 
Fibre Agreement (MFA). By the ﬁ rst of January 2005 these factories were no longer 
needed, and China produced and exported as much textile and garments as it could 
produce in China and exported them directly to Europe and the US. Th e results 
were devastating for some African countries and the markets in Europe and the 
United States were ﬂ ooded with Chinese textiles and garments (see Box 5.2).
Box 5.2 China ’s role in Africa’s textile sector decline
The Chinese investments in the textiles and garments sector paid off  in 2005. As a result, the 
export of cotton T-shirts from China to the US, for example, increased 1573 percent (almost 
sixteen times: The Economist, 28 May, 2005). However, it was not broadly known that before 
2005 a lot of these Chinese T-shirts and other garments came from Chinese factories located 
in African countries, benefi ting from the non-used quota of these countries or the duty-
free exports to Europe under the Lomé agreement between Europe and the so-called ACP 
countries. This was one of the bizarre consequences of the MFA.
Source: Van Dijk (2005)
The US and Europe started to realize in April 2005 that something needed to be 
done. Interestingly, the US and Europe did not emphasize the impact of Chinese 
textiles exports on their own textile industry (the US had lost a million jobs in 
this sector since the Second World War; The Economist, 25 May, 2005). They 
stated that other developing countries in Latin America (according to the US) 
and in Africa or in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea area (according to 
Europe) suffered from these Chinese exports.
 European trade policies
Europe already had favorable trade policies in place for its former colonies in the 
1960s. A number of agreements defined, among other subjects, the trade relations 
between the EU and its former colonies. They gave African countries almost un-
limited access to the European market, except for certain agricultural products.7 
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Because of the substantial subsidies the EU provides to its farmers it is difficult, 
however, to compete with agricultural products grown in Europe.8 Furthermore, 
the diminishing of subsidies on agriculture by the EU has become negotiable in the 
current WTO Millennium round, but much depends on the willingness of France 
to expose its farmers to world market prices and to wean them off subsidies from 
Brussels.9 It is not so much the fact that the burden of the subsidies are not sustain-
able for the EU, but the high world market prices for agricultural products in 2008 
contributed to the willingness to review the current system.
Also tariffs for agro-industrial products tended to be higher than the tar-
iffs for raw materials. These agreements did not require reciprocity (providing 
the same treatment to European exports), while that is one of the fundamental 
principles of international trade agreements, such as the ones concluded by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO ). So far the EU has managed to get a waiver 
for its agreements, but since 2000 it has felt the need to make them compatible 
with the WTO rules. Finally, the EU rules of origin are quite complicated and 
restrictive.
Already the proposal for the Cotonou convention has admitted “the impact 
and relevance of the Lomé preferences (its predecessor) have been insufficient 
to generate a real dynamic” (Van Dijk, 1997). Hence the EU argues in favor 
of the negotiation of regional or subregional economic cooperation and part-
nership agreements linked to the overall EU-ACP partnership agreement. The 
ultimate objective would be to establish Economic Partnership Agreements to 
increase trade and investments with each of the three ACP regions: Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. The first stage of this gradual process would be to 
negotiate economic cooperation agreements with regional subgroups involved in 
integration processes, such as the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the East African Community (EAC). These agreements would 
include preferential trade arrangements with reciprocity gradually introduced 
for all ACP countries or groupings, “taking account of the criteria laid down by 
the European Council concerning such issues as compatibility with WTO rules”. 
The guidelines (EU, 1997) stress the importance of introducing geographical 
differentiation rather than continuing to deal with the ACP countries as a single 
block. In the meantime, the EU would offer technical assistance to the ACP 
countries to allow them to adjust gradually to the rules of international trade 
and to allow gradual integration in the multilateral trade system. This includes 
the development of their trading capacities and their ability to attract domestic 
and foreign investment.
Subsequently, the EU went for negotiating Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs) with its former colonies in Africa, which are WTO compatible 
and are based on reciprocity (Van Hoestenberghe and Van Dijk, 2007). The 
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EU had to change from a Lomé type of agreement to EPAs because the WTO 
would no longer accept such an agreement, which violates one of the basic prin-
ciples of trade agreements: what you allow one partner should be allowed to all 
partners.
The signing of the EPA during an EU Africa summit in Portugal in Decem-
ber 2007 was not without problems. President Wade from Senegal emphasized 
that Europe is competing with China and that China is a very attractive partner 
for Africa. He gave two examples. In the first place, the decision to undertake a 
project would be much shorter when dealing with China than when trying to 
reach agreement with, for example, the World Bank . Secondly, Wade noted that 
for the same money Africa could buy two cars in China but only one in Europe. In 
the end, a limited number of blocks of countries signed and in most cases interim 
trade agreements were concluded. By the time of the summit, thirteen African 
countries had signed such interim arrangements (Africa Renewal, January 2008), 
while the Caribbean countries signed as a block (Trade Negotiations Insights, 
Vol. 8, No. 1, February 2009). The first kind of agreements are also called EPA 
light (like those Ghana has signed), while the Caricom agreement is a full EPA. 
Some described the Lisbon meeting as chaotic and consider that the EPA process 
is in disarray. Dates have been fixed for further negotiations, but the original 
deadline has not been achieved for most countries. The gist of the EPAs is sum-
marized in Box 5.3.
Box 5.3 Why Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)?
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are the European Union (EU) continuation of the 
Lomé agreement (later the Cotonou agreement). The EPAs have three new elements:
1.  They are between trade blocks, rather than individual countries, although article 37-38 
of the Cotonou agreement also allows individual member states to sign an EPA
2.  They include reciprocity; EU products should also get free access to the countries in the 
specifi c trade block that have signed the agreement
3.  For a number of products, African countries have negotiated a period of transition (de 
facto protection) to allow them to fi rst become more competitive.
 
The issue is not just tariffs, but also the stringent non-tariff barriers of the EU, 
such as phyto-sanitary requirements and the so-called tracing requirements, 
which make it necessary to be able always to track a product to its origin and 
which makes exporting more difficult for developing countries. Many Third 
World activists consider that it is high time to do away with all subsidies in agri-
culture. However, such an agreement can only be achieved in multilateral negotia-
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tions, such as the current Doha (or Millennium) round of the WTO , which had 
come to a standstill in 2007 and does not seem to be moving again, because of the 
international financial crisis.10
Clearly not all actors in developing countries are positive about EPAs. In par-
ticular NGOs have criticized the EU over EPAs, questioning in particular to 
what extent this is a partnership? (The Citizen Tanzania, 14 December, 2007). 
NGOs consider EPAs a way to defend Europe’s interests in its former colonies. 
Some arguments used are summarized in Box 5.4. Without signing the EPA, 
some countries lose duty-free access to the European market.
Box 5.4 Critique of NGOs on Economic Partnership Agreements
The editorial of the Zambian newspaper, Business Post (26 February, 2008), starts with the 
heading “EPAs will harm poor countries”. It is suggested that China ’s ever growing trade 
with Africa has been a thorn in the fl esh for the EU. The EPAs would undermine the ACP 
countries’ economic development and “end up perpetuating economic misery among 
their people”. It explains that the EPAs entail opening up most of the African countries’ local 
markets to goods produced at a lower cost in developed European countries. Secondly, the 
EPAs will decrease government revenue through loss of tariff s and “undermine the benefi t 
of regional integration”.
The editorial does not mention that the cheaper Chinese products are already available 
and that there are not that many products that Europe can produce more cheaply. It is true 
that the government will receive fewer duties from imported goods, but a lot of goods are 
currently smuggled into Zambia , which also does not result in import duties. Finally, it is not 
mentioned that consumers will get cheaper products and hence their purchasing power 
goes up.
Source: Business Post (Zambia ) 26 February, 2008
Th e EU has also oﬀ ered greater access to all least developed countries (LDCs) by 
leveling up trade preferences to match the best deal under the Lomé convention or 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP; EU, 1997).11 Th is became the Every-
thing But Arms (EBA) initiative to facilitate export to Europe by LDCs.12 This 
special arrangement for the 50 least developed countries in the world allows these 
countries the most favorable treatment, granting duty-free and quota-free access 
to the European market, except for arms. Other countries might be prompted to 
invest in a LDC to export to the European market. Unfortunately, EBA has restric-
tive rules of origin and therefore is quite useless for many small countries, which 
need to work with other countries to obtain the parts necessary for a successful 
export product. Textiles are a case in point. If good quality threads need to be 
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imported to produce quality export textile and garments the EU would not con-
sider the final product as originating from the exporting ACP country and hence 
impose a tariff, despite EPA or EBA.
Although the EU is still the most important donor in Africa, it runs some 
important risks in its relation with Africa. In the first place it has not managed 
to get broad support for its EPAs. If some African countries continue to refuse 
to sign these agreements, or if these agreements will still be seen as negative 
for Africa, it could be that, in particular, the Chinese benefit. They offer simi-
lar relations and would like to use African countries to channel their products 
to Europe on favorable terms. The European market could hence be flooded if 
China exported on a large scale via Africa, using the low or zero duties that ap-
ply, under EPA or EBA.
The Financial Times (21 December, 2007) concluded on the EPA negotia-
tions: “Too many ACPs remain obsessed with clinging to colonial-era trade ac-
cess to Europe rather than liberalizing among themselves (and) The EU tried 
stuffing the deals with familiar excess baggage including rules on foreign in-
vestment, and used the threat of a less generous scheme to dragoon reluctant 
countries into signing”.
 American trade policies with respect to Africa
The US has a specific trade policy with respect to Africa, which is summarized 
as the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA). This act envisages lower 
tariffs for exports from African countries. AGOA provides the opportunity to 
benefit from the US offer of free access to African products for the US market. 
This applies to quite a number of products. Similar to the EU, the US also of-
fers developing countries through the African Growth and Opportunities Act 
(AGOA) almost totally free access to the American market. China cannot yet 
offer such favorable conditions (see Box 5.1). However, AGOA also has rules of 
origin and the US may exclude countries for political reasons. This is what hap-
pened to Zimbabwe, for example.
The AGOA provides incentives to invest in exporting industries in African 
countries. It makes exports to the US of African products much easier and at-
tractive instead of exporting directly from, for example, China . In particular, the 
textiles and garments industries have benefited from AGOA. Unfortunately, a lot 
of the production capacity built up under AGOA was destroyed when the Multi 
Fibre Agreement ended in 2005 (see Box 5.2).
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 Th e EU and US trade policies still compare favorably to China 
In Africa, the major superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) used to compete 
with each other, for influence, raw materials, markets and political support. The 
US also always had to compete with Europe in Africa. Except for their African 
Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), which makes exports to the US much 
easier and attractive, the US does not provide as much development assistance to 
Africa as the EU. Now the Chinese are beating the US in this respect. However, 
in terms of investments the EU and the US are still more important than China 
in Africa and the EU still provides more aid than China, while the EU and the 
US also still have a lot of influence and goodwill in Africa.
Jacoby (2007) recommends that African states continue with trade liberaliza-
tion and continue with the development of intra-regional trade and a further 
division of labor between African states. He expects they would benefit from 
cooperation with Chinese partners in overcoming market entry hurdles, given 
the Chinese success in entering Western markets. To maximize their investments 
from abroad they will have to create a level playing field. To maximize the benefits 
from Chinese projects, Sub-Saharan African countries should strive to provide 
more skilled local labor, thus raising employment. Jacoby (2007) adds that mov-
ing towards other forms of cooperation, such as joint ventures, promotes technol-
ogy transfer and more sustainable relations.
 Conclusions
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) failed to convince the ACP 
countries and only a limited number of countries signed them in Lisbon at the 
end of 2007. Many Europeans consider the EPAs to be beneficial for Africa. The 
argument in Europe seems to be: we allowed the continent independence; we gave 
it development aid, signed the Lomé and Cotonou agreements and are now forced 
by the WTO to go for EPAs. Many Europeans consider that the EPAs reflect the 
modern thinking on reciprocity in trade relations and often think it is time for 
African countries to also try to become competitive in the global economy.
Do the European Union and the United States also compare favorably to Chi-
na in Africa as far as the trade policy is concerned? Table 5.1 summarizes the find-
ings, noting that all three blocks comply with WTO rules, but have additional 
packages, such as EPA, AGOA and BITs. Wissenbach (2008) rightly remarks 
that the “success” of China in Africa does not necessarily mean it’s at the expense 
of an erosion of European influence.
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Table 5.1 Trade policies of the EU, US and China compared on major points
Indicator Trade policies of 
the EU
Trade policies of 
the US
China’ s trade policy
Tariff s Zero under EPA or 
EBA, but restrictive 
rules of origin
Free access to 
American markets 
for African products, 
but under certain 
conditions
High tariff s, except 
for 450 products, 
which have been 
exempted
Exceptions Certain agricultural 
products13 under EPA 
and arms under EBA
Certain countries 
can be excluded for 
political reasons
What has been 
agreed in the 
Bilateral Investment 
Treaties
Non-tariff  barriers, 
including rules of 
origin and necessary 
health and safety 
controls
Some non-tariff  
barriers, like the 
so-called tracing 
requirements, which 
make it necessary 
to always be able to 
track a product to its 
origin
Not such 
complicated and 
restrictive rules of 
origin as the EU 
EPA. The rules of 
origin of EPA are less 
restrictive than for 
EBA
Exist but in 
compliance with 
WTO regulation
Reciprocity Not under EBA, but 
eventually under EPA 
No Wants better access 
to markets of African 
countries in the 
future, similar to EPA
China has promised that eventually it will allow more products duty-free into the 
Chinese market. EPA and AGOA are in principle very favorable trade policies 
and China cannot match these market access conditions. Although the developing 
countries criticize the EU for its restrictive rules of origin and the necessary health 
and safety controls, they can currently usually continue to trade with Europe un-
der the favorable EBA, even if the country has not signed EPA. China’s trade 
policies are more restrictive than those of the US and EU, and it will take quite 
some time before they are as open towards Africa in trade terms as the US and 
the EU are through EPA and AGOA. Th e EU does not simultaneously open its 
markets for agricultural products from Africa. Hopefully that will happen in the 
framework of the Doha round of the WTO , when subsidies will be on the agenda.
Broadman (2006) argues that China ’s trade with Africa is about more than 
just raw materials. He is optimistic that this trade allows Africa to become a 
processor of raw materials and a competitive supplier of other goods and serv-
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ices. That would be a big change compared to the past, but the question is how 
much evidence Broadman can provide for these predictions. Recently some Af-
rican economists complained that China just wants to get raw materials from 
Africa to sell manufactured products to the continent (IHT, 3 November, 2006). 
It reminded them of the colonial period.
Broadman (2007) notes three positive trends in the relations between China 
and Africa. First there is the prospect for more resource-based, value-added man-
ufacturing exports to China; second, there is a prospect for broader participation 
in global value chains; and finally there is the diversity among African countries, 
which is a potential benefit in the case of further regional integration. The book 
by Broadman (2006) is interesting since he comes up with a number of recom-
mendations to further balance the trade between Africa and China:
1. At-the-border reforms, such as elimination of China ’s (and India’s) escalating 
tariffs on Africa’s leading exports
2. Elimination of Africa’s tariﬀ s on certain inputs that make exports uncompetitive
3. Between-the-border improvements in trade facilitation mechanisms to de-
crease the transaction costs
4. Reforms that leverage linkages between investment and trade, to allow African 
businesses to participate in global production networks that investment by 
Chinese and Indian firms can generate.
These measures may work, but they will also benefit China . Hence it is certainly 
necessary to closely monitor the developments and research, to see to it that 
Africa really benefits from these trade policies as well.14
 Notes
 I wish to thank Maaike Galle and Karel van Hoestenberghe for their comments.
 The GSP is a system of reduced tariffs for manufactured goods and processed agricultural 
products imported into the EU. The tariff cuts range from  percent to total exemptions.
 The development of more uniform and flexible rules of origin may be more helpful than 
additional preferences to developing countries. Eurostep () rightly argues in favor 
of simplified rules of origin and increased ceilings for import content to promote South-
South trade, but the WTO seems to be the best forum to achieve this.
 Neo-protectionism: the green protectionism in developed countries and imposing labor 
standards on developing countries.
 Also the US seeks “trade insurance with bilateral pacts” (Financial Times,  March, 
) and the EU does the same with Asian countries, because the multilateral agree-
ments do not go far enough (NRC,  March, ).
 All kinds of other barriers to trade can exist, such as technical barriers, the practice (ver-
sus the rules) of customs valuation, import licensing and rules of origin.
 Meine Pieter van Dijk
 The negative external impact of the European Union’s common agricultural policy is dis-
cussed in a separate chapter in Van Dijk and Sideri (eds, ).
 In the early s, Dutch non-governmental organizations (NGOs), jointly with other 
European NGOs, criticized the export of subsidized EU beef to West Africa. They suc-
cessfully argued that West African countries should export meat instead of importing 
subsidized European meat via an Abidjan slaughterhouse built with support of the EU to 
export Sahelian meat.
 The competence of the WTO has been extended to new areas such as agriculture, ser-
vices, trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMs).
 A lot will depend on Europe’s willingness to give in as far as protecting agriculture is 
concerned.
 At the Ministerial conference of the WTO in Singapore in December , an agreement 
was reached on the principle of providing a zero tariff for exports from Least Developed 
Countries.
 It is based on the generalised system of preferences (GSP -), which agrees to 
important trade preferences for developing countries. GSP is an autonomous trade ar-
rangement through which the EU provides non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU 
market to  developing countries or territories. 
 In particular beef, rum, cocoa and bananas.
 A series of seminars and publications can help to assess the results of China ’s presence in 
Africa over time. Some of the contributions in this book were discussed during seminars of 
the EADI working group on industrial development, in particular Chapters , ,  and .
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Part III
Case studies

6 State-driven Chinese investments in Zambia : 
Combining strategic interests and proﬁ ts
Anders Bastholm and Peter Kragelund1
 Introduction
The meeting in November 2006 of 48 African leaders gathered in Beijing , to-
gether with their Chinese hosts, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, 
to inaugurate the 3rd Forum on China -Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) marked the 
zenith of Sino-African cooperation. It followed the dramatically intensified po-
litical and economic interactions between China and African countries. Figures 
on trade, aid and investment are increasing rapidly and political ties are growing 
stronger, as are personal ties between the political elites of China and Africa. 
This relationship is of immense significance for Africa’s political and economic 
development; and naturally, both media and scholarly attention on the topic is 
growing.
While overall Foreign Direct Investment (FDI )2 into Africa is relatively mod-
est (Asiedu, 2004), Chinese FDI to Africa is growing at a very fast pace: China is 
currently the third most important investor in Africa, and African expectations 
for the future are high. A recent survey amongst national investment promotion 
agencies in several African countries ranked China as the third most important 
future investor after South Africa and the United States (US) (UNCTAD, 2005). 
In a decade, Chinese FDI stock in Africa has increased almost five times – from 
approximately 260 million US$ in 1995 to 1250 million US$ in 2006 (Chapter 3). 
The Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009, the immediate result of the FOCAC, along 
with China’s Africa Policy (from 2006) lays the foundation for strengthening the 
relationship between China and African countries in the future. In particular, 
trade and FDI figures are likely to continue growing rapidly, underpinned by 
political initiatives like, for example, the creation of three to five Economic Trade 
and Cooperation Zones in Africa; the establishment of the China-Africa Devel-
opment Fund of five billion US$ to support Chinese investors in Africa; and the 
provision of a zero-tariff treatment on a large range of African goods.
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The purpose of this chapter is to go beyond the all-encompassing type analy-
ses that have characterized most recent writing on the Sino-African relationship. 
Instead, we take a closer look at one particular aspect of this complex and multi-
faceted issue, namely Chinese FDI in one African country. This chapter focuses 
on the ability of the Chinese state to create advantages for Chinese companies 
that invest in Africa. It seeks to increase our knowledge of the international as 
well as the local dynamics of Chinese investments in Africa, and heighten our 
understanding of the terms on which Chinese companies operate in the African 
context. We use Zambia as a case and scrutinize Chinese investments here and 
the conditions under which they take place.3
FDI is important in the capital formation process in Africa. In fact, external fi-
nance currently dominates the majority of African economies, and FDI is a grow-
ing source of external finance. Proponents of FDI argue that FDI creates employ-
ment, facilitates technology transfer, and improves competitiveness. It should be 
noted though, that FDI is by no means by definition positive for development. 
Rather, the developmental effects of FDI are ambiguous, depending on factors 
such as the motive of FDI, the strategies, the time, and the local absorption capac-
ity (Kragelund, 2007). In order to further our understanding of the consequences 
of China ’s FDI in Africa we need first to scrutinize the specific mechanisms and 
strategies of these investments.
Zambia has been chosen as a case for several reasons: China has been present in 
Zambia since independence in 1964; Zambia is the third most important destina-
tion of Chinese FDI in Africa (Lafargue, 2005) and, next to South Africa , Zam-
bia is the most important destination for Chinese non-oil investments in Africa. 
Chinese companies invest in practically all sectors of the Zambian economy; to 
date, more than 200 Chinese companies have invested in Zambia; and the stock 
of Chinese investment reached 570 million US$ in 2006.4 These figures are likely 
to increase significantly as President Hu Jintao, during a visit to Zambia in Feb-
ruary 2007, pledged Chinese FDI of 800 million US$ for Zambia.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section two sets out to build a framework 
to understand why and how Chinese companies invest in Zambia . It departs from 
the eclectic paradigm and stresses the importance of both home and host factors 
as well as the institutional context for FDI . This set of theories, however, is criti-
cized for not taking the role of the state into account. Therefore, inspiration is 
drawn from the literature on transnational corporations (TNC) from emerging 
economies in order to further our understanding of the specific nature of Chinese 
FDI. Section three pinpoints the strategic importance of outward FDI (OFDI) 
for China . While section four provides an overview of Chinese investments in 
Zambia, section five illustrates how the Chinese state supports Chinese inves-
State-driven Chinese investments in Zambia
tors in Zambia. Sections six to eight describe Chinese investments in three key 
sectors of the Zambian economy: mining, construction, and agriculture. Based 
on these cases, section nine takes a fresh look at the motives for Chinese FDI in 
Zambia and how the Chinese state facilitates these investments.
 Understanding Foreign Direct Investments – bringing the state 
back in
Among the most widely used approaches to account for companies’ interna-
tionalization patterns is Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, which seeks to enable an 
analysis of the determinants of FDI by paying attention to firm-internal as well 
as firm-external factors (Dunning, 2001, 1993). The paradigm conceptualizes a 
company’s decision to invest abroad according to advantages that relate to firm-
specific advantages internal to the firm (ownership-advantages (O)); to immobile 
production advantages (location-advantages (L)), which in combination with the 
O-advantages, determine where a company invests; and to advantages of choos-
ing a specific organizational setup in a certain setting (internalization-advantages 
(I)). The OLI-model, as it is named, alongside the investment development path 
(IDP) hypothesis, which connects a home country’s structural features (espe-
cially economic development) with patterns of outward FDI (OFDI), form the 
two central components of the eclectic paradigm.
The relative significance of explanatory factors pertaining to FDI varies with 
the specific context and scale of analysis. Therefore, the eclectic paradigm should 
be perceived as a conceptual toolbox from which researchers can pick the most 
useful tools. The advantages of the paradigm are that it emphasizes the interplay 
between individual firms and locations, and thus pays attention to the influence 
of the host – as well as the home country upon flows of FDI. Thereby, the para-
digm hits at why companies internationalize. Using Dunning’s paradigm, FDI 
can be categorized into different types, according to investment motives. The four 
types are: resource-seeking FDI (e.g. access to natural resources); market-seeking 
FDI (e.g. expand sales in an external market); efficiency-seeking FDI (e.g. in-
crease productivity by localizing production in a host country with low labor 
costs), and strategic asset-seeking FDI (e.g. internalize strategic assets of other 
companies, such as technology and management skills) (UNCTAD, 2006).
Th e eclectic paradigm was constructed largely upon the basis of examples of the 
internalization process of ideal-type, profit-maximizing (private) Anglo-Saxon 
TNCs. Only recently it was adapted and applied to an emerging economy con-
text. Therefore, it has been criticized for not taking into account the specific char-
acteristics of TNCs from emerging and transitional economies, stemming from 
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their home-economy contexts (Goldstein, 2007). Based partly on this critique, 
a large and growing literature has emerged, which seeks to explain the specific 
phenomenon of emerging economies’ OFDI.
The literature of FDI from emerging countries can be divided into two phases. 
The first relates to the emergence of Third World multinationals, which first 
gained scholarly attention in the 1970s, and the second relates to the current focus 
on global top-TNCs from emerging economies. While none of them specifically 
relates to Chinese OFDI in Africa, they both offer valuable insights into the na-
ture of the internationalization pattern of Chinese enterprises and thereby, also 
of Chinese OFDI.
The first wave of literature focused on the specific characteristics of companies 
from non-industrialized countries that operated outside their country of origin. 
In general, these companies were perceived both as an engine of growth in their 
home economies and as an effective device to boost South-South cooperation 
and, thereby, pave the way for an alternative development path. However, this 
literature stereotyped these companies – often in contrast to traditional TNCs. 
Thereby, many studies missed out the variety and complexity of the companies 
(Yeung, 1994).
Notwithstanding this critique, a number of characteristics emerge from the 
literature. To begin with, this so-called first wave of Emerging TNCs (ETNC) 
is perceived as a result of market restrictions and export difficulties in the home 
countries (Mathews, 2006; Yeung, 1999). They were, in other words, pushed to 
internationalize. In addition, they showed a high degree of geographical proxim-
ity, and their comparative advantage was perceived to relate to their ability to 
minimize economic risks due to ethnic and cultural affiliations between home- 
and host nations; to their ability to adapt products and processes to local needs; 
and to their concentration on low-price products. Of particular interest to the 
study of Chinese OFDI, is Aggarwal and Agmon’s (1990) study that highlighted 
the important (and changing) role of the state to direct and support ETNCs in 
their internationalization process.
Linked to this, another strand of literature also places emphasis on the ac-
tive role of the state in the internationalization process. Herein, it is argued that 
the state has vested interests in the emergence and growth of OFDI from do-
mestic firms as part of the process of the wider national economic development. 
Not only firms are competing, nation-states are also competing for shares in the 
world market (Porter, 1990). Therefore, the state, by means of policies; govern-
ment agencies; and state-owned financial institutions, may play a significant and 
central role in supporting and shaping the stream of OFDI emerging from their 
home economy, as is evidently seen in the case of the developmental states of East 
Asia (Woo-Cumings, 1999).
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The second wave of literature on ETNCs departs from the identification of 
several ETNCs among the global top-500 TNCs. It pays particular attention to 
the facts and figures of the global top-ETNCs (Goldstein, 2007). Compared to 
the first wave of ETNCs that were pushed to internationalize, this second wave 
is pulled to internationalize in order to leverage resources by linking up to firms 
abroad (Mathews, 2006).
 Chinese outward FDI and the role of state policies
Before Deng Xiaoping initiated political and economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
Chinese OFDI was virtually non-existent. Overseas investments only took place 
as part of government-sponsored development assistance projects or were in-
tended to facilitate trade. However as a consequence of the changing political 
discourse in China vis-à-vis the outside world, the Chinese State Council passed 
legislation in August 1979 allowing specific state-owned companies to invest 
overseas (Lunding, 2006). This political change became the starting point for 
emerging Chinese OFDI, and, together with the sustained economic growth of 
the past three decades, it provided the basis for both the emergence and growth 
of Chinese OFDI.
Figure 6.1 Chinese OFDI fl ows 1979-2006
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However, as depicted in Figure 6.15, the reforms did not lead to immediate growth 
in OFDI. Rather, Chinese OFDI, being limited to certain types of companies, 
was an insignificant foreign economic activity for many years. Only from the mid-
1980s, when the government initiated a liberalization process and allowed other 
types of Chinese companies to invest overseas, Chinese OFDI took off. In 1992, 
internationalization of Chinese enterprises was incorporated in the national eco-
nomic policy (Buckley et al., 2007). Following this, private Chinese enterprises 
also began to invest overseas (Wu and Chen, 2001). This resulted in an immediate 
rise in OFDI, as depicted in Figure 6.1. Most OFDI went to nearby Hong Kong 
where Chinese investors speculated in the real estate and stock markets. This led 
the Chinese state to tighten up the screening and approval procedures for OFDI 
(Zhang, 2005). Figure 6.1 also shows the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
which resulted in a general slow-down of Chinese OFDI. Then, in 2001, with 
the approval of the “Go Out” policy6 (see below) this tendency was reversed and 
Chinese ODFI has since grown considerably. If the latest (and highest) figure, 
reported in Xinhua (2007), is to be believed, China is currently ranked thirteenth 
on a global scale in terms of OFDI flows with an estimated flow of 16.1 billion 
US$ in 2006, and a total stock of 73.3 billion US$.
Various factors have contributed to the growth of Chinese OFDI. Economic 
growth in China in the past three decades has resulted in an accumulation of 
capital (the stock of foreign exchange reserves is currently surmounting 1.33 tril-
lion US$); an increasing level of human capital; and increased learning amongst 
domestic firms as a result of “spill-over” effects from inward FDI . Besides the 
range of economic growth-related factors influencing Chinese OFDI, the Chi-
nese state and its institutions also wield significant influence over Chinese OFDI.
Chinese OFDI originates in a home-economy context with a high degree of 
political control and with a long tradition of central planning. Hence, Chinese 
OFDI is still predominantly undertaken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(Wu and Chen 2001; Buckley et al., 2007; Woo and Zhang, 2006). These SOEs 
are instruments of Chinese foreign policy, and the central government plays a 
determining role in directing FDI activities of the SOEs. Various domestic and 
international motives for Chinese OFDI have been outlined: Chinese companies 
are urged to invest overseas in order to get access to new markets as China ’s in-
dustrial capacity in many industries now exceeds the domestic demand; OFDI is 
used as a means to secure supply of natural resources; OFDI has also been used 
to circumvent import quotas; to convey technological and managerial capabilities 
into the Chinese economy from more advanced economies; and lastly to pursue 
political goals (Wang, 2002).
The so-called “Go Out” policy in China reduced red tape to make procedures 
more OFDI-friendly. It entitles certain firms to tax incentives, cheap loans, di-
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rect or indirect subsidies; and various types of support from state institutions 
in China and in host-country contexts. In spite of this policy, and in spite of the 
most recent developments towards streamlining the approval process of investing 
abroad, Chinese OFDI flows are still restricted and controlled by means of highly 
bureaucratic application and approval procedures (Sauvant, 2005). The Chinese 
state, thereby, selectively creates various advantages and disadvantages respec-
tively for domestic firms in accordance with the interests of the state.
Currently the bulk of Chinese OFDI targets nearby countries in Asia, but 
compared to the size of the host economies, African countries are indeed very 
important. The total amount of Chinese OFDI to Africa is unclear: data are 
deficient and different sources mention different figures. Nevertheless, there is 
no doubt that OFDI to Africa during the 1990s increased, but the importance 
of Africa in total OFDI sometimes appears exaggerated. Wong and Chan (2003: 
Figure 6.2), for instance, report that while only 4 percent of Chinese OFDI went 
to Africa in 1991, this figure increased to 16 percent in 2001. This trend contrasts 
to other, more recent studies (Schüller and Turner, 2005).
Th e growing importance of Africa for Chinese companies is shown by the num-
bers (more than 80 in 1988 and 900 in 2006) and the increased FDI stock (from 
54 million US$ in 1992 to 1,250 million US$ in 2006). In less than two decades the 
number of Chinese enterprises in Africa has increased more than eleven times and 
the stock of Chinese FDI has increased 23 times in less than ﬁ fteen years. Moreo-
ver, the growing importance of smaller (partly private) Chinese investments in 
Africa can be noticed. While the average size of investments in the year 2000 was 
almost two million US$, this ﬁ gure decreased to approximately 1.4 million US$ 
in 2006. Hence, even though Chinese investments in the oil sector get the lion’s 
share of public and academic coverage, Chinese OFDI increasingly dominates in-
vestments in all sectors. Zambia is an excellent case to study these non-oil invest-
ments. Chinese companies have been present in Zambia since Zambia’s independ-
ence and Chinese OFDI targets basically all sectors of the economy.
 Chinese investments in Zambia 
China has invested in Zambia since the country, as the first Southern African 
nation, established diplomatic ties with China immediately after independence 
in 1964. The first Chinese investments in Zambia materialized in the form of 
development aid, and since then, China has undertaken at least 35 development 
projects in Zambia. During the past decade Chinese investments have changed. 
By the end of 2006 a total of 200 Chinese companies and FDI stock of more than 
570 million US$ was recorded by the Chinese Centre for Investment Promotion 
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and Trade (CCIPT). These investments are characterized by a combination of 
political and economic interests. But the historical friendship is still an important 
factor for contemporary Chinese investments in Zambia. Kenneth Kaunda, the 
first president of Zambia, describes it like this:
Th e Chinese investments in Zambia today are diﬀ erent than the investments 
of the 1960s and 70s – today there is a lot of economic interest (...) [but] I 
believe that, even today, the history of political friendship between Zambia 
and China plays a very important role for Chinese investments in Zambia.7
Figure 6.2 depicts the development of Chinese investments in Zambia from 1993 
to 2006. The numbers represent the amounts registered in investment licenses 
with the Zambia Investment Centre (ZIC) and thus only provide a rough ap-
proximation of real investment figures.8
Figure 6.2 Approved Chinese FDI licenses in Zambia 1993–2006
It should be noted though, that the largest Chinese investment in Zambia ever, 
namely the 200 million US$ Chambishi Copper Smelter, which caused total reg-
istered licenses in manufacturing to reach 210 million US$ in 2006, cannot be 
represented properly within the range of the graph. Moreover, the second largest 
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Chinese investment in Zambia (the 150 million US$ investment in the Cham-
bishi Copper Mine) is not included in the figure, because this investment was 
licensed by the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development and not by ZIC.
Figure 6.3 Distribution of Chinese FDI : the four largest sectors
Even though the Chambishi mine is not registered by ZIC it is included in Figure 
6.3, which depicts the sectoral distribution of Chinese investments in Zambia . A 
large proportion of the value invested in the manufacturing sector (approximate-
ly 230 million US$) is closely related to mining activities. The Chambishi mine 
along with the Chambishi Copper Smelter and Sino-Metals Leach and Acid 
Products Zambia Ltd., which constitute our mining case, make up more than 60 
percent of all Chinese investments in Zambia and they are all subsidiaries of the 
same Chinese state-led group: the China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Co. 
Ltd. (CNMC). There are six other Chinese mining investments in Zambia, but 
these are considerably smaller, below five million US$ each.
Twenty Chinese companies were operating in the construction sector in Zam-
bia in 2006; all of them established in the past ten to fifteen years. Until recently, 
most of them were state-owned, but the rise of private companies in China has 
influenced ownership configurations overseas. The Centre for Chinese Studies 
(2006: 55ff ) asserts that half of the Chinese construction companies in Zambia 
in 2006 were privately owned.9 Among the Chinese construction companies in 
Zambia are the large SOE, China Jiangxi Corporation (CJC), and the smaller 
privately owned company, Zamchin Construction (ZC). CJC is one of the three 
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largest Chinese construction companies in Zambia and has invested six million 
US$ since 1995, while the ZC, founded in 1998, made an initial investment of 
around 400,000 US$. Together the two construction companies, which consti-
tute our construction case, form 16 percent of Chinese investments in the Zam-
bian construction sector.
In the agricultural sector, the largest Chinese player is the state-owned China 
State Farms Agribusiness Corporation (Group) Co. Ltd (CSFAC). CSFAC owns 
three farms in Zambia , the China Zambia Friendship farm, Jhonken Friendship 
Farm, and Jhonken Estates. The three investments of CSFAC, which constitute 
our agricultural case, amount to 2.9 million US$, constituting almost a third of 
Chinese agricultural sector investments in Zambia.
 Th e Chinese state and Chinese investments in Zambia 
Th e Chinese state backs Chinese investments in Zambia via diﬀ erent channels 
and at diﬀ erent scales. At the highest political level, the Chinese government lends 
its support to Chinese investors by means of the FOCAC as well as by paying 
oﬃ  cial state visits to the country.10 At this level, negotiations concerning Chinese 
development assistance and investments take place, and Chinese leaders use their 
authority and access to the Zambian political elite to positively inﬂ uence the con-
ditions for Chinese investments in Zambia. Th e relationship between the Chinese 
government and the Zambian ruling party, Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD), is very close. Th e Chinese government openly supports MMD, both ﬁ -
nancially and rhetorically.11 Th e close and personalized linkages between the Chi-
nese central government (along with its representatives in Zambia at the Chinese 
embassy) and the Zambian political elite provide the Chinese investors with a very 
direct channel of communication with the Zambian authorities that may facilitate 
advantageous investment terms vis-à-vis other investors.
Support from the Chinese central government produces a range of more con-
crete supportive measures in Zambia , in the form of four central organizations 
set up at the request of the Chinese state to support the Chinese investors in their 
day-to-day activities, namely the Chinese Embassy, the Association of Chinese 
Corporations in Zambia (ACCZ), the CCIPT, and the Zambian branch of Bank 
of China (BOC).
The Chinese Embassy, and specifically the Economic Counsellor’s Office, is 
the most important contact for Chinese investors in Zambia . Here, investors get 
advice on investment options and crucial support to establish contacts with Zam-
bian authorities and the Zambian elite. The Embassy is the extended arm of the 
Chinese political leadership and it is directly involved in investment negotiations.
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The ACCZ, established in 2005, functions as the Chinese Chamber of Com-
merce in Zambia with around 60 Chinese member companies. ACCZ was estab-
lished by political decree of MOFCOM (which also funds it), and falls directly 
under the authority of the Economic Counsellor’s Office in Zambia (with the 
Economic Counsellor himself presiding over the organization and hand-picking 
the members of the board amongst the senior management staff of the larger 
Chinese companies in Zambia). ACCZ takes care of the interests of the Chinese 
companies both vis-à-vis the Zambian public and the Zambian authorities, com-
municating and promoting the cause of the Chinese investors directly with local 
authorities and indirectly through public media. ACCZ also educates its mem-
bers in the rules and regulations of Zambia and handles immigration and labor 
cases for Chinese companies on behalf of the Chinese Embassy.
The CCIPT, like the ACCZ, is a parastatal organization established in 2002 
upon the request of MOFCOM.12 The primary function of CCIPT is to identify 
suitable investment options, provide practical support (in the form of accom-
modation, transport and communication), and facilitate contacts with relevant 
Zambian authorities for potential or newly arrived Chinese investors.13
The last supportive institution in place in Zambia , the BOC Zambia branch, 
is different from the other institutions as it is not a political organization or in-
stitution per se. Rather, BOC is a state-owned commercial bank. In the Zambian 
context, however, BOC’s investment is strictly political and entirely non-com-
mercial. This first Chinese bank in Sub-Saharan Africa was established in Zam-
bia by political decree of then vice-premier Zhu Rongji in 1997 with the purpose 
of facilitating operations of Chinese investors in Zambia. Since it was established 
ten years ago, BOC has made no profit. BOC is not in Zambia to make profit but 
to facilitate the day-to-day activities of Chinese companies in Zambia. Accord-
ing to Mr. Zhu, the manager of BOC Zambia, all Chinese investors in Zambia 
use BOC for daily banking operations and for transferring money to and from 
China .14 BOC, thus, is a strategic investment that considerably reduces the dif-
ficulties of Chinese investors to manage their banking affairs in a foreign context.
Another concrete outcome of the Chinese state’s policy is the opening of the 
Zambia -China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. Hu Jintao was partak-
ing directly in the negotiations over the coming investments in the newly estab-
lished economic zone, which is situated around the Chambishi mine in the Cop-
perbelt. This zone is the first of three to five exclusively Chinese Economic and 
Trade Cooperation Zones that, according to the Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009, 
is to be established in African countries before the end of 2009. This zone will 
benefit CNMC, which has been assigned by the Chinese government to manage 
the zone. The aim is to build a production chain centered around CNMC’s key 
enterprises and to create an export hub for locally produced Chinese products 
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to the Southern African region. The Chinese government will strongly support 
investments in the zone via cheap financial packages, through state-owned banks, 
and by Chinese development assistance and Hu Jintao pledged a total of 800 mil-
lion US$ in investments over the next three years.
 Chinese FDI in mining
The mining sector is of economic and political importance in both Zambia and 
China : Zambia is Africa’s leading copper producer – the copper mines in Zam-
bia produce almost 60 percent of Africa’s copper and copper exports constitute 
40 percent of Zambia’s total exports. By contrast, China is the world’s largest 
copper consumer – in 2005, it accounted for more than one-fourth of the world 
consumption, and demand is increasing rapidly. Meanwhile, China’s copper pro-
duction is increasing at a much slower rate and the average grade of ore is very low 
(between 0.4 to 0.6 percent). China therefore imports large volumes of copper, 
and Zambia and Chile are the most important suppliers (Streifel, 2006; Hilson 
and Haselip, 2004; Goldstein et al., 2006; AMM, 2002).
A combination of rapidly growing demand for copper (especially from China 
and to a lesser degree from, for example, India), falling stocks, and the effect of 
earlier capacity closures when prices were low, has caused international copper 
prices to rise rapidly, reaching record nominal highs in 2006 (Africa Research 
Bulletin, 2006b). Moreover, numerous strikes, technical problems, and lower ore 
grades have been reported in the most important sourcing countries. Increasing 
prices and local problems have triggered massive Chinese OFDI in the mining 
sector in order for Chinese companies to gain a better control of its external 
resource supply.
The privatization of the Zambian mining sector in the 1990s, set in motion by 
the international financial institutions, rendered this process possible in Zambia . 
Among the mines that were privatized was the relatively small Chambishi mine. 
NFC Africa (a subsidiary of CNMC) bought an 85 percent share of the almost 
dormant mine for twenty million US$ in June 1998. Chambishi mine is China ’s 
first and largest overseas nonferrous metal mine and since the acquisition of the 
shares the Chinese group has invested a total of 150 million US$ to restore the 
mine back into production, which happened in 2003. The purchase of the Cham-
bishi mine gives China control over considerable copper resources; the Chambi-
shi mine still only produces between 5 and 10 percent of Zambia’s total annual 
copper output (55,000 tonnes copper concentrates).
Since the initial investment by CNMC, the SOE has invested in two other cop-
per-related productive facilities: the Chambishi Copper Smelter ( jointly owned 
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by CNMC, with a 60 percent share, and the parastatal Yunnan Copper Industrial 
Group) and the Sino-Metals leach plant (where CNMC holds a 70 percent share; 
and state-owned China Hainan Sino-Africa Mining Investment Ltd. holds a 30 
percent share). The construction of the copper smelter is intended to release NFC 
Africa from its dependence on the South Africa n smelting company Transmine, 
which purchases around 40,000 tonnes of the produced copper concentrate. The 
last 15,000 tonnes are sold directly to China, but when the copper smelter came 
into operation in 2008, CNMC and its partners gained full control of the copper 
production chain and will export the refined copper directly to China.
According to the management secretary of the NFC Africa, the company 
would most likely not have invested in Zambia without the support of the Chi-
nese government. The parent company in China benefits from the investment 
policies and incentives of the Chinese government, and this spills over to the 
branch in Zambia. Among the most important advantages are loans at favorable 
conditions in the Exim Bank (for the mine and the leaching plant) and the China 
Development Bank (for the copper smelter) and the political support on the 
Chinese diplomatic level. The establishment of the Economic and Trade Co-
operation Zone for example is an outcome of the active diplomatic work of the 
Chinese government. The zone will give Chinese investors in Zambia favorable 
tax conditions and good infrastructure (provided by means of Chinese develop-
ment assistance). Particularly, the CNMC will benefit from the zone, because 
CNMC intends to use it to diversify its economic activities to hedge for the 
future risk of falling copper prices. The purchase of the Chambishi mine is an-
other example of Chinese diplomatic support playing a crucial role for Chinese 
investors. Ms Lin says:
Chinese government oﬃ  cials paid a lot of attention to buying this mine. A 
lot of government oﬃ  cials were involved (...) Th e decision [to invest] was 
made in the CNMC headquarters in China in cooperation with the Chi-
nese government (...) We have a lot of support from the Chinese govern-
ment (...) I do not think CNMC would have invested in the Chambishi 
mine without the support from the Chinese government.
 Chinese FDI in construction
Th e construction sector is also of economic importance to Zambia : it contributes 
greatly to GDP (approximately 9 percent in 2007); it is closely linked to the mining 
sector; it is dominated by locally owned companies – only a tiny share of the total 
of almost 1,300 registered construction companies in Zambia are foreign-owned; 
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it is very labor-intensive; and it is the backbone of the Zambian private sector in as 
much as it builds essential infrastructure for other sectors to operate (EIU, 2007; 
NCCZ, 2004). For China , OFDI in the construction sector is ﬁ rst and foremost 
perceived as an eﬀ ective means to build closer relations with African governments 
– relations that, according to the Centre for Chinese Studies (2006), eventually 
may spur access to resources and increasing political inﬂ uence. Moreover, ODFI in 
this sector also facilitates access to new technologies, access to new markets, and a 
gradual diversiﬁ cation of core competences in the Chinese companies.
The Zambian construction sector covers the building and maintenance of 
infrastructure such as roads, railways, airports, and bridges, as well as the con-
struction of housing and other buildings. However, not all companies perform all 
types and scales of work. Rather, the industry structure is essentially dualistic. 
Large-scale construction projects in Zambia are donor- or government-financed. 
Competition for these projects first and foremost takes place among foreign com-
panies in Zambia – not with domestic companies. Domestic small-scale construc-
tion companies, in contrast, are concerned with the delivery and maintenance of 
housing and infrastructure. In many cases they act as sub-suppliers for large-scale 
foreign companies supplying them with, for instance, timber, river sand, bricks, 
concrete, and steel products.
Lately, Chinese companies have won the bulk of the large-scale tenders in the 
construction sector in Zambia .15 Unfortunately, hardly anything is known about 
the relationship between the Chinese construction companies and Chinese aid. 
According to the Centre for Chinese Studies (2006), the relationship is indeed 
very close. Recently, China awarded Zambia a 39 million US$ soft loan to recon-
struct transport essential infrastructure (EIU, 2007: 21).
CJC, a Chinese SOE in the construction sector, saw investment and profit 
possibilities in Zambia and, via a combination of the company’s own financial 
resources and cheap bank loans from Chinese state-owned banks, it established a 
branch in Zambia in 1995. Thereby, it became one of the first Chinese construc-
tion companies in Zambia. CJC Zambia’s main customers are the World Bank , 
the African Development Bank, and the Zambian government, but it also does 
projects for the Chinese government and bids for tenders for projects related to 
development assistance from other donors. Competition , however, is increasing. 
Since the establishment of the branch in 1995 profit margins have dropped from 
an astonishing 50 percent to approximately 10 percent, but according to CJC’s 
managing director, Mr. Fang, the Zambian market is still very attractive for Chi-
nese construction companies. At least, “The market in Zambia is still better than 
the market is now in China ”.16
Favorable market conditions also led to the establishment of ZC, a privately-
owned Chinese construction company in Zambia . In contrast to CJC, Mr. Liu, 
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managing director of ZC, could not get loans from the Chinese government in 
order to finance his company. Instead, he had to raise capital through family and 
other personal networks in China .17 ZC’s main customer is the Zambian govern-
ment. According to Mr. Liu, his company cannot take part in projects financed by 
Chinese development assistance “... we don’t have much chance for that as a private 
company (...) I think they just give it to parastatals”. Even though the company 
is not closely associated with the Chinese state through finance and develop-
ment projects, it is still a product of the Chinese state’s engagement in Zambia, 
because the managing director and his business partner previously worked for 
several years in a Chinese parastatal construction company in Zambia. Via the 
parastatal they gained sufficient experience and knowledge about the Zambian 
market, which enabled them to start their own business.
Today private Chinese investors can get more support than ZC got almost ten 
years ago, as the institutional setup of Economic Counsellor’s Office, ACCZ and 
CCIPT, forms a more supportive setup towards private investors than the setup 
ten years ago.
 Chinese FDI in agriculture
From the beginning of the 1960s until the late 1970s, China initiated several ag-
ricultural aid projects in Africa. These projects ranged from technical assistance, 
to fisheries and irrigation schemes (Eadie and Grizzell, 1979). What is most vis-
ible today, however, is that there are large-scale experimental farms, which were 
also established during these years. Initially, they were set up as aid projects, but 
alongside the general change in the relationship between China and Africa, agri-
cultural cooperation also changed. Chinese farms in Africa today serve as both a 
mechanism to generate profits and as a safety valve for future food supply prob-
lems in China. China’s then Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Li Zhaoxing, de-
clared in 2002 that, “China will make agricultural cooperation with Africa a key area 
of cooperation in the coming years” (Peoples Daily, 2002).
Alongside China ’s rapid population growth, China has been able to increase 
its food supply by increasing the number and efficiency of its farms. Nevertheless, 
an upper limit to how much China can increase its food supply may be rapidly 
approaching. According to Kane and Serewicz (2001), Chinese food supply faces 
the double problem of industrialization and economic growth. The rapidly grow-
ing manufacturing sector in China puts pressure on arable land, and the rising 
economic prosperity among a large part of the Chinese population affects the 
diet towards more protein, i.e. more meat. Raising animals for food requires more 
land than growing crops for direct human consumption. Therefore, the Chinese 
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food supply system has come under pressure, and according to Sanusha Naidu 
of the Centre for Chinese Studies, China is no longer “food independent” and 
the African agricultural sector is therefore becoming increasingly interesting for 
China (Hazelhurst, 2007).
The parastatal CSFAC owns three farms in Zambia . The most renowned is 
the oldest Chinese farm in Zambia: the China -Zambia Friendship Farm. The 
farm has been in Chinese hands since 1988, but the farm was not economically 
viable and CSFAC “saved” the loss-making farm by buying it in 1991, under the in-
struction of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture .18 Since then the parastatal has 
purchased another two farms in Zambia: the Jhonken Estates; and the Jhonken 
Friendship Farm. Together the farms mainly produce wheat, eggs, beef and pork 
for sale in the local Zambian market. None of the farms export any products, 
which according to the managers of the Friendship Farm and Jhonken Estates 
is because Zambia has a deficient production of agricultural food products and 
they both estimate that this situation will keep them from exporting anything 
for another five to ten years, due to the domestic market conditions. When asked 
directly about the prospects for exporting to China, the answer from Ms Li Li, 
managing director of Jhonken Estates, was: “It is not possible to export to China, 
mainly because it is too far away and the agriculture there is doing very fine so there is 
no market”. The argument that China is investing in African agriculture in order 
to secure the food supply does therefore not apply in the short term in the case of 
Zambia, but it may still be a long-term political objective.
The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture is central to the investments of CSFAC. 
The three investments were all financed by loans obtained by the CSFAC head-
quarters from the Ministry of Agriculture in China . CSFAC’s relations to the 
Ministry of Agriculture are very close since CSFAC was previously an integrated 
department of the Ministry.
The CSFAC farms are very likely to benefit from development assistance from 
the Chinese state in the form of the announced establishment of a large-scale ag-
ricultural demonstration centre (one of ten to be created in Africa, according to 
the Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009). The Ministry of Agriculture is furthermore 
pushing for more Chinese investments in the agricultural sector. Recently, it has 
sent a large delegation to Zambia to visit the existing CSFAC farms and identify 
new suitable locations for future investments. The number of Chinese agricul-
tural investments in Zambia is growing. According to Ms Li Li:
As far as I know there were only two Chinese farms in Zambia , when we 
invested in Jhonken Estates in 1994, but now I think there are more than 
twenty Chinese farms in Zambia – and still more are coming in.
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The support from the Chinese state is of paramount importance for the exist-
ence of Chinese agriculture in Zambia , and of crucial importance for its further 
progress. Mr. Ma, assistant general manager at the Zambia-China Friendship 
Farm, formulates it this way:
Some [agricultural] companies would be facing a very diﬃ  cult and tough 
situation without the help from the Chinese government (...) if the govern-
ment does nothing these farms will go ...may go bankrupt – it’s quite pos-
sible. Th ey would be in very big problems. (...) Th e government has to give 
us support otherwise we would be facing very diﬃ  cult times.
 Th e state as a driver of Chinese FDI – concluding remarks
China is often accused in the media of only putting Africa high on its agenda in 
order to secure vital resources for its own development process. Based on invest-
ment cases from three key sectors of Zambian economy, this reading of the mo-
tives for Chinese FDI to Africa contains both fact and fiction.
It is true that the lion’s share of Chinese FDI to Zambia targets mining or 
mining-related activities. Conditions for these investments are negotiated at the 
highest possible political level and these investments are closely linked to other 
investments as well as to more charitable activities in Zambia. FDI in the mining 
sector is carried out by SOEs and is solely of a resource-seeking kind. Neverthe-
less, Chinese FDI to Zambia is not confined to mining: Chinese companies also 
invest in other sectors. Most are in some way mining-related, but some are not.
In the construction sector, all the large-scale Chinese companies are state-owned. 
Th ey are in Zambia for two reasons: they serve as the extension of the Chinese 
state in Zambia in order to acquire natural resources and they gain international 
experience in a protected market. Th e smaller, privately owned companies, in the 
Zambian context, ﬁ nd a less competitive market with higher proﬁ ts than in China . 
Even though they do not beneﬁ t directly from the Chinese state, they beneﬁ t in-
directly by being part of a closely tied network of Chinese enterprises in Zambia.
In agriculture the Chinese investments are, according to official documents 
from China , of a charitable nature: China only invests in agriculture because 
African leaders highlight this specific area as being of utmost importance for 
African future development (Wu, 2006). No doubt, Chinese investments in the 
Zambian agricultural sector – also in a historical perspective – have been closely 
related to China’s political objectives, i.e. to be perceived as the leading Third 
World nation; to gain support for its one China policy; and more recently, to gain 
access to copper. But today, Chinese companies in this sector also seek new mar-
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kets, also looking at experiences in other African countries, they are also resource 
(i.e. land)-seeking investments. FDI in this sector thus serves several purposes. 
It serves the overall strategy of strengthening political ties; it is part of a plan to 
guarantee future food supply to China; and it is profitable in itself.
Even though not all investments are directly related to interests of the Chinese 
state, it is still a very significant player in the Zambian context. The Chinese 
state is a key driver of strategic investments; directly, via political leverage, and 
indirectly, via investments that benefit the local political elite. In the market-seek-
ing investments, the Chinese state plays a less dominant but still important role. 
The very foundation for Chinese investments in Africa lies in the Chinese go out 
policy. Chinese companies are encouraged to invest abroad. In order to ease this 
process the Chinese state negotiates access at the very highest political level via 
bilateral visits and grand events, but support is not confined to this. In Zambia , 
the Chinese state has created an institutional setup that facilitates and directs 
Chinese enterprises in the country. Originally, it only catered for the SOEs but 
with the liberalization process in China , these institutions now also serve the 
private Chinese companies in Zambia.
The internationalization process of SOEs into Africa is, therefore, to a large 
extent driven directly by the Chinese state. In order to pursue its economic and 
political goals, however, private enterprises must also internationalize. These 
companies are not directly driven by the state but benefit by the work done at all 
levels by the Chinese state apparatus. Not only do they benefit for instance from 
the establishment of an Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the inclusion in 
value chains, the creation of large infrastructure projects and so on, they may also 
take advantage of the information disseminated by Chinese institutions in China 
as well as in Zambia . Moreover, the Chinese SOEs in Zambia serve as an example 
to all Chinese enterprises, that it is possible to conduct business in Africa and 
secondly, that it is profitable.
The direct and indirect interference of the Chinese state in OFDI to Zam-
bia thereby gives Chinese companies access to cheap capital, lays the foundation 
for economies of scale, and facilitates access to technology, while simultaneously 
minimizing local competition. It also puts up the necessary infrastructure and 
lowers trade barriers in the host-country context. Thereby, it creates both O- and 
L- advantages for Chinese companies in Zambia. These very advantages make 
Chinese companies competitive vis-à-vis both large international players and lo-
cal companies.
This chapter has provided insights into how the Chinese state drives Chinese 
OFDI in Zambia . It has pinpointed the linkages between sectors of key strategic 
importance for China , such as the mining sector and sectors that are, at first sight, 
less important, but which serve to ease access in key sectors. Moreover, it has em-
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phasized the heterogeneity of Chinese investments in Zambia, an aspect that will 
become more pronounced in the years to come as more and more private Chinese 
companies are investing in Africa. In addition, it has hinted at why, given the 
lack of international experience and the disadvantages of physical and cultural 
distance, Chinese companies are able to compete in a Zambian setting. Thereby, 
it has gone beyond the dichotomous position on Chinese presence in Africa and 
instead pointed to the interconnectedness of all Chinese activities in Zambia and 
how one player, the Chinese state, regulates these activities.
However, some key questions remain unanswered. First and foremost, how 
does Chinese FDI affect the Zambian economy? In particular, how do the O- 
and L- advantages of Chinese FDI affect the competitiveness of local companies? 
And to what degree will the Chinese state seek to promote cooperation with lo-
cal partners in order to minimize future critique and thereby avoid the erosion 
of a valuable relationship? Linked to this, it is important to know how different 
Chinese companies manage to compensate for different O- and L-advantages in 
Zambia adopting different organizational setups, and whether this affects how 
local companies are included in the value chain. Lastly, another question arises: 
to what degree do other ETNCs benefit from their respective state institutions 
in the host-country contexts?
ETNCs are becoming a dominant factor not only in Zambia , but all over Af-
rica, and knowledge about the conditions under which they compete is essential 
in order to further our understanding of the local (as well as international) con-
sequences of this new trend.
 Notes
 This article is based on two papers by the two authors, presented at the Second European 
Conference on African Studies, Leiden, - July, .
 FDI is here defined as an investment by a company resident in one country with the aim 
of a long-term relationship and control (more than  percent) in a company resident in a 
foreign country. In this paper FDI and investments are used interchangeably. 
 The case study builds upon primary as well as secondary data. Primary data were gath-
ered during fieldwork, undertaken by Anders Bastholm, from June  to July ,  in 
Zambia , primarily in Lusaka and in the Copperbelt. Information stems from semi-struc-
tured qualitative interviews with key informants from Chinese firms and institutions as 
well as with representatives from key Zambian private sector institutions.
 Interview with Mr. Fang, Board Secretary, Chinese Centre of Investment Promotion and 
Trade ,  June, .
 Figure . is compiled using data from various sources. Two diﬀ erent estimates are indi-
cated for the year . Th is illustrates the discrepancy that exists when dealing with Chi-
nese OFDI ﬁ gures. According to Xinhua (), the  ﬁ gure is an oﬃ  cial ﬁ gure from 
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the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Nevertheless, extreme care should be 
taken with regards to Chinese OFDI figures (Goldstein ). Different Chinese institu-
tions release different figures. The Ministry of Commerce provides approved OFDI data 
while the State Administration of Foreign Exchange includes FDI from, for example, Tai-
wan , Hong Kong, and Singapore “round-tripping” to China . Hence, Figure . should be 
seen as an indicator of a growth tendency rather than as a representation of precise OFDI 
figures.
 This policy framework is referred to with a number of slightly different names which 
all stem from diverse translations of the Chinese name. Other common translations are: 
“Step Out”, “Going Out”, “Going Abroad”, and “Going Global”.
 Interview with Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia (-),  June, .
 Data from ZIC show neither actual FDI stocks nor FDI flows, but only investment com-
mitments from investors who obtain investment licenses at ZIC. Furthermore the licens-
ing procedure has not been centralised with ZIC, which means that not all investment 
licenses are registered here. Various ministries can provide investment licenses on their 
own behalf, as well as can local governments. Especially investments in the mining sector 
are predominantly approved by the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development (inter-
view with Mr. Sifafula, Manager of Research and Policy Analysis, ZIC,  June, ). 
Nevertheless, according to the US Dept. of State (), it is the only FDI data available 
in Zambia .
 Some of these companies were indeed owned by Chinese nationals in Zambia , operated 
like the other Chinese companies, i.e. had access to Chinese capital via the local branch of 
Bank of China , and could use the facility of the Trade Promotion Centre, but they were 
not strictly speaking the result of Chinese OFDI. 
 The most renowned visit was the recent visit of President Hu Jintao in February , 
but a number of other Chinese state dignitaries have visited Zambia in recent years, e.g. 
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji (), Premier Li Peng (), Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan 
(), and a wide range of visits by representatives of Chinese ministries and state insti-
tutions (MFA ).
 During the  election, Chinese people publicly supported the MMD campaign (inter-
view with Dr. Francis Chigunta, the Department of Development Studies at the Univer-
sity of Zambia ,  June, ).
 Similar Chinese investment centres have been established in ten other African countries.
 Interview with Mr. Fang, Board Secretary, CCIPT,  June, .
 Interview with Mr. Zhu, Manager, BOC,  June, .
 This tendency is not only confined to Zambia . China seems to win a lion’s share of the 
current tenders in the construction sector throughout Africa. According to Singh (), 
Chinese companies won . billion US worth of contracts in . This is the result 
of a deliberate Chinese strategy. In Mozambique, for instance, Bosten () reports that 
the Chinese embassy in Maputo actively informs Chinese construction companies about 
upcoming international tenders.
 Interview with Mr. Fang, Managing Director, CJC,  June, .
 Interview with Mr. Liu, Managing Director, ZC,  June, .
 Interview with Mr. Ma, Assistant General Manager, Zambia -China Friendship Farm,  
June, .
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7 Th e political impact of the Chinese in Sudan
Meine Pieter van Dijk
 Introduction
Sudan is often called the most controversial case in the wave of Chinese en-
gagements with Africa (Large, 2007: 57). In particular, the developments in the 
Southern and in the Darfur region and the pressure on China in 2008 before 
the Olympics are important factors in understanding China’s role in Africa. Our 
ambition is not to give a complete overview of the Chinese presence in Sudan, 
but we would like to understand the reasons for and the impact of the Chinese 
involvement in this country.
First a short review of the history of the cooperation between China and Su-
dan will be given. Then an overview of the recent economic relations will be pro-
vided before discussing some of the controversial issues like the developments in 
Southern Sudan and the Darfur region. There are some important questions to 
be answered. To what extent have China’s arms deliveries contributed to the crisis 
in Sudan? Has China’s diplomacy helped to find a solution? We will also study to 
what extent China did impose conditions when providing aid and while investing 
in Sudan. Finally, the issue of whether China is an alternative for the Western 
development model will be taken up by looking at China’s actual behavior and 
policies with respect to Sudan.
 Th e short history of China ’s presence in Sudan
Sudan is the biggest country in Africa in terms of its size. It is also a country 
known for its Islamic government and the long-lasting civil war in the South. 
After a five-decade civil war with the Arab-led north there is now an agreement 
(signed January 2005 and called the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or CPA) 
and there will be a referendum on an eventual secession of the South in 2011. 
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Currently the conflict in the Western part, in the Darfur region, has caught the 
attention of the world and will be discussed, since China plays an important role 
in that conflict.
There are several recent overviews of the developments in Sudan and even 
papers specifically on China ’s role in the country (Large, 2007; IKV, 2008 and 
Ashkenazi et al., 2008). However, a lot has happened since these overview papers 
on the Chinese in Sudan were published. After a short overview of the history 
of China’s relations with Sudan we will deal with the recent developments, in 
particular those related to the Darfur region.
Large (2007) notes that Sudan was the fourth country in Africa to recognize 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in February 1959. This means the rela-
tions between the countries cover half a century. Even before any energy short-
age hit the country, China had become active in Sudan. Fortune (20 February, 
2006) notes that already in the late 1980s, when US sanctions against Sudan’s 
Islamic government forced US companies out of Africa’s biggest country, China’s 
oil company CNPC (the mother company of Petro-China) took over Chevron’s 
discarded assets.1
State-owned Chinese oil companies stepped in at a moment when the country 
was really isolated. The relation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF ) 
had ended because of non-payment and hence Sudan was no longer eligible for 
World Bank support. The civil war in the south was flaring up and an Islamic 
economy developed. This is based on promoting participation in private compa-
nies rather than on providing loans with interest. Islamic banking does not allow 
for asking interest and considers participation in a business an alternative. Islamic 
brotherhoods were very active and a large part of the economy was informal any-
way and continued to function in this way. The debt crisis of the 1980s had made 
it difficult for Sudan to import and export in a regular way. A shortage of foreign 
exchange added to the informalization of the Sudanese economy.
Sudan’s export to China used to be cotton and China would provide aid and 
“attractive trade arrangements” (we discussed what that means in Chapter 5) to 
the country. Aid came in the form of projects and some Chinese investments took 
place prior to China’s involvement in the oil sector in the 1990s. As noticed by 
Chaponnière in Chapter 3, countries exporting oil or raw materials are among the 
priorities of Chinese cooperation in Africa. Furthermore, China tends to operate 
in countries that the OECD countries (the club of developed countries) avoid, 
such as Angola , Guinea-Bissau, Togo, the Central African Republic (CAR) and 
Zimbabwe.
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 Th e Sudanese economic situation
IKV (2008) stresses that oil is an important factor in Sudanese politics. It is the 
government’s main source of income and the driving force for the economy. How-
ever, the sector is poorly managed and highly politicized: “it remains a source of 
strife and division”. The report clearly establishes the link between the conflict in 
the south and oil exploration in that region. IKV (2008: 5):
Problems began in 1991. Th e army began chasing the people without warn-
ing. Th ey came, they shot and they burned. Why? Th e SPLA (one of the 
major liberation movements for the South MPVD) was far away. It was 
because the Government was greedy for oil and saw any southerner as a 
threat, a possible supporter of the SPLA.
Easterly (2007: 218) calls Sudan a case of state failure, defined as a country whose 
government is unable or unwilling to organize the basic services for its popula-
tion. He dates it back to 1986 and calculated that in the ten years preceding 1986 
Sudan was 58 percent of the time under International Monetary Fund programs. 
The suggestion is that these programs do very little to prevent state failure.2 In 
1983 the civil war began again after a decade of peace. In that year President Nu-
meiry imposed the shari’a (Islamic law) on the whole country, trying to get Islam-
ist support for his unpopular government. Consequently the war flared up again 
and a peace agreement was signed only in 2005.
In March 2006, the country signed a letter of intent with the IMF (IMF, 2006). 
Following the peace agreement the Minister of Finance and National Economy 
and the Governor of the Central Bank of Sudan wrote to the IMF, stating that 
they had sought to implement economic policies that aimed at maintaining eco-
nomic stability, fostering growth and reducing poverty. They attached a memo-
randum on economic and financial policies, which is required in the framework 
of an IMF staff-monitored program for 2006. This suggests that Sudan is trying 
to re-establish its relations with the Bretton Woods institutions. The objective 
could be to benefit from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and the Multilat-
eral Debt Relief Initiatives. Secondly, Sudan may want to qualify for World Bank 
loans again, which could then be used to reconstruct the south and to develop the 
Darfur region.
The memorandum of understanding with the IMF deals with economic and 
financial issues and gives a good overview of the Sudanese macro-economic situ-
ation, which was pretty disastrous. The memorandum notes that, for example, 
“broad money” (a measure of money supply) grew by 45 percent, while reserve 
money growth increased by 35 percent, noting that both variables exceeded the 
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programmed amounts. This is normally a recipe for high inflation. Private sec-
tor credit also increased 62 percent in that year. One wonders about the total 
inflationary effects of such an increase. A number of reforms were announced 
and an economic growth of 13 percent was assumed in 2006. In 2005 the growth 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated to be 8 percent, while 
inflation was 8.5 percent. The Sudanese dinar also appreciated 8 percent against 
the US dollar. Sudan increased its payments to the IMF from 30 million US$ in 
2005 to 45 million US$ in 2006. This can be seen as steps in the direction of an 
agreement, which requires a country to settle its previous debts with multilat-
eral organizations. Such an agreement would pave the way for a debt reduction 
program and the eventual resumption of support from the IMF and the World 
Bank .
 Economic relations with China 
Fortune (20 February, 2006) notes that China is Sudan’s biggest foreign investor, 
spending about four billion US$ per year and importing about 7 percent of its oil 
from Sudan. China has long-term contracts, which allowed it in 2008 to import 
the oil at prices far below the world market. The contractual price paid in Sudan 
would be around 65 US$ per barrel, while actual market prices reached 150 US$ 
per barrel in July 2008. The problem is that Sudan’s oil-fuelled economic growth 
is primarily benefiting a small urban elite and, in particular, people living in the 
north of the country (Large, 2007: 57).
In Chapter 4 we have given the flows and outflows of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI ) for different African countries. Sudan has received in total 1,511 
million, 2,305 million and 3,541 million US$ in 2004, 2005 and 2006 respec-
tively, according to UNCTAD (2007). In 2006, more Chinese FDI in Africa 
only went to Egypt and Nigeria. Given the fact that China is on average good 
for 10 percent of the investments in Africa in 2006, but China is good for 25 
percent of the FDI in Sudan! Fortune (20 February, 2006: 59) concludes that 
Chinese trade has proliferated so quickly in the past few years that it threatens 
to eclipse the commercial relationships the US and the EU have nurtured with 
Sudan for decades.
One-third of the Chinese oil supply now comes from Africa and in particular 
from Sudan and Angola . The oil exploitation rescued Sudan from dire financial 
straits in the early 1990s and turned it into one of Africa’s fastest-growing econo-
mies (Financial Times, 28 January, 2008). The economy has recently grown 12 
percent per year and the president has just constructed a new palace, built with 
an interest-free loan from China . Sudan is one of the few African countries that 
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export more to China than it imports from it. That makes it easier for Sudan to 
ask for weapons in exchange for its oil export, weapons which can then be used 
in the south or in Darfur (see Box 7.1). However, China, as a large investor in the 
Sudanese oil industry, is blamed for not doing enough to resolve the humanitar-
ian crisis in Darfur (Financial Times, 16 July, 2008).
Box 7.1 An overview of the weapons imported by Sudan from China 
Croll et al. (2008) give an overview of the weapons imported by Sudan from China . They call 
it a high-profi le case of Chinese arms exports to Africa:
 “Starting with the sale of helicopters and fi ghter aircrafts in the mid-1990s, the export of 
military equipment to Khartoum has grown in line with the rising importance of Sudanese oil 
for the Chinese economy. The range of military hardware includes anti-personnel and anti-tank 
mines, T-59 tanks, 122 mm towed howitzers, assault rifl es, machine guns and anti-aircraft guns, 
as well as ammunition. According to Sudanese government sources, China has also provided the 
expertise for the development of an indigenous Sudanese arms industry, but so far no verifi able 
record of domestic production exists.”
Source: Croll et al. (2008)
Croll et al. (2008) conclude, “while Beijing ’s arms exports, like all Chinese-African 
trade relations are characterized by a blatant disregard for human rights, China 
is by no means the most important arms supplier to the continent”.3 However, 
the delivery of arms has certainly contributed to the escalation of the conflict in 
Sudan.
A failed state is defined in terms of a government unable or unwilling to sup-
ply basic services to its population. Ashkenazi et al. (2008) find that in the south, 
public services are not applied in a uniform manner due to a lack of capacity and 
security. This is causing resentment among returnees. They are facing conflict-
ing reactions, oscillating between feelings of respect and brotherhood to feelings 
of suspicion and animosity from those who have stayed. The security situation, 
as well as a lack of infrastructure, are major constraints for development in the 
south. Abuses of power by the military in Southern Sudan appear to be com-
mon, and acquisition of small arms by the general public remains endemic. The 
conclusion is that there is little provision for the most vulnerable victims of the 
war in Southern Sudan and that the majority of assistance comes from the non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).
Sudan is one of the countries receiving a lot of aid, and not only from China . 
The aid is often provided in a very uncoordinated way. The country is at the 
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top of the list receiving Chinese “International cooperation” (excluding external 
financing) in 2004/05, as described by Chaponnière in Chapter 3, receiving the 
equivalent of 1,342 million US$. In the period 1959-98, it received in total 230 
million US$ and occupied the fifth position after Tanzania, Zambia , Congo and 
Mauritania.
Because the Chinese government is in favor of putting no conditions on its 
development assistance, the Chinese support to Sudan is certainly not an alterna-
tive for the support from the Bretton Woods institutions in the field of economic 
policies and management. Concerning the Chinese intervention in Sudan, IKV 
(2008: 44) concludes that there is a need to:
take action and pressure Chinese companies and politicians to change their 
policies.” ...“Neither the Chinese government, nor the companies show con-
cern about the massive human rights abuses that occur in Sudan. Neither 
do they take action to save the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which is 
the constitution of the country.
For the humanitarian assistance there is a Sudan consortium with Western do-
nors, China , Kenya , Egypt , Turkey, the World Bank , etc., which meets regularly 
with or without non-governmental organizations. In May 2008 they met in Oslo 
(Norway) and concluded there is the need to move to recovery in South Sudan. 
Agreed principals for such a course are: a transfer of responsibility for aid to the 
government of South Sudan and making financing more predictable by agreeing 
on multi-year budget support. Preferably such support would be in line with a 
government development plan. The donors decided that non-state delivery of the 
assistance is needed in the interim, but to contribute to building state capacity in 
the long term.
The donor group meeting in May 2008 in Oslo could not agree on a roadmap 
for the Darfur region. Some donors had wanted a development roadmap, others 
considered it to be too early for such plans and so the final communiqué does not 
mention the matter.
Juba is the capital of the now semi-autonomous South Sudan. The town 
economy is still stagnating and the development process has barely started. The 
Financial Times notes that the administration has struggled to manage a unique 
combination of 1.1 billion US$ of non-humanitarian aid since 2006 and 1.3 billion 
US$ in annual oil revenues and an influx of UN peacekeepers and tough-minded 
business people. Hence Juba gives the impression of a vibrant foreign-run econo-
my (Financial Times, 22 January, 2008).
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 Developments in the Darfur province
Once there was a peace settlement in the south of Sudan, the attention of the 
world turned to the Darfur region, which is suffering from what some call “ethnic 
cleansing” and others coin a struggle for resources.4 There was a universal outcry 
against these events, but despite the fact that many NGOs and donor organiza-
tions have become active in Sudan an effective solution remains elusive.
Riddell (2007: 351) notes that what he calls agencies have launched a series of 
wide-ranging and high-level advocacy initiatives to draw attention to the humani-
tarian and linked human rights problems in Darfur. Riddell (2007: 313) mentions 
the horrific events that have unfolded and persisted in the Darfur region from 
2003 onwards. However, despite several efforts, effective solutions have remained 
elusive. China used its veto to block US-led efforts to impose sanctions on Sudan 
over the atrocities committed in Darfur.
According to the United Nations, the conflict in the Darfur region has killed 
300,000 people and displaced 2.5 million people since 2003. China has received 
sharp criticism for obstructing attempts by the United Nations Security Council 
to try to quell the violence in Darfur. It took until 2007 before China was willing 
to exert some influence on the political leadership in Sudan.
The dirty work in the Darfur region is done by militias, known under the 
name of Janjaweed militias, which get support from the government in Khartoum. 
These Arab militias attack Africans, some of whom have been critical about the 
repression by the north of Sudan. Many villages have been burned down by them 
and the inhabitants have fled to Chad. The Janjaweed militias terrorize civilians 
with arson, massacre and rape. Their activity has led to a humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur. Some US activists argued in 2007 and early 2008 in favor of a boycott of 
the Olympics in China over Darfur.
Several times peace talks were organized, for example in Libya in October 
2007 (Financial Times, 4 October, 2007). The year before, an unsuccessful peace 
agreement was signed which had promised 30 million US$ of compensation to 
the different parties involved, to be paid by the international community. These 
funds were never disbursed, due to “wrangling over whom it will be distributed 
to” (Financial Times, 4 October, 2007). The newspaper notes that there were 
competing claims from different ethnic groups and areas of Darfur, as well as 
from the representatives of specific villages that have been destroyed and from 
individuals.
It took a long time before the so-called Annan plan for a joint African Union-
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was accepted and put in place. The 
so-called rebels in the Darfur region have required that China will not partici-
pate in such a UN force (NRC, 26 November, 2007). The force should comprise 
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26,000 men and officially started January 2008. However, it faced problems get-
ting enough soldiers.
Pressure was put on China to help solve the conflict in Sudan. That led the 
Chinese government to appoint a special Chinese envoy for Sudan, who was 
nominated in April 2007. Mid-2007, China managed to persuade the Khartoum 
government to accept a bigger and better equipped UN/African Union peace-
keeping force in the Darfur region. This remarkable event was noted as an exam-
ple of China’s willingness to intervene in African countries’ policies: China had 
put pressure on Sudan (Financial Times, 19 June, 2007). This happened in the 
wake of growing criticism by Western countries of China’s perceived reluctance 
as Sudan’s leading trading partner and top consumer of Sudanese oil to influence 
the policies of the government with respect to Darfur (Financial Times, 4 Oc-
tober, 2007). The diplomatic offensive brought Liu Gujin, China’s special envoy 
to Africa, to London at the beginning of 2008. He declared that he was work-
ing hard to persuade the Sudanese authorities to co-operate with a hybrid UN-
African Union peacekeeping force that would be deployed in Darfur (Financial 
Times, 23 February, 2008).
China ’s special envoy to Sudan had indicated that China had “privately” ex-
erted pressure on Khartoum over the conflict in Darfur. If that is true, it shows 
China is willing to interfere in internal affairs if put under pressure. The same 
Mr. Liu stopped short of criticizing Khartoum and argued that to impose further 
sanctions, as some people in the West were proposing, would be counterproduc-
tive (Financial Times, 19 June, 2007).
Part of the peace negotiations were a discussion on compensation. The Finan-
cial Times (4 October, 2007) announced that a 200 million US$ loan from China 
will form the bulk of a compensation payment that the government of Sudan 
has pledged to make to the beleaguered Darfur region. This was announced by 
former US president Jimmy Carter, who visited Sudan at that time with other 
elderly statesmen like Nelson Mandela. The 200 million US$ loan comes on top 
of the 100 million US$ coming from the Sudanese government itself. The Finan-
cial Times notes that this would mark a significant departure for China, whose 
financial assistance to African countries is normally provided for trade and infra-
structure projects and needs to be spent in China.
The conflict has turned from a high-intensity conflict in 2005-2006 to a low-
intensity conflict since this period. Darfur has gone from incident to incident. For 
example, an “unprecedented attack on an African Union peacekeeping base by a 
renegade group of rebels, which killed at least ten personnel over the weekend” 
was reported in 2007 (Financial Times, 4 October, 2007). The newspaper added 
that the attack underlined that violence in Darfur has evolved beyond a simple 
conflict between government-backed forces and homogenous rebels.
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Mia Farrow, the American actress, launched a campaign in June 2007 to turn 
the spotlight on Beijing ’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics as a way of exerting pres-
sure on China to use its leverage to stop Sudan fueling the conflict in Darfur. 
Steven Spielberg, the famous movie director, decided in February 2008 to quit as 
an artistic director of the Beijing Olympics. He declared that China’s policy on 
Darfur was the main reason for this decision. These activities may have helped 
somewhat, but, in particular, a group of NGOs is active in keeping Darfur on the 
agenda (Croll et al., 2008; IKV, 2008 and Ashkenazi et al., 2008).5 They produce 
regular reports and even put advertisements in the Western media, to inform the 
world about what is going on in Darfur.
Another complication which did not get as much attention as Spielberg’s de-
parture was an attack on a Chinese oilfield in Sudan in 2007 (NRC, 26 October, 
2007). The attack resembles the attack on Chinese oil workers in Ethiopia , de-
scribed in Chapter 8. A “rebel movement” attacked an oil field, in this case the 
Defra oil field in Kordofan. Kordofan is a Sudanese region neighboring Darfur. 
The article mentions that China as a major investor in Sudan is considered an 
important pillar of support for the government in Khartoum by the “rebels”. Van 
Hoeymissen (2008) notes that these kinds of events make it more difficult for 
China to maintain its non-interventionist stance.
However, in February 2008 it was announced that there is a new Sudanese 
government offensive against the rebels in the western region of Darfur (NRC, 
28 February, 2008). This led to large numbers of refugees in Chad and several 
civilians raped and killed. Earlier that month, 12,000 refugees reached Chad to 
escape increasing violence.
In July 2008, six Darfur peacekeepers, members of the joint UN-AU peace 
mission in Sudan’s Darfur region were killed in an ambush. A convoy of 40 ar-
mored vehicles ambushed the peace force while on patrol in North Darfur (Times 
of Zambia , 10 July, 2008). The newspaper adds that the UN-AU mission has 
been struggling to contain the violence and has just 9,000 of the planned 26,000 
troops. Other peacekeepers were wounded and a number of others remain miss-
ing. Finally, ten vehicles were destroyed and UNAMID (UN-AU Mission In 
Darfur) was outraged by the attack. So far it is unclear who was responsible 
for the attack: “Numerous armed groups operate in Darfur: rebel factions, pro-
government militias and criminals” (Times of Zambia, 10 July, 2008).
As of February 2009, the Sudanese government has started negotiations with 
the most important “rebel” groups in Qatar (NRC, 11 February, 2009). Among 
others, the Islamic fundamentalists that attacked Khartoum in 2008 (the Justice 
and Equality Movement, JEM) is present and declared it is interested in an all-
encompassing peace agreement. These negotiations should be seen against the 
threat of an arrest of the Sudanese leader Bashir and have also been interpreted 
 Meine Pieter van Dijk
as an effort to distract the attention of the possible order to arrest the Sudanese 
president. NRC (17 February, 2009) even announced that Sudan had reached an 
agreement with JEM in Qatar about the principles for further negotiations. It is 
not clear to what extent these are important steps in a peace process, or just ongo-
ing discussions in a continuing conflict.
 Indictment of the president
In July 2008, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague in the Neth-
erlands had announced that the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir may be in-
dicted because of genocide and crimes against humanity. It is the ﬁ rst time that 
the Court would indict a president in oﬃ  ce. Th e Argentinean attorney general, 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has formulated ten complaints and three judges will have 
to decide whether this justiﬁ es an arrest. Th e president is considered the brains be-
hind a plan to annihilate three ethnic groups on the basis of their ethnicity. Th ese 
groups are the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa. Th e attorney general is quoted 
in the newspaper (NRC, 14 August, 2008) as saying: “he could not beat the rebels 
and hence he went behind their people”. He continues: “the motives were largely 
political. Th e alibi used was controlling a revolt, but his intention was genocide”.
Sudan immediately reacted that an indictment would undermine the peace 
process in Darfur. The Sudanese governing National Congress Party warned that 
an indictment could lead to more violence and bloodshed. The United Nations 
have reacted by withdrawing “non-essential” personnel, around 2,000 people in 
July 2008 (Financial Times, 16 July, 2008). Mid-February 2009, there were ru-
mors that the ICC was indeed going to issue an order to arrest the Sudanese 
president (New York Times, 11 February, 2009). Reuter also quoted a diplomat 
who had said that the ICC had decided to do so, but the ICC officially denied 
that such a decision had been taken. A Sudan specialist, Alex de Waal, argued 
in Amsterdam (3 February, 2009) that it would not serve its purpose to arrest 
Bashir. His main argument is that the rest of the world would not have a party 
to negotiate with, while important issues like Darfur and the possible independ-
ence of the Southern region were on the international and national policy agenda. 
Several African and Arab countries have protested against the decision to arrest 
him, pointing to the risk of even more violence in Sudan.
The actual indictment announced in March 2009 will put the UN in a difficult 
situation. On the one hand, the UN asked for a study of the violation of human 
rights in Sudan, on the other hand, the UN is currently present in the Darfur 
region with peacekeepers, whose safety was put in danger by the court’s indict-
ment. The journal carries a special box on Beijing ’s reaction (see Box 7.2). China 
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expressed “grave concern” over the charges by the International Criminal Court in 
the Hague, the Netherlands.
It is unique that when asked for a reaction by the foreign press, Chinese govern-
ment oﬃ  cials gave a reaction immediately, and that it took such a strong position 
in public. Th e position has been published in full in the Western press (for exam-
ple in the Financial Times). Two days later, Sudan’s envoy to the UN declared that 
Sudan does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court and added: “With his action 
against Mr. Bashir, he (the prosecutor) is inviting the rebels to be more intransi-
gent and not to join the peace process” (Financial Times, 16 July, 2008).
Box 7.2  China expresses “grave concern” over charges by International Criminal 
Court
“China expresses grave concern and worry about the International Criminal Court 
prosecutor’s indictment of the Sudanese leader”. The prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court was also investigating alleged war crimes by rebel groups seeking to 
overthrow the Khartoum regime (Financial Times, 18 July, 2008). He said he had the 
names of two rebel commanders alleged to have been involved in an attack on African 
Union peacekeepers in the Darfur town of Haskanita last September. The action of the 
International Criminal Court must be “benefi cial to the stability of the Darfur region and 
the appropriate settlement of the issue, not the contrary”. The spokesman of the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry added that China, “which has a close relation with Sudan would consult 
with other members of the UN Security Council over the issue”.
Source: Financial Times (16 July, 2008)
In the end the Security Council of the UN has the power to delay the arrest for a 
year if this would be in the interest of peace. The main argument for such a deci-
sion would be that the UN does not want to put their troops in Darfur at risk.
 China criticized
China has made choices (like supporting Sudan and Zimbabwe), which do not al-
ways please Western countries and NGOs. Human rights groups say Chinese arms 
exported to Sudan fuel the conﬂ ict in Darfur (IHT, 3 November, 2006). Chapon-
nière, in Chapter 3, explains that China publishes no data on its foreign aid. It cer-
tainly does not provide data on its arms exports to Sudan. Th e data on investment 
published by UNCTAD (2007 and Chapter 4) do not include arms sales, while it 
is also not very clear from the trade statistics how much and what type of arms have 
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been supplied. Arms would be excluded or be included under diﬀ erent labels, say as 
imports of textile and garments. Sources like the Financial Times (23 June, 2006) 
note that China has stepped up sales of arms, including ﬁ ghter aircrafts. It adds 
that manufacturing of Chinese weapons and ammunition in Sudan complicates the 
enforcement of a UN embargo on supplies to militias in the Darfur region.
The Financial Times (23 June, 2008) adds that while China claims it abides 
by a United Nations embargo on sending weapons directly to Darfur, a panel of 
UN experts found that Chinese weapons were making their way to Darfur. The 
special Chinese convoy, Mr. Liu, denies that China is a big supplier of weapons 
to Sudan, arguing that Chinese sales accounted just for 8 percent of total arms 
exports to Sudan (Financial Times, 23 February, 2008). He insisted that the total 
value of Chinese arms sales to developing countries was well below that of the 
US, Russia, the United Kingdom and Germany, which is somewhat besides the 
point if we are discussing the problems of arms export to or production of arms 
in Sudan, instead of exports of arms to developing countries in general.
 Conditions when providing aid to investing in Sudan
China ’s aid is not subject to the type of conditionality we know as the Washing-
ton consensus. It also does not apply international regulation concerning the nat-
ural environment and forced displacement of people. The building of the Merowe 
dam in Sudan, with Chinese support, is an example of neglecting environmental 
conditions. This dam does not comply with international standards with respect 
to dam building. Its construction caused the displacement of many inhabitants 
to distant locations where the land was not suitable for farming. According to 
Chaponnière in Chapter 3, the Chinese government recognizes these abuses but, 
on grounds of non-interference, refuses to take the initiative of including social 
and environmental responsibility (SER) clauses in the contracts.
However, there exist all kinds of alleged conditions related to the Chinese sup-
port for Sudan. China vetoed UN intervention in Sudan, which may have been 
part of a deal with the Sudanese government. In the same way, if Chinese compa-
nies pay a fixed (low) price for Sudanese oil and supply arms and munitions, this 
is part of an agreement between the Chinese and Sudanese governments, which 
may be full of conditions and conditionalities.
Western donors are generally very prudent in Sudan. Only Denmark has re-
cently withdrawn its development assistance because of continuing critique on 
the producers of “anti-Islam” cartoons. The Netherlands provided 424 million 
euro during 2005-2007. When the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development 
Cooperation were visiting Darfur, they were very prudent not to offend their 
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host because they consider if you are out you have no influence any more and the 
Chinese will take over the activities, without applying the same ethical standards 
(NRC, 8 February, 2008).
 An alternative for the West: China ’s policies towards Sudan
Investments are part of broader economic engagements, which have been ana-
lyzed in relation to aid and trade policies in Chapters 3 and 5 of this book. Europe 
and the US have specific trade policies with respect to Africa. Is China really an 
alternative for the Western development model? More specifically, is China an 
alternative for the West in Sudan? Yes, when Western donors boycotted Sudan 
and the country needed help to develop its oil sector. Since 1995, the Chinese have 
been involved in the oil sector in Sudan. The country was quite isolated at that 
time and had broken with the International Monetary Fund and was neglected by 
most other donors because of this and the war raging in the south of the country.
However, the Chinese aid for Sudan is part of a broader strategy. Concerning 
China ’s strategy in Africa, one can only conclude that China seeks to assure its oil 
supply. Friedman (2005: 409) illustrates the point by telling the story of the Strait 
of Malacca, the narrow passage between Malaysia and Indonesia patrolled by the 
US. “Chinese strategic planners have become increasingly concerned that the US 
could choke oﬀ  China’s economy at any time by just closing the Strait of Malacca, 
and this threat is now being increasingly and openly discussed in Chinese military 
circles”. He considers this just a small hint of the potential struggle for energy and 
power that could ensue if “the great American dream and the great Chinese dream 
(we should add that this is also the great Indian dream and the great Russian 
dream; MPVD) come to be seen as mutually exclusive in energy terms”.
China ’s Foreign Minister denounced the “handful of people trying to politi-
cize the Olympics” (Financial Times, 19 May, 2007). Western governments see 
China as a country with a significant leverage over Sudan because of its strong 
trading relationships with Khartoum. China makes a lot of effort to provide the 
“right picture” of its presence in Sudan.6 In February 2008, it started a diplomatic 
initiative to persuade Western public opinion that it is working hard to try to 
resolve the humanitarian crisis in Darfur (Financial Times, 23 February, 2008). 
If a country needs to justify its actions so much there are good reasons to follow 
it critically.
On the one hand, the positive side, the Chinese have become aware of the 
critique and nominated a special envoy for Sudan in 2007. Sudan is a case where 
China has been willing to interfere in local affairs, for example when it pushed 
the government to accept the joint AU-EU peace force in Darfur, but this has had 
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only limited positive effects so far. On the other hand, China is achieving very 
little in Sudan in terms of contributing to the solution of the country’s biggest 
problems, the conflicts with the Southern and the Darfur regions.
The special envoy, Mr. Liu, denies that China is surprised about the reaction 
to the Chinese presence in Sudan: “I am sometimes puzzled why China’s arms 
sales are exaggerated by our friends in the media... Is it a misunderstanding or is 
it intentional?” (Financial Times, 19 May, 2007). He added that they are not going 
to accept certain efforts to blackmail the Olympics. Finally he said that there are 
limits to how far China would go to put pressure on Khartoum.
 Conclusions
Of all the cases discussed in this book, the involvement of China in Sudan shows 
most clearly how far China will go to defend its interests in Africa. Here it can be 
seen what “unconditional aid” and “refraining from intervening in local politics” 
really mean.
The impact of the Chinese presence in a country depends on the type of activi-
ties and the number of Chinese involved. The analysis of Sudan in this chapter 
and of Zambia in the previous chapter showed the importance of raw materials 
(oil in Sudan and copper in Zambia) and shows the political consequences of in-
tensive relations. The case of Sudan even threatened the Olympic Games in 2008 
and China ’s commercial interests in Sudan, while in the case of Zambia, political 
interference of the Chinese was not appreciated.7
The Chinese have selected Sudan for investment purposes because of its oil, 
just like they opted for Angola and Nigeria because of Chinese strategic interests. 
However, the country wants to assure its supply of oil and does not bother about 
human rights violations, or poor governance in these countries. In 2007, a lot of 
critique was voiced with respect to China ’s intervention in Sudan (Azkenazi et 
al., 2008; Croll et al., 2008; IKV, 2008). The wave of critique was becoming even 
stronger in 2008. It implied that China had to make an effort to show its political 
power in Sudan. Because of its lack of action in Sudan and the troubles in Zim-
babwe, where Mugabe is supported by the Chinese, and because of the demon-
strations in Tibet and China’s violent reaction to these events, China became less 
popular in a number of countries.8
Despite eﬀ orts to stress the neutral character of its presence in Sudan and Chi-
na ’s emphasis on the win-win nature of its activities, China continues to be seen 
as an inﬂ uential ally of Sudan, who could inﬂ uence its policies (Financial Times, 
23 February, 2008). Th e Chinese themselves consider that China’s ties with Sudan 
have been “unnecessarily politicized”, which they consider “unfair and irrational” 
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(Financial Times, 19 June, 2007). One can conclude that China showed its real 
face, when investing in Sudan ‘without imposing any conditions’ and that it does 
not stick to its own principles of not intervening in local policies and of not im-
posing conditions on the assistance provided. An argument often heard as to why 
China is not willing to intervene in human rights issues or allow pressure on local 
authorities is that it does not want such interference in China’s internal aﬀ airs and 
certainly would not like a discussion about its own human rights record.
Although there are strong similarities with European and American policies 
with respect to Africa, China ’s policies are different from Western countries deal-
ing with oil countries in three respects. All countries, the EU as well as the US 
and China, will try to build up good relations with oil-supplying countries, but 
the actual negotiations in the case of the US and EU are happening through 
private oil companies. These Western companies usually have to go through a 
process of competitive bidding, which allows the country to select the best of-
fer. Such an opportunity was not given to Sudan when the Chinese state-owned 
enterprises started to play a role in Sudan after the departure of the American 
companies. Finally, Western companies can be held accountable. They usually 
have critical shareholders and face governments and NGOs in their home coun-
try, whether they like it or not (see also Chapter 9).
I would argue that as far as Sudan is concerned, China is different from 
 other donors. In fact, Chaponnière followed the same line of argument concern-
ing Chinese development aid in Chapter 3, and Kragelund and Van Dijk con-
cerning investments in Chapter 4. Both chapters make clear why Chinese aid 
and investments are different. The Chinese government seems to pursue Chinese 
interests only, but tries to sell it as a win-win situation, if not as pure development 
aid. The lack of a clear distinction between aid, trade and investments makes the 
deals made not very transparent. What we see in Sudan is that it is impossible for 
a major power to be present and to claim that it can remain neutral.
 Notes
 The second pension fund of the Netherlands decided in January  to stop investing in 
Petro-China (NRC,  January, ), because the company is the main player in Sudan 
and as such a funder of the Sudanese government. The pension fund had raised human 
rights several times but considered the dialogue as not very cooperative.
 He is only saying, however, that statistically speaking spending a lot of time under an IMF 
program is associated with higher risk of state collapse.
 Only  percent of Chinese arms are exported to Africa. China ranks tenth for the period 
- (Croll et al., ). There are also unexpected suppliers, such as the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (IHT,  March, ).
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 This is the term used by the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, when he visited the 
region in .
 In particular, “Fatal transactions” is a network of European and African NGOs and re-
search institutions dedicated to the transformation of fatal transactions into fair transac-
tions, which truly contribute to sustainable peace and reconstruction in Africa (Croll et 
al., ).
 The Financial Times ( April, ) reports that China seeks Public Relations (PR) ad-
visers to counter Tibet anger. It sometimes looks as if they are also struggling with the 
impression they give by helping the Sudanese government and could use a PR initiative 
“to understand what people think of them and how they can get their story in the media”.
 Even the Angolan government has made it clear how much influence from China they will 
accept (Financial Times, ). See the next chapter under “the mining sector”.
 After the Sichuan earthquake in May , all critique stopped because the world was 
now supposed to show its solidarity with the Chinese people.
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8 Th e impact of the Chinese in other African 
countries and sectors
Meine Pieter van Dijk
 Introduction
So far we have discussed three instruments for China ’s presence in Africa in de-
tail (aid, investments and trade policies) and dealt with two case studies (Zam-
bia and Sudan). However, most African countries have experienced an increased 
Chinese presence and China is active in very different sectors. We cannot analyze 
in this book each and every African country and all the different sectors in which 
China is active separately. For that reason we will bring together in this chapter 
the experiences in a few other African countries where China is present and pro-
vide some details for typical sectors in which Chinese investors are active. The 
cases of Angola , Congo , Ethiopia , Tanzania and Zimbabwe will be discussed. 
The Chinese experiences in agriculture, textiles, the financial, the construction 
and the mining sector will be analyzed.
How will the development of these African countries be affected by the rapid 
growth of China ’s exports and investments? China takes over markets in African 
countries more easily than it manages to break into European or American mar-
kets. Does that mean these African countries will never be able to compete with 
China in sectors like the production of shoes or textiles? At the moment, produc-
tion factors like labor, capital, raw materials and entrepreneurship are still impor-
tant but “knowledge” will be a key factor in China’s continued industrial growth. 
China is really investing in research and development and seems to be aware that 
it cannot continue as a cheap labor producer in the global economy (Van Dijk, 
2007). The flow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI ) to Africa and the figures on 
total trade provide insight into the dynamics of the different regions. They show 
that African industries are usually not “competing with”, but in the best cases 
“complementary to” Chinese industrial exports and investments in the country 
concerned (Kragelund 2007, summarized in Chapter 1).
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 Angola 
In Angola , the government was about to reach an agreement with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF ), when China came along. Th e IMF promised to 
lend a few hundred million dollars for the development of the economy, but the 
Chinese immediately let it be known that they would invest about one billion US$ 
in Angola. Hence the ﬁ rst bid was rejected and with it the conditions to stimulate 
sound macro-economic policies and the promotion of good governance. However, 
Wissenbach (2008) notes about the case of Angola that it is disapproving
earlier Western speculation of a take-over by the Chinese. Angola used oil 
diplomacy to extract concessions from China while rejecting an IMF loan, 
then it dealt China’s eﬀ orts a blow by cancelling the contract for the build-
ing of the Lobito reﬁ nery and joining OPEC, while not cutting its ties with 
the US, IMF, World Bank despite their outrage over the earlier failure of 
the structural programme negotiations.
The country receives a lot of Chinese aid and China is not only active in the oil 
sector. It is also involved in repairing the railroads and constructing roads, using 
lots of Chinese workers. Chaponnière remarks in Chapter 3 that the Chinese are 
being criticized in Angola and are falling behind on some of the large projects 
they are carrying out and Wissenbach remarks that the country refuses to do 
things that would please China. This suggests that African countries do not have 
to bow to the pressure of the Chinese government if they really have something to 
offer to China and if a country does not put all its eggs in one (Chinese) basket.
 Congo 
Congo is another example of a country which had second thoughts concerning 
China ’s aid and investment proposals. In 2008, China’s intentions to invest on a 
large scale in Congo surprised the world (Financial Times, 10 May, 2008). Box 8.1 
gives a summary of the “$9 billion China deal”, also called the “deal of the century”.
It is estimated that five billion US$ out of the 9.25 billion US$ will be available 
to build roads, railways, hospitals and universities. This is infrastructure that can 
be built in the short run and that would allow President Kabila to show that he 
did fulfil his election promises. These are the kinds of things politicians like and 
help them to get re-elected! However, the Financial Times (10 May, 2008) adds 
that the deal comes at an uncertain cost to Congo , because the country was at a 
delicate stage in negotiations to secure a write-off of around eight billion US$ of 
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Box 8.1 “Congo outlines $9 billion China deal”
“The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo has unveiled details of a 
controversial $9.25 billion agreement that pledges millions of tonnes of copper and cobalt 
to China in exchange for roads, railways and other infrastructure. The general opinion is that 
Congo goes for a quick deal, instead of waiting for years for World Bank formulated projects, 
which then need to be approved and tendered.”
Source: Financial Times (10 May, 2008)
external debt when the news broke last year of its plans to enter a barter agree-
ment with Beijing . It is feared that the deal could scupper the debt write-off.
Marysse and Geenen (2009) carried out a critical study of the deal of the centu-
ry and concluded that it is deﬁ nitely not a win-win situation, but rather an example 
of unequal exchange. Th ey make clear that the investments have to be repaid with 
a guaranteed access to mineral resources and that the terms of reimbursement are 
not concessional at all: “in contrast to the Chinese discourse, this proves that the 
Chinese government is only pursuing its commercial and strategic interest”.
No wonder that in early 2009 Congo announced that it wanted to get rid of 
the contract (Volkskrant, 7 February, 2009). The Financial Times (10 February, 
2009) reports that the biggest investment deal in Africa is faltering as: “Western 
donors put pressure on the Democratic Republic of Congo to renegotiate a min-
erals-for-infrastructure contract”. In the NRC (7 February, 2009) it is explained 
that the current price for copper and cobalt is so low that Congo would have to 
pay China instead of the other way around. That would be the reason for Congo 
to try to renegotiate the deal. Already Marysse and Geenen (2009) had calculated 
that Congo would miss a lot of tax revenues, because China had negotiated tax 
holidays for the lifetime of the project. The conclusion can be drawn that it is dif-
ficult for an African country to negotiate a fair deal with a big country like China, 
when there are no transparent procedures and there is no competitive bidding, 
which would allow Congo to select the most attractive bid. In that sense it was a 
gamble to go for the Chinese deal instead of organizing competition.
The end of the story is even more surprising. The Financial Times had an 
article (20 February, 2009) with the heading “Chinese copper entrepreneurs flee”. 
It broke the news that more than 40 Chinese-run copper smelters are standing 
idle in Congo after their owners fled the country without paying taxes or com-
pensating staff at the end of the commodity boom, according to the governor of 
Katanga province, the province where most of Congo’s minerals can be found. 
The Financial Times adds that the Chinese entrepreneurs who came were part of 
their country’s small-scale, private sector-led engagement with Africa.
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The newspaper adds that the abrupt downturn has released resentment over 
the conduct of some Chinese businessmen in Africa, “where hard bargaining and 
lack of warmth towards local people won them few friends”. The governor himself 
said, when asked if the Chinese private entrepreneurs would be welcomed back 
when the price of copper rebounded: “No, no, no. Not as long as I am governor. 
Katanga is not a jungle. They worked as if it was a jungle.” The Chinese ambassa-
dor in Congo stressed that the policy is that Chinese entrepreneurs must respect 
the laws and regulation of the countries where they work.
 Ethiopia : China is considered an example
The presence of China in Ethiopia is very visible, for example in the construction 
sector, but also in the leather and textiles sector, where competing Chinese prod-
ucts have changed the market for local producers.1 In Ethiopia a lot of industrial 
products are imported or smuggled into the country. Buses are often imported 
from India or bought second-hand in China, but also shoes, textiles and food 
products from abroad are available. In the construction sector, the Chinese have 
carried out lots of projects in Ethiopia. Among those undertaken by them are the 
ring road around the capital, Addis Ababa , a low-cost housing project, a stadium 
and a ministry. It must be noted that the quality of the work is often limited, be-
cause no money is available in the city for complementary investments. Improving 
the quality is also not considered a priority in Ethiopia.
China is also exploring oil in the south of Ethiopia . However, the Ogaden Lib-
eration Front attacked the Chinese oil explorations in Ethiopia and, in April 2007, 
killed 65 Ethiopian and nine Chinese citizens. A number of Chinese workers in 
the oil exploration were abducted, but eventually liberated (Financial Times and 
NRC Handelsblad, 2007). It was speculated for some time that the Chinese gov-
ernment would start to protect the workers with armed guards.2 However, such a 
military presence in Africa has not yet been noticed, except under the ﬂ ag of the 
United Nations in a few cases (Puska, 2008). Also this was not the ﬁ rst time China 
had a problem protecting its citizens in Africa. In the Niger Delta in Nigeria, Chi-
nese employees of Chinese oil companies have also been attacked, just like their 
Western colleagues (Van Hoeymissen, 2008). She concludes rightly that such 
events make it more diﬃ  cult for China to maintain its non-interventionist stance. 
China considers it should protect its people, but ﬁ nds it diﬃ  cult to do so. Hence 
it may eventually also consider a military presence in certain African countries.
The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, returned from the summit in 
Beijing at the end of 2006 with praise for his hosts. More agricultural products 
would be allowed into China duty-free and the Chinese had pledged some 500 
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million US$ in concessionary loans for various development projects in Ethiopia . 
The country will also receive unconditional support from China consisting of 1.5 
billion US$ investments in telecommunication and infrastructure and 1.5 million 
US$ will be available for short-term export credits (Financial Times, 6 February, 
2007).
These are soft loans, coming without conditions. This may conflict with the 
principles of the Washington consensus and may be contrary to the agreements 
concerning the reduction of Ethiopia ’s debt with the Bretton Woods institutions. 
The current Prime Minister, Meles Zewari, refers to the Chinese economic suc-
cesses when he argues in favor of government-led economic development. He 
confronts this approach with the World Bank - and IMF -imposed Western de-
velopment model, the Washington consensus. However, the population, and in 
particular the Ethiopians living abroad, do not really trust his policies and do not 
invest as much in their mother country as would have been possible.
The Chinese are also helping Ethiopia to build up an industrial zone (see 
Box 8.2). It will be named the Ethiopian Eastern Industrial Zone (EEIZ). The 
Chinese investment group has already signed an agreement with the Ethiopian 
Investment Authority, and the construction of five projects will begin shortly as 
part of a total of 80 industrial projects.
Box 8.2 Chinese are helping to build industrial zones in Ethiopia 
A Chinese investment group has fi nalized preparations to construct a private industrial 
zone some 387km south of Addis Ababa of at least fi ve square km. According to the 
president of the investment group, 80 industrial projects will be constructed at a cost of fi ve 
billion Yuan (0.5 billion US$). Over twenty Chinese companies have already shown interest 
in investing in the industrial zone. Projects will include textile and garments, leather and 
leather products, food, electrical materials and manufacturing. It is expected that in the 
next fi ve years jobs will be created for over 20,000 Ethiopians. It is estimated that Ethiopia 
will benefi t from over a billon Birr each year from tax collections, after the tax exemption 
period ends.
Source: www.klmclubafrica.com, accessed 28 April, 2008
Competing with Chinese manufactured products is a problem for many African 
countries. However, a competitive advantage can sometimes be found in unex-
pected sectors. For example, Ethiopia has a lot of potential in tourism and leath-
er. However, private operators take the political system into consideration and 
study the macro-economic context before deciding whether they will invest in 
these sectors in Ethiopia. Making such an evaluation is what horticulture farmers 
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choosing between Kenya , Tanzania and Ethiopia have done and also what Ethio-
pians living abroad are constantly doing (Van Dijk and Pfisterer, 2009). Many 
prefer Kenya or Tanzania. For the development of the local economy in Ethiopia 
it is also important that the national government is willing to really decentralize 
decision power and to stimulate private entrepreneurship, preferably in an inno-
vative and export-oriented environment.
Politically, it is interesting that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi works with 
the Americans and the Chinese and manages in this way to stay in power. The 
Americans were not difficult about the cheating during the 2006 elections and 
then convinced him to go to war in Somalia at the end of 2006.3 Ethiopian troops 
were occupying large parts of Somalia and the capital Mogadishu, until they left 
at the end of January 2009 (NRC, 26 January, 2009). The Financial Times (6 
February, 2007) summarized Meles’s dealings with China as: “Ethiopia looks 
east to slip reins of western orthodoxy”. In the article it is noted that Ethiopia 
draws inspiration and a growing portion of funding from the east. Meles consid-
ers neo-liberal market reforms the hallmark of the West and the World Bank , 
but they did not generate the kind of growth Africa was looking for, while it 
weakened the role of the state. He believes in a strong developmental state and 
considers China to be the example.
Western countries and in particular the European Union (EU) were more 
critical about the political developments in Ethiopia . The EU stopped its aid for 
some time and a small country like the Netherlands went from budget support 
(showing confidence in the African partner country) to financing projects, which 
are selected using the criteria applied by Dutch development cooperation.
Meles denies that China ’s willingness to lend without conditionality is un-
dermining Western aid conditionality and reinforces some of the continent’s re-
pressive regimes. According to Meles, “the West assumes that they can buy good 
governance in Africa. Good governance can only come from inside; it cannot be 
imposed from outside. That was always an illusion”. The reality is of course that 
Meles’ regime is repressive, denying the results of a democratic process in Ethio-
pia , and that he has managed to pacify the Americans and now uses the Chinese 
for his purpose. His political model, with no space for real opposition, resembles 
the Chinese political system. Hence the same question can be asked for both 
countries, how long will the people still accept this kind of repression (Van Dijk, 
2008)? Ethiopia ends up as one of the countries that receives very limited FDI 
(it is not even coming from China), because investors lack sufficient trust in the 
long-term policies of the government and because the government is unwilling 
to sell land, which is all government-owned in Ethiopia (Serbeh-Yiadom et al., 
2008).
The impact of the Chinese in other African countries
 Tanzania, more trade with China , but also more exports?
From Tanzania, China imports mainly ores, wooden logs and cotton, while it ex-
ports garments, batteries and other consumer goods to the country. The Chinese 
government has promised to gradually reduce import tariffs for products coming 
from least developed countries to zero. Tanzania could benefit from this policy by 
exporting more products and not only raw materials. The long history of China 
and Tanzania’s relations has already been mentioned. It resulted in the railroad 
from the capital, the port city of Dar es Salaam, to Zambia ’s mining region. The 
irony is that these railroads may now be privatized.
Tanzania tries to attract Chinese investors and promotes more joint ventures 
with the United States (US) and Chinese companies. Although the Chinese are 
mainly interested in selling their products and in buying raw materials in Africa, 
a Chinese mission visiting the country in August 2006 made some promises to 
invest. According to the Tanzanian Guardian (24 August, 2006), the Tanzanian 
vice-president has pledged government support to investors trying to achieve the 
goals of the Tanzanian government. The Chinese answered that they seek invest-
ments in industry, minerals, agriculture and irrigation and that China has helped 
Tanzania with the development of an Export Processing Zone (EPZ). These 
investments should lead to real export, but usually also result in sales in the lo-
cal market, because the industries in the EPZ are looking for a market for their 
textiles or garments, in particular the lower quality products, which are difficult 
to export.
It is not so clear why China would invest in Tanzania in other sectors than 
raw materials. One can hardly expect the Chinese to play the role that Japan 
has played for many East Asian tigers, where they promoted industrial develop-
ment by subcontracting to local firms in these countries. Technical education 
has also been neglected in Tanzania, meaning that companies have to train their 
own people. This is one of the factors increasing the costs of production in 
Tanzania.
The Danish development cooperation financed a project to provide Tanza-
nian enterprises better access to international markets. Van den Hoestenberghe 
(2006) notes that the following sectors are particularly ready for Chinese technol-
ogy transfers, FDI , or for promoting linkages with other sectors of the economy: 
the transport sector, the mining sector and especially ore and coal. He suggests 
joint ventures and technology transfer to help Tanzania to process the ore before 
exporting it. Also other mining products and wooden logs could be processed 
in Tanzania before being exported. For cotton he suggests that making yarn and 
doing the spinning and weaving in Tanzania may be an option to be supported by 
Chinese capital and technology.
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Countries like Tanzania ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult to compete in an international or glo-
bal context, while their markets are ﬂ ooded with cheap Chinese products (Box 1.1 
in Chapter 1 gives the example of textiles and garments from China exported to 
Tanzania competing with the local tailors). An example of the unexpected eﬀ ects 
of globalization concerns plastic bottles. It is important that there will be a plastic 
recycling plant in Tanzania soon. Currently most of the plastic bottles are com-
pressed and exported to China, where the material is reused! Fortunately there will 
probably come a plant with the help of the UN Industrial Development Organisa-
tion (UNIDO). Scrap metal has already become valuable in Tanzania for exports, 
and the hope is that people will recover plastic in the future for local processing.
When trade statistics are looked at more closely, it turns out that the real 
dynamic for Tanzania is in the trade with India and China . Their shares in Tan-
zania’s trade have been increasing rapidly over the last years. It is difficult for 
Tanzania to compete with the top league in the region (South Africa ), or even 
with Kenya , one of Tanzania’s partners in the East African Community, which is 
considered quite advanced as far as industrialization is concerned. Hence China 
may provide new export opportunities for Tanzania and hence Tanzania is trying 
its luck, building on long-lasting relations and hoping it will not be disappointed.
 Zimbabwe, the wrong type of support
In Zimbabwe, China is providing substantial financial support to president Rob-
ert Mugabe and all kinds of support to his ailing government. For example, China 
helps to solve the problems of the tobacco industry, which suffered a lot from 
the nationalizations of the white farms. Where Western donors insist on good 
governance, China is not difficult and accepts a fake democracy and a corrupt 
administration.
The embarrassing situation for China will come when Mugabe will eventually 
be replaced. This became clear in April 2008. Reports were made of a Chinese 
ship carrying arms for Zimbabwe, which had to return from Durban because its 
cargo of bullets and mortar bombs was not unloaded in South Africa (Interna-
tional Herald Tribune or IHT, 25 April, 2008). Dockworkers, church groups, 
Western diplomats, human rights workers, trade unionists and religious leaders 
campaigned against it and had been able to convince the dockworkers and a local 
judge, who cancelled the permission to bring the weaponry over road to Harare, 
the capital of Zimbabwe.
The argument used was that the weaponry could be used to carry out an even 
more lethal crackdown on Zimbabwe’s political opposition. The call had also re-
ceived important backing from the Zambian president, Levy Mwanawasa, who 
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was leading a block of fourteen Southern African states (IHT, 25 April, 2008; he 
died later in a Paris hospital). At that time, the results of the presidential elec-
tions in Zimbabwe had not yet been announced, but the violence used by the gov-
ernment against the opposition increased almost every day. The opposition had 
to decide to boycott the elections, since the level of repression was unbearable. 
Hence Mugabe started his sixth presidential term, although only recognized by a 
limited number of countries so far (by Iran, for example). He was later pressed to 
accept as a compromise the opposition leader as his prime minister. It was later 
announced in the press that the ship was unloaded only slightly later in a port in 
Congo and that the Chinese weapons had arrived in Zimbabwe only a few weeks 
later (NRC, 2008).
 Chinese investments in African agriculture
China is looking for cheap food. For that reason, China is ready to invest in the 
agricultural sector in Africa. Bastholm (2007) analyzes the Chinese “strategic” 
investments in the agricultural sector in Tanzania. The Chinese State Farmers 
Agribusiness group has also invested in Zambia (see Chapter 6), where they lease 
more than 3,000 hectares (producing chicken and pigs and with an annual turn-
over of three million US$; Internationale Samenwerking, September 2006: 37). 
Bastholm and Kragelund pay attention to the role of the Chinese in the agricul-
tural sector in Zambia in Chapter 6. The Chinese are also present in the agricul-
tural sector in countries like Egypt , Sudan and Senegal .
Apart from investments in Africa’s agriculture, the Chinese government has 
also developed official plans to acquire land abroad to secure its food supplies (Fi-
nancial Times, 9 May, 2008). According to the Financial Times, Chinese compa-
nies will be encouraged to buy farmland abroad, particularly in Africa and South 
America, to help guarantee food security for China . The Chinese Ministry of 
Agriculture has drafted a proposal, which suggests supporting off-shore land ac-
quisition by Chinese agricultural companies. According to this Financial Times 
article:
Th ere are already policies to boost oﬀ -shore investments by state-owned 
banks, manufacturers and oil companies, but oﬀ -shore agricultural invest-
ments have so far been limited to a few small projects.
The plans to acquire land abroad to secure food supply could face intense oppo-
sition in the countries concerned. The Financial Times summarizes as the main 
arguments against it that it could result in “rising global food prices and defor-
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estation”. On the one hand it must be noted that a number of countries face de-
creasing rural populations (for example in Eastern Europe) and would welcome 
foreign farmers. On the other hand, nationalist feelings may resist an invasion of 
Chinese farmers. Box 8.3 shows that China is not the only country with plans to 
acquire land abroad. A number of Middle Eastern countries have similar plans, 
while European companies and individuals are investing heavily in the horticul-
ture sector in different African countries, although they are often leasing the land.
Box 8.3 Non-Chinese initiatives to promote agricultural investments in foreign 
countries
Libya is discussing options to invest in agriculture (growing wheat) abroad in the Ukraine. 
Saudi Arabia has also said it would like to invest in projects abroad to ensure food security 
and control of commodity prices. Finally, the Emirates are doing the same in Pakistan.
 Horticultural investments are made by, for example, Dutch and French fi rms and 
individuals in countries like Ethiopia , Kenya , Tanzania, Uganda and some other East African 
countries. These countries face similar problems of leasing land to foreigners, which is then 
not available for local farmers. Similarly, foreigners may be obtaining scarce water, while 
diverting land from producing agricultural products contributing to achieving local food 
security.
 The Wall Street Journal (11 July, 2008) recently gave an overview of “Rich nations 
investing in farms of poor ones”. The Journal stresses that unless the plans raise the local 
living standards, they will likely be a failure in the eyes of the local population. The key is 
how the local population can benefi t from these investments.
Source: Financial Times (9 May and 13 May, 2008); and for Tanzania, Van Dijk (2009)
European flower growers also lease land in African countries to export their 
products to Europe and the US. They argue that the soil and climate are more 
appropriate for certain flowers. An argument forwarded by the Chinese press 
for investing in agriculture abroad is that China counts about 40 percent of the 
world’s farmers, but has only 9 percent of the world’s arable land. Secondly, Chi-
nese scholars argue that domestic agricultural companies should expand abroad 
if China is to guarantee its food security and to reduce its exposure to global mar-
ket fluctuations. It shows another contradiction. China, having benefited from 
globalization through manufacturing, is not accepting globalization when agri-
cultural production is concerned. In the agricultural sector, other developing and 
developed countries could benefit from the additional demand for their products. 
In particular, there is a potential for additional agricultural production in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and some of the former republics of the Soviet Union. 
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Also Africa may be ready for an agricultural revolution given the current world 
market prices for food products (Kuyvenhoven, 2007).
One can be favorable about the principle of using land in other countries, as 
long as the sovereignty of the country concerned is respected and foreign invest-
ments do not become some new form of imperialism. Countries like Ethiopia are 
very positive about these investments in horticulture, because they create local 
employment and help Ethiopia to generate foreign exchange.
Some developing countries exporting agricultural products have become very 
protectionist the moment agricultural commodity prices started to really increase 
in 2007. Argentina, Egypt , the Ukraine and Vietnam, for example, have all re-
stricted their exports or have introduced export taxes. This is surprising, because 
simultaneously these countries put pressure on Europe, Japan and the United 
States in the Doha round of trade negotiations of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO ) to be less protective with respect to agricultural imports. Such an 
attitude is also risky for countries like China , which would not be able to get the 
agricultural products out, which were the fruits of their investments.
 Chinese investments in the textile sector aﬀ ecting Africa
The effect of China ’s export activities in Africa can be illustrated by the role 
of Chinese manufacturers producing garments in Africa. Textile and garments 
exports used to be limited through the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA), which 
would set quotas for textile-exporting countries.4 Everybody knew twelve years 
before that the MFA would run out, but China was one of the few countries antici-
pating this event by investing heavily in its local production capacity and it ben-
efited strongly from the new opportunities after 2005 to export textile products. 
China rapidly increased its textile exports after the termination of the MFA in 
January 2005. In Tanzania the effects were very limited, because the textile sector 
had already had problems for a long time and is still in a restructuring process 
(see Box 8.4 on page 168).
The issue was particularly relevant in 2005. While the EU and the US de-
cided to protect their markets from Chinese exports of textile and leather in 
2005 and 2006, China may have diverted its export to Africa and Latin America. 
African and Latin American countries have suffered very much from the com-
petition of cheap Chinese textile products.5 The EU and US argued that they 
took protectionist measures to protect other Third World producers of textiles 
and garments, because hardly any textiles are produced in the EU or the US any 
more.
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Box 8.4 Negative eff ects of Chinese textile exports for Tanzania
Textiles from Southeast Asia had already hit Tanzanian textiles and garments before the 
end of the Multi Fibre Agreement. This competition started in the 1990s when Tanzania 
opened up its economy. All shops in Dar es Salaam are now fi lled up with Southeast Asian 
textiles and Tanzania is mainly producing specifi c types of textile and clothing, which are 
demanded in the local market. If one asks Tanzanian traders, they claim that a lot of these 
textile products and garments are dumped by China , or come from Dubai, but that the 
Tanzanian government doesn’t want to follow up on this information. Good shirts are sold 
for less than 1,500 Tanzanian Shillings (just over one US dollar), which poor people really 
appreciate. Some trade experts think that Tanzania should ask the World Trade Organization 
to set up a joint committee to investigate the dumping. Subsequently the country can then 
try to restructure its own textile and garments sector.
The impact of China ’s rapidly increased textile exports after the termination of 
the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) has been devastating for the emerging textile 
industry in a number of African countries. The markets in Europe, the United 
States and Africa were flooded with Chinese textiles and garments. Thousands 
of jobs were lost in countries like Kenya , Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa and 
Mauritius due to the flood of Chinese textile and garments (NRC, 4 June, 2005). 
In particular, South Africa suffered tremendously. The newspaper noted, how-
ever, that African consumers benefited greatly from these developments, because 
cheaper textiles and garments became available locally, which is a blessing for the 
poor people, who cannot afford the more expensive clothing.
During President Hu’s visit to Africa in 2006, South Africa ’s President Thabo 
Mbeki raised the question of whether China would develop a colonial relation-
ship with Africa. This question had a lot to do with the negative experience in the 
South African (and other countries’) textile industries with Chinese competition. 
Th e Chinese invested in several African countries in the 1980s, which did not 
use up the textiles export quotas to which they were entitled under the MFA. By 
January 1, 2005, these factories were no longer needed and China produced and 
exported as much textile and garments as it could produce itself and exported 
them directly to Europe and the US.
 Construction activities
The role of the construction sector in Zambia was one of the examples in Chap-
ter 6. Also in the case of Ethiopia , the importance of Chinese construction firms 
was mentioned. A recent example of how Chinese contractors obtain construc-
tion jobs in Zambia is given in Box 8.5.
The impact of the Chinese in other African countries
Box 8.5 Chinese contractor to work on Zimba-Livingstone road
The Zambian journal The Post (4 July, 2008) carried the heading: “Chinese contractor to 
work on Zimba-Livingstone road”. It states that the government has granted authority 
to the Road Development Agency to award a contract for the rehabilitation of the highly 
dilapidated section of the Zimba-Livingstone road to a Chinese contractor. The contract 
would defi ne the scope of works on the rehabilitation of 30 kilometers of the 74 kilometer 
stretch of road. The contract for the rehabilitation of the 30 kilometers has been awarded 
to China Geo-engineering Corporation (CGC), “which will also be expected to carry out 
maintenance of the next 42 kilometers into Livingstone”.
Source: The Post (4 July, 2008)
Superficially there are no problems, because the work has been tendered using 
newspaper advertisements to raise the interest of local and international con-
struction firms. However, reading the article in The Post more closely, it turned 
out that Zambia had not enough money for the work and that there were still 
“considerations being done on the design”. A previous tender failed last year be-
cause “the bidders failed to bid within the terms”. Staying within the terms may 
be difficult, if the design is not fixed and the money is not adequate. The Chinese 
firm seemed to be comfortable with these uncertainties.
Chinese construction firms active in different African countries receive the 
news about upcoming tenders from their embassies. They are usually willing to 
do the construction work at lower prices, but they tend to use mainly Chinese 
managers and sometimes even Chinese workers, who seem to accept working 
very hard at relatively low salaries and tend to finish their jobs faster than the lo-
cal firms. Local construction firms and communities feel very frustrated and this 
sometimes leads to protests again the policies of Chinese contractors, as was the 
case of Zambia , which is summarized in Box 8.6 on page 170.
In this case, the Chinese contractor did not want to bring in Chinese work-
ers, but people from other regions. The example makes it clear that the Zambian 
population has become very sensitive to foreigners carrying out projects without 
involving the local community. To answer the resistance of the local population to 
the use of managers from different regions, officials argued with the old slogan: 
“One nation, one Zambia ” and they stressed that the population may scare away 
potential investors in their region.
 Meine Pieter van Dijk
Box 8.6 Villagers warned to stop intimidating Chinese contractor
Under the heading, “Villagers warned to stop intimidating contractor”, the Zambia Daily 
Mail (10 July, 2008) tells the story of a Zambian District commissioner advising villagers 
to stop intimidating a contractor engaged by the government to construct a 500 million 
US$ irrigation scheme co-funded by the African Development Bank and the government, 
which was meant to benefi t the local community and reduce the high poverty levels in the 
area. He added that: “the demand that employment opportunities should only be given to 
community members would not be entertained”.
In an editorial in the Times of Zambia (10 July, 2008), it is noted that: “reports that local 
people have threatened to use violence to stop a Chinese investor from recruiting qualifi ed 
Zambians from other parts of the country to work on a Government project are disturbing”. 
It is noted that the local people lack the desired qualifi cations and should listen to the 
District Commissioner.
Source: Zambia Daily Mail (10 July, 2008) and Times of Zambia (10 July, 2008)
 China buying into the African ﬁ nancial sector
The Chinese government has opened a bank in Zambia exclusively for Chinese 
customers. However, Chinese government-controlled financial institutions are 
also interested in owning financial institutions in African countries. The largest 
takeover was the buying of the Standard Bank of South Africa in October 2007, 
mentioned in Chapter 3. It shows that Chinese investments are diversifying into 
services. According to Chaponnière in Chapter 3, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC) invested five billion US$ to buy 20 percent of Standard 
Bank. This is the largest South African bank, with subsidiaries in eighteen Af-
rican countries. In the financial press it was mentioned that this would make it 
much easier for Chinese businessmen to transfer money within Africa and be-
tween China and Africa.
 China involved in African mining and the oil industry
Mineral resources that are important for China in Africa are cobalt, iron and 
copper. It was recently announced that Chinese oil companies are in energy talks 
with Nigeria “with a 2.5 billion loan” (Financial Times, 22 April, 2008). The 
Financial Times adds that China agreed to lend Nigeria this amount for infra-
structure projects in a renewed attempt to win access to markets and energy re-
serves in Africa’s main oil exporter. An even bigger deal in the mining and oil 
sector than the one in Nigeria had been suggested for Congo . It was discussed at 
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the beginning of this chapter. The result of previous Chinese investments is that 
now more than one-third of Chinese oil supply comes from Africa. China often 
has long-term contracts, which allows it to import the oil at prices far below the 
world market. The price paid in Sudan would be around 65 US$ per barrel, while 
in July 2008 the actual market price was 150 US$ per barrel. The Chinese state-
owned oil companies invested in particular in oil and gas in countries like Angola , 
Nigeria and Sudan. These investments are now very valuable and helped China in 
2007 and 2008 to control its inflation, by keeping the price of fuel low.
There were also problems with Chinese employers in the mining sector in 
Zambia , who refused to pay the legal minimum wage to Zambian workers. The 
mining sector has very limited forward and backward linkages and the govern-
ment wants the employers to develop these linkages. However, only the direct 
employment effects of mining are substantial, just like the tax revenues. But be-
cause of increased exports the local currency also tends to gain value because of 
the investments in the mining sector. This makes it difficult for Zambia to step 
up its exports of other products. Just like Tanzania, Zambian companies find it 
difficult anyway to compete in regional markets because of more advanced in-
dustrial countries like Kenya , South Africa and China , which supply industrial 
products at lower prices.
Box 8.7 Labor unrest in Zambian mines
In March 2008, Zambian miners working in the Chinese-owned Chambesi copper mine went 
on strike. They wanted their salaries to increase from Kwacha 280,000 to 1.2 million per month. 
About 500 miners demonstrated and stones were thrown to members of management of 
the mining company, who wanted to talk to the miners. One Chinese manager ended up in 
hospital and the house of a foreman was burnt down. The problems continued the following 
day and management put 400 workers temporarily out of work. It was announced that the 
intention is not to fi re them, if they respect that the negotiations have to take place according 
to the offi  cial procedures for agreements on wages and other labor conditions.
Source: Zambia Bulletin No. 122, 9 June, 2008. One US dollar is worth 3500 Kwacha
China ’s presence in the mining sector has led to labor and environmental issues 
in Zambia (see Box 8.7). The workers complained about security in the mines 
and the work conditions. It was noted that the work conditions may have been 
acceptable to Chinese workers but not for Zambian ones. This is a problem of a 
different perception of certain (labor, environmental, etc.) standards and we will 
come back to it in the final chapter. The same problems have emerged in South 
Africa , where the Minister of Labor criticized Chinese employers saying: “they 
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had no excuse to mistreat workers or pretend to labor inspectors they could not 
speak English” (Business Day, 26 June, 2008).6 The Chinese Association of South 
Africa reacted that the remarks about South Africa’s Chinese community were 
unfounded, irrational and inaccurate.7
 Conclusions
President Hu presented the Chinese approach to economic development as a 
political and economic alternative, but it could also hinder Africa’s industrial de-
velopment. “Angel or devil” is the title of a comment provided by Tegegne Worku 
(2006) in an Ethiopian weekly on China ’s role in Africa. He is dealing with what 
he calls the re-rise of China and its impact on Africa. Like Kragelund (2007), he 
distinguishes countries and industries that compete head to head and stand to 
lose, while those that complement its economy stand to gain from China’s eco-
nomic growth. This is an opinion about economic development that can be heard 
more often and is based on the idea that globalization is a zero sum game and 
if one country gains another has to lose (the opposite is argued by Wolf, 2008). 
Tegegne (2006) continues that China is a new alternative and that the nature of 
China’s engagement appears to be pure business. It is straightforward with no 
strings attached, no ideological tint and no fuss about the internal affairs of the 
countries concerned. However, we saw in this and other chapters that this is to 
some extent an illusion. China did intervene in Zambia , it did consider a military 
presence in Ethiopia and has been willing to exert some pressure on Sudan when 
boycotting the 2008 Olympics was suggested by Western NGOs.
Tegegene (2006) then points to one big advantage for Africa from China ’s in-
creased presence. Due to China’s increasing demand for commodities, their prices 
have gone up substantially, which has helped a number of commodities-produc-
ing African countries to grow faster. However, China also discourages higher 
value-added production in Africa. He rightly concludes with the question of why 
we should expect China to be more altruistic than its predecessors.
I also agree with him that it is not a question of angels and devils, but rather of 
African countries, which should stop letting external parties determine their fate. 
Th ey should rather start taking their fate into their own hands. Angola and Congo , 
and to some extent Nigeria, which has recently refused some Chinese deals, are 
examples of countries which have developed their own reaction to the proposed 
Chinese presence in their country. It seems like the bigger and richer countries are 
better placed to develop such a counter-strategy. We will come back to this discus-
sion in the last chapter, where we will also ask the question under which circum-
stances China ’s presence would slow down a local development process. Certainly 
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a more united stand would be beneﬁ cial, if only for the smaller African countries. 
A good a priori analysis of the distribution of the cost and beneﬁ ts may help, and 
the choice for public-private partnerships in the development of certain sectors 
would allow the African country concerned to closely monitor the developments 
and to intervene when the national interests are not being served.
 Notes
 These construction contracts are financed partially under international and partially un-
der bilateral financial support contracts, but sometimes just Chinese development coop-
eration.
 This issue is discussed by Puska ().
 The Americans did not want to go back to Somalia after their humiliating drawback ear-
lier and since they are already overstretched with soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 In January , the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) ended. It limited exports of textile 
and garments from developing countries to developed countries by imposing quotas (Van 
Dijk and Sideri, eds, ). 
 For an example concerning the leather industry in Ethiopia , see Tegegne (). 
 The Chinese in South Africa had gone to court to be declared black for the purpose of 
benefiting from economic empowerment legislation (Business Day,  June, ).
 The association added that it was surprised by his remarks, which conflicted with the 
constitution and the legislation he was meant to administer. In their words: “His un-
founded generalisations about the South Africa n Chinese community are factually inac-
curate” (Business Day,  June, ).
 References
Bastholm, A.H. (2007). Chinese strategic investments in the agricultural sector in 
Tanzania, trends and prospects. Leiden: ECAS Conference at the Africa Stud-
ies Centre.
Dijk, M.P. van (2007). The contribution of cities to economic development, An expla-
nation based on Chinese and Indian cities. The Hague: ISS Public lecture series 
2007, No. 1, 61 pp.
Dijk, M.P. van (2008). Why China ’s growth will stop and Europe has something 
to offer (In Dutch: Waarom de Chinese groei zal vastlopen en europa iets te 
bieden heeft). Fiducie, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 23-29.
Dijk, M.P. van (2009). Tanzania: Uneven Growth, Policy Reforms and Poverty 
Alleviation: An Example of an African Success? African Development Yearbook 
14. Berlin: Lit.
Dijk, M.P. and Pfisterer, S. (2009). Partnerships in the horticulture sector in Tanza-
nia. The Hague: DGIS, draft report.
 Meine Pieter van Dijk
Dijk, M.P. van and Sideri, S. (eds, 1996). Multilaterism versus regionalism: Trade 
issues after the Uruguay Round. London: F. Cass.
Dijk, M.P. van and Fransen, J. (eds, 2008). Managing Ethiopian Cities in an Era of 
Rapid Urbanisation. Delft: Eburon.
Hoeymissen, S. van (2008). Niet-inmenging als PR troef onder druk. Internatio-
nale Spectator, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 331-337.
Hoestenberghe, K. van (2006). China ’s African policy and its impact on Tanzania, 
Improved access to markets project. Dar es Salaam: MIT-Danida international 
trade support program.
Kragelund, P. (2007). Chinese Drivers for African Development? The effects of 
Chinese investments in Zambia . Africa in China ’s Global Strategy, ed. M. Ki-
tissou, pp. 162-181. London: Adonis and Abbey Publishers.
Kuyvenhoven, A. (2007). Africa, agriculture and aid. Wageningen: WUR.
Mold, A. (ed., 2008). European development policies and Africa. Amsterdam: Uni-
versity Press.
Puska, S. (2008). Resources, security and influence, the role of the military in 
China ’s Africa strategy. China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 11, pp. 2-6.
Serbeh-Yiadom, K.C., Alehegn, E., and Dijk, M.P. van (2008). Land Administra-
tion: Law, Policy, Practice. In: M.P. van Dijk and J. Fransen (eds, 2008), pp. 
11-28.
Tegegne, W. (2006). Angel or devil? The re-rise of China and its impact on Af-
rica. Capital , Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 1-2.
Wissenbach, U. (2008). “The EU’s response to China ’s Africa safari, Cooperation 
to make aid sustainable and matching needs”. Contribution EADI Working 
group on industrial development. Geneva: EADI General conference.
Wolf, M. (2008). Globalization can be win-win, in the Financial Times, www.
ft.com
 
Part IV
Conclusions

9 Responsible production in Africa: Th e rise of 
China as a threat or opportunity?
Peter Knorringa1
 Introduction
This chapter explores likely impacts of the rise of China on opportunities to en-
hance responsible production in Africa. Responsible production refers to those 
situations where lead actors in value chains make a deliberate effort to include, 
throughout their supply chain, labor and environmental standards that go beyond 
the existing minimum legal requirements. In this way, I use responsible produc-
tion as an umbrella term, encompassing both Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives and Fair Trade activities. This chapter is part of a broader pro-
gram of research that raises two basic questions in order to begin assessing the 
development relevance of responsible production. First, how likely is it that re-
sponsible production becomes increasingly mainstreamed? Second, to what ex-
tent can we expect the “tool” of responsible production to enhance developmental 
outcomes? In other words, these questions explore the quantitative – reach – and 
qualitative – depth – importance of responsible production for development. 
While CSR has been first and foremost a business tool so far, the challenge is to 
identify where and when it can also become a development tool.
The question that will drive this chapter is whether the increased competitive 
pressures from Asia are pushing African producers to an ever more desperate race 
to the bottom, or whether a significant number of examples exist of producers 
that consciously compete through incorporating higher labor and environmental 
standards.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a working 
definition of responsible production. It outlines a typology that distinguishes 
between compliance, risk minimization and value creation strategies, and adds 
the Norm Life Cycle model to make this typology more dynamic. Before using 
this typology to position existing case studies from Africa in the fourth section, 
a section briefly introduces the broader context of the case studies by looking at 
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private sector development and CSR in Africa, and the role of China in these de-
velopments. Then we bring in some additional sobering thoughts to the idea that 
responsible production will be the way of the future, by showing how the rise of 
China as a center of global production and consumption may well limit the reach 
of responsible production. The final section concludes by presenting the main 
findings and outlining suggestions for further research.
 A dynamic typology of responsible production
Defining responsible production, Fair Trade and CSR seems a simple first step in 
developing this chapter. However, the confusion in the discussion on the defini-
tions reflects the overall confusion in this area of work. Instead of getting drawn 
into a survey of the definitional issues in this booming literature, I will try to 
highlight very briefly the often implicit discourse clashes that thwart agreement 
on straightforward definitions. For me, responsible production refers to those 
situations where the lead actors in supply chains make a deliberate effort to in-
clude, in dealing with stakeholders throughout their supply chain, labor and en-
vironmental standards that go beyond the existing minimum legal requirements. 
In this way, I use responsible production as an umbrella term, encompassing both 
Fair Trade and CSR initiatives. While CSR is particularly important to investi-
gate the likelihood of broadening the reach of responsible production, as it often 
involves large, brand-sensitive corporations, Fair Trade initiatives are inherently 
niche activities that may provide significant demonstration effects of localized 
depth of responsible production.
This section will continue to first briefly define Fair Trade , and then focus on 
unpacking the idea of CSR by using a typology of three often cited and partly 
overlapping CSR strategies. Finally, I add the infrequently used model of the 
norm life cycle to this typology to provide an often missing dynamic element of 
process to the CSR debate.
The official definition of Fair Trade has been the result of fierce discussions 
within the movement, and presently is formulated as follows: “Fair Trade is a 
trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks 
greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development 
by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized 
producers and workers – especially in the South” (FINE, 2001).
Th e reality of Fair Trade , inevitably, is more unruly. Even for the star product 
of coﬀ ee, it seems clear that it is far from easy to deliver on the very ambitious 
claims made in Fair Trade documentation.2 Moreover, and this is probably more 
important and structural, with their modest turnover and the volatility in con-
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sumer tastes, Fair Trade marketing channels simply cannot guarantee a regular 
demand for particular upgraded indigenous handicrafts from speciﬁ c groups of 
specialized artisans from the South. Fair Trade can and does aim to upgrade such 
producers, and in some cases succeeds in assisting them to “get on the radar screen” 
of mainstream buyers. Nevertheless, the overall picture seems to indicate that for 
local development in the South, in whatever sector, Fair Trade on its own cannot 
achieve signiﬁ cant reach in terms of mainstreaming responsible production.
Many CSR definitions by management scholars not only include that firms 
need to go beyond what is required by law, but also to go beyond the interest of 
the firm (McWilliams, Siegel and Wright, 2006).3 I find this counter-intuitive 
and counter-productive, as the more sustainable achievements in responsible 
production are to be found most feasibly in situations where firms can actually 
increase long-term profitability and sustainability by engaging in CSR as a way 
to differentiate themselves and their products. In a very critical, forcefully argued 
recent survey, The Economist (20 January, 2005) even goes one step further and 
argues that only the type of CSR where both profits and social benefits increase 
makes sense. Given their dislike of the CSR terminology, they prefer to label the 
situation where higher profits and increased social benefits go together as “good 
management”, so as to differentiate it from three other types of CSR which they 
feel are flawed.4 This type of “good management” is what much of the business-
school CSR literature refers to as the “business case for CSR” (see below). This 
implies a win-win situation, often without much emphasis on the inherent con-
flicts of interests among the different “stakeholders” in such initiatives. Two other 
recent special issues on CSR by development researchers (International Affairs, 
2005, and Third World Quarterly, 2007) shed a very different light on the debate 
(see e.g. Blowfield, 2005; Jenkins, 2005; Newell and Frynas, 2007). They argue 
that the development relevance of CSR will remain inherently limited in terms of 
reach as long as only internationally operating brand-sensitive firms in consumer 
markets are pushed to behave responsibly, and depth remains limited as long as 
private sector actors can get away with defining, implementing and evaluating 
what is to be seen as socially responsible.
Even though philanthropy is often the first association with the idea of CSR, 
especially in the USA and in many developing countries, in this chapter I focus 
on the more strategic dimensions of CSR in terms of incorporating responsibil-
ity attributes in the day-to-day operation of the firm. In other words, while phi-
lanthropy is basically about ways to use profits to “give back to the community”, 
I focus on CSR as part of a business strategy or when CSR “becomes the way in 
which the company does business...” (Chapple and Moon, 2005: 425). 5
The more strategic CSR literature often uses the following typology of three 
different but in reality often partly overlapping strategies: 1. Compliance (with ex-
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isting regulations, laws, conventions and standards), 2. Risk minimization (safe-
guard brand-name goodwill and company reputation by moving beyond mere 
compliance) and, 3. Value creation (using CSR activities as a way to compete and 
essentially differentiate oneself from other companies that offer similar products) 
(Nelson, 2000: 28). One might argue that “mere” compliance with existing regula-
tions should not be seen as a strategic CSR activity. However, there is more to 
compliance than initially meets the eye. Regulations are continuously changing, 
regulations differ by country (and does one take the country of consumption or of 
production as point of departure?), and regulations can be adhered to by follow-
ing either the letter or the spirit of the regulation. Moreover, the really significant 
improvements in the reach of responsible production are made through small 
improvements that are incorporated by large groups of companies, and by far 
most companies can be situated under the heading of “1. Compliance”. Therefore, 
so-called “active” compliance behavior is to be seen as a strategic CSR activity.
The three strategic CSR strategies are often visualized as a pyramid, where 
firms aiming for compliance form the large base of the pyramid, a smaller group 
of companies with brand-names aim at risk minimization, and an even smaller 
group of companies uses their responsible behavior as a key competitive tool.
This categorization gains a dynamic perspective by adding the Norm Life Cy-
cle model, a useful tool to analyze the process of how new norms can become 
mainstreamed (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 898).6 They distinguish three stag-
es: norm emergence, norm cascading, and norm internalization, with a key role 
assigned to the “norm tipping” that takes place between the first and second stage 
(Segerlund, 2005: 5). In the first stage of norm emergence, altruism, empathy, 
idealism and commitment are seen as the main motives for “norm entrepreneurs” 
to push, for example, for better labor standards. This refers to the frontrunners 
in responsible production, in particular the various types of Fair Trade initiatives. 
Moreover, it also includes those firms that really use their image of responsibility 
to create value (a well-known example is The Body Shop).
Once a certain critical mass of key companies have adopted such a norm, 
“norm tipping” brings us to the second stage of norm cascading in which legiti-
macy, reputation, and esteem become the main motives of companies to join what 
is now seen as “the right thing to do”. This is also where risk minimization comes 
in. A-brand companies start seeing they need to invest in boosting their respon-
sibility image, in order not to “fall behind” those firms who used to be seen as 
frontrunners but are now increasingly setting the new level of expected respon-
sible behavior.
In the third stage of norm internalization, the new norm has become a gen-
erally accepted minimal standard that all participants need to conform to, and 
at this stage, for example, new laws on minimum labor standards can further 
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institutionalize the now generally accepted new norm. At this stage also, those 
firms who focus on compliance need to respond to the changed situation. Add-
ing this dynamic dimension therefore shows that firms need to actively respond 
to changes in norms, even when they continue to follow the same CSR strategy. 
Moreover, through this dynamic process of new norms becoming mainstreamed 
and subsequently internalized over time, the “floor of basic compliance can be 
raised”, and overall compliance requirements can increase over time.
The danger with these types of models is that one might be tempted to think 
only in terms of inevitable improvements leading up to a steady state of utopia. 
Obviously, over time companies may move up and down through this model, and 
it is important not to be naïve about ever reaching a state in which a majority 
of companies would use their responsibility profile to differentiate themselves 
from competitors. Nevertheless, I feel this model helps to more systematically 
assess trends in the occurrence of responsible production. Therefore, combin-
ing the Norm Life Cycle model with the more commonly used typology of CSR 
strategies leads to three different levels of responsible production that will be 
used below to position the existing case studies on Africa. But first, it is useful to 
introduce private sector development in Africa and the renewed role of China in 
African private sector development.
 Private sector development in Africa
As many contributions to this edited volume focus on aspects of private sector 
development in various African countries, it suffices here to briefly and selectively 
pick out four issues that are important to provide a context to interpret the role 
of responsible production in Africa. First, an introduction to why private sector 
development may be seen as part of the problem, but it also has to be part of the 
solution. Second, to stress that private sector development in Africa faces many 
daunting challenges to perform this constructive role. Third, while Chinese in-
vestments in Africa may at least potentially be part of a solution, they are viewed 
in very different ways. Fourth, and lastly, it is argued that the role of CSR in ad-
dressing broader development issues has been extremely limited, but is at least 
potentially significant.
To start with the first point, there are several general ways through which the 
private sector contributes to development in general and poverty reduction in 
particular, most importantly as the engine of the economy and the main source 
of employment (when for the moment we include the informal sector in our de-
scription of the private sector). At the same time, private sector actors are often 
seen as exploiting specific groups of workers, destroying local environments, and 
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siding with undemocratic leaders to optimize profits. Therefore, a nuanced ap-
proach is a necessary first step in discussing the link between private sector activi-
ties and developmental concerns. Most observers agree that private sector growth 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development. Without a growing 
“cake”, it is difficult to imagine sustainable poverty reduction among less privi-
leged groups in society. At the same time, growth as such does not lead automati-
cally to poverty reduction. Including the private sector as an indispensable actor, 
along with civil society and the state, to deliver development, is only a rather 
recent phenomena and is still frowned upon by many traditional elements within 
civil society and the state.7
Second, private sector development in Africa faces many structural challenges. 
A key contribution in this area of work has been a study by Pedersen and McCor-
mick on African Business Systems. They argue that the African business system 
is characterized by fragmentation, and that despite:
... important diﬀ erences in resource endowments, pre-colonial social struc-
tures, colonial rulers and settlement patterns, post-independence indus-
trial policies and donor involvement, the business systems of many African 
countries have developed in remarkably similar ways. Th e typical African 
production and distribution system consists of several distinct segments: a 
parastatal sector, a formal, large-scale private sector typically dominated by 
multinational aﬃ  liates, and so-called ‘non-indigenous’ enterprises owned 
by migrant traders or settlers such as Asians in East Africa, whites in Zim-
babwe and Lebanese in West Africa; and ﬁ nally an ‘informal’ sector which 
is mostly African and small-scale, but often contains an important illegal or 
semi-legal large-scale component. Th e various fragments interact with each 
other, but only in limited ways,... (Pedersen and McCormick, 1999: 112-113).
Pedersen and McCormick (2001: 122) also argue that a key problem in many Af-
rican business systems is that they are fragmented and volatile, which makes de-
veloping bridging social capital extremely difficult, especially between small and 
large firms. Entrepreneurs are caught in risky environments, where they can be 
confronted with problems beyond their control. Moreover, they often need to 
base their business relationships on personal relationships because “... monopo-
listic or illicit tendering practices and the inability of the legal system to secure 
enforcement of contracts is a major problem” (ibid: 121). Finally, they are exposed 
to increasingly pervasive rent-seeking and corruption, especially among groups 
of businesses with political protection, and growing instability because of in-
creasingly predatory states. As a result, small entrepreneurs are boxed into what 
Mumvuma (2000) calls simple contracting. He finds that “... transactions and as-
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sociational activities as a consequence are often polarized along religious, racial, 
gender, ideology etc. lines” (Mumvuma, 2000: 256). In general, a wave of recent 
studies emphasize several ways in which macro-economic uncertainty and vola-
tility in Africa further inhibits private sector development (Hyden, 1997; Plat-
teau, 2003; Rothstein, 2004).
Third, the role of Chinese investments and the impact of the rise of China 
on prospects of developing export-oriented sectors in African countries. In a 
provocative paper, Kaplinsky and Morris (2007) argue that “the entry of China 
(and to a lesser extent India) into the global economy as a significant exporter 
of manufactures poses severe problems for export-oriented growth in Sub Sa-
hara Africa” (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2007: 254). They basically argue that the 
first steps into export-oriented manufacturing, often in sectors like garments, 
textiles, shoes, are blocked by Asian producers. Without protection, African 
producers will not be able to compete in these labor-intensive sectors, neither 
in export markets nor in their domestic markets. The situation looks less bleak 
for extractive resource-based industries like mining and oil, and for high-value 
agro-based products like flowers and specialty vegetables. China (and to a lesser 
extent India) is not so much a competitor in these sectors but has increasingly 
become a main consumer. China, especially, sees Africa as a strategic supply base 
to ensure access to resources like oil and minerals (Konings, 2007; Gu et al., 
2008). Moreover, China sees opportunities in Africa to sell its products and (re)
build political alliances.
For many African rulers, China offers a very attractive alternative to dealing 
with European and North-American governments and companies. China does 
not interfere in state sovereignty, and it does not impose a multitude of govern-
ance-related conditions in giving aid. More generally, it offers an opportunity to 
African rulers finally to wriggle out of the Western hegemony (Konings 2007). 
Therefore, some observers are jubilant about the performance of Chinese inves-
tors in Africa. They put forward that while many Western investors and govern-
ments may claim to have the interest of the Africans at heart, their paternalistic 
and self-serving (conditionalities!) behavior in practice might well offer fewer 
development opportunities as compared to the more straightforward business 
approach by Chinese investors. By contrast, in Western circles the increased Chi-
nese involvement in Africa is often seen as a negative force, precisely because it 
does not impose good governance conditionalities on African rulers, and because 
it makes it more difficult for Western companies to secure cheap access to stra-
tegic resources.
Fourth, some authors have more broadly investigated the relevance of CSR to 
development. According to Blowfield (2007), we have relatively little to be cheer-
ful about as most of the existing information on the impacts of CSR focus on the 
 Peter Knorringa
impacts of CSR on business concerns like effectively adhering to standards and 
the effects of that on consumer perceptions. In contrast, so far very little infor-
mation has become available about “how CSR affects the major societal issues it 
was intended to tackle” (Blowfield, 2007: 683). Unpacking these societal issues, 
Utting argues that of the four central components of equality, as a key element of 
development, most CSR initiatives focus on social protection, and more recently 
also hesitantly on labor and other human rights (Utting, 2007: 697). The other 
two central components of equality, empowerment and redistribution, hardly fea-
ture in the practice of CSR at all.
Obviously, one cannot expect CSR to solve all problems for everyone. Never-
theless, it is important to identify and position the modest but potentially sig-
nificant contribution of CSR as part of how the private sector operationalizes 
its relationships with society and the state. Conventional wisdom claims that the 
private sector drives economic growth, how the state regulates and how civil so-
ciety acts as a watchdog. Strategic CSR is one way in which private sector actors 
explore new delineations in the complementary roles of private, state, and civil ac-
tors. Moving forward with improving our understanding of the relevance of CSR 
to development also requires a pragmatic and empirical approach, recognizing 
that “CSR initiatives work for some firms, in some places, in tackling some issues, 
some of the time” (Newell and Frynas, 2007: 674).
 African case studies on responsible production
This section positions the limited number of existing African case studies that fit 
within the domain of responsible production, and discusses the extent of Chinese 
involvement in these cases. But first of all, it needs to be pointed out that many 
publications on CSR in Africa focus on philanthropy and therefore do not fit 
into the present classification. One good example of this literature is a paper by 
Amaeshi et al. (2006) titled “Corporate Social Responsibility in Nigeria: western 
mimicry or indigenous practices?”. They convincingly show how Nigerian CSR 
has a strong philanthropy focus (“giving back to the community”) and is almost 
exclusively carried out by big business, often multinational companies but also 
(and that is where the “mimicry” comes in) major domestic companies. They ar-
gue that such a focus makes sense because in African countries such initiatives 
fulfil an obvious need because governments have retreated substantially from 
social policy. Moreover, and more importantly, they argue that a conception of 
CSR as philanthropy also fits the socio-cultural heritage of indigenous firms and 
business leaders:
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... the kinship-network-based system of business organization would imply 
that businesses ﬁ rst serve the interests of their network members as their 
primary constituency. Philanthropy, goodness to society and charity are 
therefore conceived within the moral economy of kin-based solidarity and 
reciprocity (Amaeshi et al., 2006: 24).
This philanthropic understanding of CSR also makes sense in relation to the is-
sues discussed above: fragmented African business systems characterized by high 
trust and dependency within groups but very low levels of bridging social capital 
that enables more generalized norm emergence. CSR researchers often seem to be 
frustrated by this focus on philanthropy and cannot withstand the temptation to 
refer to an assumed linear progression in societies from a focus on philanthropy 
to a more central role for CSR in the core business strategy. However, I think the 
two models will coexist and may have different weights in distinct settings and 
time periods. In this chapter I wish to focus on CSR as part of a business strat-
egy. Below, I present a synthesis of existing African case studies which do focus 
on one or more of the three strategic CSR issues: compliance, risk minimization 
and value creation.
 Dynamic compliance: Raising the “ﬂ oor of expectation”
Compliance with existing regulations forms the base of the pyramid of strategic 
CSR (see the second section above). To start with, most regulations like labor 
laws on minimum wage levels, or freedom of association remain a distant abstrac-
tion for workers in the informal sector, the main source of employment in Africa. 
But also for state-owned and foreign or domestically owned private sector firms 
in the formal sector, it seems unlikely that we can expect many states in Africa 
to have the political will and the capacity to enforce implementation upon those 
firms that resist complying to existing regulations. These structural constraints 
on legal enforcement at least partly explain the recent popularity of voluntary 
codes of corporate governance, a way for the “coalition of the willing” to enhance 
the visibility of their CSR practices.
In recent years, many African countries adopted rather sophisticated volun-
tary national codes of corporate governance, usually based on or inspired by three 
well-known codes: the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), the 
Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance Principles for Corporate 
Governance (1999), and either the first or second King Report on Corporate Gov-
ernance for South Africa (1994, 2002), as discussed in Rossouw (2007).8 The main 
challenge with these codes of corporate governance is to bring a critical mass of 
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companies under their umbrella, making it increasingly difficult for “respectable” 
companies to not join such initiatives. Some authors argue that achieving such 
a critical mass of responsible producers will provide a competitive advantage in 
attracting foreign investors (Vaughn and Verstegen Ryan, 2006). Other authors 
debate the possibilities of achieving more generalized (responsible) values in Af-
rica, given that its moral economy has shown an “... inability of its institutions to 
enforce societal norms” (Adi, 2005: 4; see also West, 2006). While the existing lit-
erature diverges on the reasons for a lack of generalized norm emergence, it seems 
to converge on the observation that for the foreseeable future one should not 
expect an overall increase in the level of expected responsible behavior. Therefore, 
the logic of the Norm Life Cycle model, in which the “floor of minimum expec-
tations” can be raised through a cascading effect of a critical mass of companies 
worried about their corporate image, does not seem to hold for the present reality 
in Africa. The fragmentation and polarization of business systems and consumer 
markets go a long way to explain this disruption.
In short, this means that presently in Africa there is limited scope for raising 
the floor of minimum expectations of corporate responsibility, neither through 
additional laws and regulations, nor through additional voluntary codes of corpo-
rate governance, given the weak and fragmented implementation. The fundamen-
tal differences between regulations and voluntary codes of conduct, which are 
often discussed in the CSR literature (see, for example, Newell, 2005), seem to 
wither away almost completely in much of the private sector in Africa. The need 
to rely almost fully on voluntary codes also implies that the final step in the logic 
of the Norm Life Cycle model does not hold for the present context in Africa. By 
and large, I do not see a process in which increasing standards of what is to be 
seen as responsible production at some point become further institutionalized in 
enforceable national laws.
 From risk minimization to the “right thing to do”
Risk minimization occupies the middle section of the pyramid, in between com-
pliance and value creation. A variety of case studies exist that show the importance 
of risk minimization to the brand name goodwill of especially multinational com-
panies and supermarket chains. In this section a distinction is made between risk 
minimization by lead actors in global supply chains like ﬂ owers and horticulture 
on the one hand, and extractive industries like oil and mining on the other hand.
The extractive industries are especially dominated directly or indirectly by 
multinational companies, like oil in Nigeria, or mining in Southern Africa (see, 
for example, Ameshi et al., 2006; Frynas, 2005). In the case of extractive indus-
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tries the responsibility issues often zoom in on impacts on local communities, 
human rights and environmental damage. One might even argue that local com-
munity development programs should be seen as part of philanthropy, removed 
from the core business strategy. However, in the case of, for example, mining and 
oil in Africa, at least partly because of awareness-raising by campaigning non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), it has become imperative for Multi-Na-
tional Companies (MNCs) to be seen to be addressing these issues, to minimize 
the risk of damaging their brand name goodwill. At the same time, these MNCs 
have by and large been successful in limiting the scrutiny of their social perform-
ance to rather straightforward technical outcome standards such as the number 
of schools built. So far, they have been able to prevent being drawn into a process 
approach that focuses on the empowerment and rights of local communities.
The other type of actors involved in risk minimization are lead actors like 
supermarkets that nowadays source from Africa. There are many regional and 
sectoral success stories, like cut flowers from Kenya and Ethiopia , horticultural 
products from Ghana, wine from South Africa , and more generally a variety of 
products from those African countries with a more competitive and organized 
private sector like South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya. It is perhaps not surprising 
that many of the existing case studies on risk minimization in Africa deal with 
one or more of the examples mentioned above, especially in those cases where 
final products are retailed by large companies in Europe which are, for exam-
ple, members of the Ethical Trading Initiative or less well-known initiatives to 
enhance responsible production (see, for example, Barrientos and Smith, 2006; 
Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004; Ewert and Hamman, 1999; Fig, 2005; Hamann 
et al., 2005; Hughes, 2001; West, 2006).
In the last decades we have seen a bewildering proliferation of standards and 
codes. Probably the best-known example of a risk minimization strategy (with 
some value creation elements in its presentation) is the Ethical Trading Initiative, 
in which a group of well-known brand name companies work together with trade 
unions and NGO s to ensure that labor conditions of suppliers “meet or exceed 
international labor standards”. A very recent and in-depth independent study on 
the Ethical Trading Initiative (Barrientos and Smith, 2006; and at www.ethi-
caltrade.org) indicates that such international labor standards are successfully 
met for core workers in core supplier firms, but that the picture becomes more 
variegated for indirectly employed workers or for smaller firms and farmers who 
supply to core suppliers of global buyers. While ETI has perhaps received most 
publicity, many other Multi Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) exist. Among MSIs 
a convergence towards some of the ILO core standards can be seen. Most MSIs 
include health and safety, working hours, equal treatment of women, and child 
labor. Controversial remain operationalizations of freedom of association, wage 
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levels (minimum versus prevailing versus living) and the scope of non-discrim-
ination clauses (O’Rourke, 2006). One general trend in these supply chains is 
that smallholders are likely to be squeezed out of the chain in favor of large-scale 
commercial farmers who find it much easier to conform to standards (see, for 
example, Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). In effect, smallholders increasingly depend on 
niche markets like Fair Trade , as discussed in the next sub-section.
 Value creation
The third and last type of responsible production constitutes the top of the 
pyramid, where firms use their responsibility profile as a Unique Selling Point. 
Therefore, at least in theory, the key difference between value creation and risk 
minimization as types of responsible production is that value creation is a pro-
active approach to responsibility, while risk minimization is a defensive strategy. 
The first and foremost type of production that springs to mind when looking at 
value creation is Fair Trade . For Fair Trade initiatives responsible production is 
at the core of their business model. However, as discussed in Section 2, the reality 
of Fair Trade is more unruly. Nevertheless, the intrinsic problems related to the 
model and reality of Fair Trade do not render it useless. On the contrary, they 
have played a crucial role as norm entrepreneurs, setting an example of how in-
ternational trade can (at least aim) to be done “differently”. Fair Trade has played 
a catalytic role in raising consumer awareness, especially among middle-class con-
sumers in Europe and the USA. It can be argued that the present fashion for 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) among leading companies, can at least 
partly be attributed to the pioneering role of Fair Trade. In the first decade of 
this millennium, Fair Trade has found it difficult to maintain its niche in the 
consumer market. Many CSR initiatives of leading brand names in, for example, 
coffee, and supermarket chains promoting their own brands, have in recent years 
flooded the market with responsible labels. Consumers have found it increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between these labels, and Fair Trade appears to be losing 
its claim to a Unique Selling Point. Mainstream companies have been successful 
in convincing consumers that their ethical purchasing practices are in effect on 
par with what Fair Trade offers to producers. At least partly this is a result of a 
process in which mainstream companies have been able to limit responsibility 
indicators to relatively straightforward issues such as wages and health and safety 
issues. As discussed in the subsection on risk minimization, these indicators do 
not address more controversial issues such as freedom of association or broader 
equality issues such as empowerment. Moreover, monitoring often remains lim-
ited to core workers.
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One recent case study from South Africa shows an interesting contrast be-
tween the earlier mentioned Ethical Trading Initiative and the Wine and Agri-
cultural Ethical Trading Initiative (WIETA) (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2006). 
While ETI involves northern companies, international NGOs and global Un-
ion federations, WIETA is a southern-based initiative that links local suppliers, 
trade unions and NGOs. According to this study, the key difference between 
the two initiatives is that the localized initiative is much better able to negotiate 
inclusion of casual workers. Since labor conditions are often more substandard 
among casual workers, and most codes do not address these workers at all, local-
ized initiatives like WIETA can play a crucial role in strengthening the relevance 
of standards to local development. In effect, they start addressing the challenge 
raised by Barrientos and Smith (2007: 727), to move from a compliance approach 
to a process approach that focuses on empowerment of workers. This can also be 
seen as a modest first step towards “how CSR affects the major societal issues it 
was intended to tackle” (Blowfield, 2007: 683).
 Chinese presence in responsible production in Africa
On compliance, China ’s non-intervention policy makes it very unlikely they 
will play a pro-active or stimulating role in encouraging African countries to 
raise the floor of expectations. A more important role for Chinese producers 
can be envisaged in risk minimization strategies. However, the extent to which 
Chinese producers will be active in risk minimization strategies depends on 
several factors. First, to the extent that Chinese producers will increasingly own 
A-brands that have been shown to be more sensitive to risk minimization. Sec-
ond, to the extent that attention for responsible attributes will become increas-
ingly important among the new middle-class consumers in the global South 
(see also Section 5 below). One might hypothesize that citizens in the global 
South might give more importance to environmental issues, as they live – and 
breath the air – in countries where global production is increasingly concen-
trated. Third, risk minimization strategies can be important in the food indus-
try, to the extent that Chinese consumers will force companies to ensure food 
safety. In the Chinese media food safety is a recurrent issue, and many new 
middle-class households seem to be willing to go to great lengths to ensure safe 
and healthy food. Finally, no indications have been found of Chinese involve-
ment in value creation strategies. The next section will put these observations 
in a broader perspective.
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 Th e rise of China and the likelihood of mainstreaming 
responsible production in Africa
While the previous section presented findings on initiatives to strengthen re-
sponsible production in Africa, in this section I will put forward some further so-
bering observations to put these initiatives into a broader perspective. Two trends 
need to be taken into account. First, the rise of China in the global economy 
has accelerated the globalization of production and trade. Globalization requires 
firms to be more flexible. Basically the need for more flexibility at the firm level is 
“passed on” to workers in terms of more insecure and precarious labor conditions. 
Moreover, while core workers in final product producers and key supplier firms 
may enjoy responsible standards and improved employment conditions, due to 
increased outsourcing the proportion of such core workers seems to be decreas-
ing. The overall picture is one of fewer core workers at global level, and more 
differentiation through various layers within firms, through local subcontracting 
arrangements and through international relocation of economic activities.
Moreover, some observers stress that firms and production countries are also 
facing the pressure of what is called “immiserising growth”9, where: “... growing ... 
participation in industrial activities – reflected in the level of industrial activity, 
the growth in physical trade and the increase in industrial employment – may 
in fact become associated with declining overall standards of living” (Kaplinsky, 
1998: 4). This negative macro-effect is not because of an inefficient allocation 
of resources, but because of the pressures arising from economic globalization. 
Kaplinsky concludes that: “in previous eras, participation in industrial segments 
of the value chain provided the source for sustainable income growth. But, in-
creasingly, in a globalizing economy these industrial niches have become highly 
competitive, raising the spectre of immiserising growth” (Kaplinsky, 1998: 31). He 
argues that firms or countries need to identify and exploit specific rents from 
competitive advantages, but that the main lesson from recent history is that all 
rents are transitory and that new suppliers in GVCs basically carry out “rent-
poor” activities. Again, escaping from this immiserising-growth trap is something 
that might be achieved by some individual firms or countries, but the general 
trend is expected to be one of: “... declining real wages and declining real incomes 
in those countries specializing in rent-poor products. [...]The challenges thus 
confronting producers everywhere is to upgrade by appropriating whatever cat-
egories of rents are within their grasp, but to do so more rapidly than competitors 
in the knowledge that a rate of innovation lower than the average will result in 
immiserising growth” (Kaplinsky, 1998: 34).
Many observers may feel that the image of immiserising growth paints a too 
pessimistic picture, especially when looking at dynamic growth in China . This is 
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not the place to get into this debate. It suffices here to state that our argument 
does not hinge on immiserising growth to become more or less widespread. To 
assess the likelihood of mainstreaming responsible production we simply need to 
be aware that the basic capitalist business model implies that a majority of firms 
in a particular sub-sector do not produce A-brands with high image vulnerability, 
but will continue to look for the cheapest acceptable price/quality mix. Given the 
continued abundant availability of cheap and quickly to be skilled labor for labor-
intensive production phases in global value chains, the market wage for this type 
of labor is not likely to rise in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, China should not only be seen as one of the major workshops of 
the world; increasingly, it also manifests itself as a key player in major global 
value chains. For example, Chinese value chain organizers are increasingly set-
ting standards and/or making existing standards applicable or irrelevant, and we 
do not know enough about how the entry of China in the global economy affects 
the relevance of for example ILO and FSC standards (Schmitz, 2006: 55). While 
A-brand consumer goods and A-brand retailers are very vulnerable to the “power 
of activism” and have in recent years become pro-active in terms of responsible 
standard setting, this applies much less to the rather invisible Asian intermedi-
aries who are more likely to downplay these logistically more complicated and 
cost-raising concerns and be at best re-active in terms of responsible standard 
setting. Given the increasingly dominant role of Asian intermediaries, and their 
expected minimalist approach to responsible standard setting, this also makes 
it increasingly difficult for others to remain competitive through following a 
higher road towards responsible standards setting, except in premium market 
segments.
The second main trend is that a significant number of new middle-income 
consumers from “production” countries in the global South are entering the glo-
bal consumption market. So far, attention on the consumer side has focused on 
the roughly 800 million middle-income consumers in OECD countries. How-
ever, another 600 million to one-and-a-half billion middle-income consumers 
from the Global South (most visible in countries like China , India, South Af-
rica , Brazil) are likely to have started to significantly influence global consump-
tion patterns. We do not yet know much about the extent to which these new 
middle-income consumers are more or less or similarly inclined to responsible 
consumption behavior, nor do we know much about whether CSOs in these 
“new” consumption countries will be able to effectively wield their potential 
“power of activism” (Spar and La Mure, 2003) to push companies towards more 
responsible production. What we can hypothesize is that it is easy to over-es-
timate the relative importance that most consumers would attach to the labor 
and environmental impacts of the production and distribution of goods that 
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they (do not) purchase. Many of the new middle-class consumers in the Glo-
bal South, but also many consumers in OECD countries, probably attach very 
limited importance to these “additional attributes” of the products they buy, if 
it means paying a somewhat higher price, except perhaps for identity products 
like clothing and shoes, and possibly for food and health products. Research in-
dicates that relatively few (around 5 percent) consumers actually use their “con-
sumption as voting” (Shaw et al., 2005), although it needs to be stressed that this 
type of research is still in its early stages in terms of representativity and has an 
almost complete OECD focus.
Related to this is an implication for the “Bottom of the Pyramid” thinking 
(Prahalad, 2005). The Bottom of the Pyramid debate focuses on bringing another 
four billion relatively poor consumers into the global market realm by “simplify-
ing” existing consumer products, to produce them at cost levels within reach of 
relatively poor consumers. From the perspective of this study one might argue 
that such a simplification of product attributes would probably leave no space for 
“luxury” responsible attributes like, for example, an FSC label. In other words, 
branded products will increasingly need to find a way to produce a broader vari-
ety of simpler products at lower price ranges.
It seems clear that we need additional insights into these interconnected trends 
of global production and consumption patterns to be able to better assess the 
potential reach of responsible production. For now, the discussed aspects of the 
rise of China lead to a picture in which we are probably more likely to experience 
a further rise in low-road production, and an increased differentiation within 
low-road production, instead of an inevitable spreading of higher-road produc-
tion with more responsible attributes. Next to this increasing share of low-road 
production, we could envisage a significant market segment for some middle and 
upper income citizens that consume responsibly produced goods supplied by A-
branded retailers, and an even smaller niche for Fair Trade products consumed by 
particularly concerned and action-oriented citizens.
Finally, the fact that two large developing countries (China and India) will join 
the ranks of the superpowers will not automatically lead to more developmental 
global value chain governance. Instead, it is perhaps more likely to lead to more 
hard-nosed capitalism and ruthless competitive behavior in a broader range of 
product ranges and market segments. What we may expect is quite a long and po-
tentially volatile transition period in which the new global power structure works 
itself out (Gu et al., 2008). In conclusion, there seems to be very little reason 
to assume that a drive towards mainstreaming responsible production will gain 
dominance in this volatile situation.
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 Conclusion: Responsible production in Africa as an uphill 
struggle
Responsible production encompasses both CSR and Fair Trade initiatives, and 
refers to situations where lead firms in supply chains make a deliberate effort to 
include labor and environmental standards that go beyond the existing minimum 
legal requirements. This chapter has tried to investigate the extent to which re-
sponsible production is practised and might be further mainstreamed in Africa, 
and to discuss how the rise of China may influence this process. Three respon-
sible production strategies have been distinguished: compliance, risk minimiza-
tion, and value creation. On enhancing more pro-active compliance, it was found 
that while many countries in Africa show good intentions, in terms of imple-
mentation not much progress has been made. Moreover, Chinese producers or 
government officials are unlikely to push for raising the floor of expectation. On 
risk minimization, it was found that brand-name companies do what is necessary 
to protect their brand name goodwill. They can usually get away with a focus on 
technical outcome standards, and do not need to engage with a broader develop-
ment approach that enhances development opportunities for workers and affect-
ed communities. Chinese producers play a role in risk minimization strategies to 
the extent that they own or represent international brand name companies. In the 
very small niche market of using responsibility attributes as a key differentiation 
strategy, i.e. for value creation, some modest attempts have been made to enhance 
localized depth of responsible production through a broader process approach 
which potentially does enhance development opportunities for workers, includ-
ing casual workers.
Moreover, two general trends make it unlikely for responsible production to 
become mainstreamed. Firstly, the rise of China leads to increasing competitive 
pressures and a likelihood of an increasing share of low-road production in which 
luxury responsible attributes are not to be expected. Secondly, this might well be 
further enhanced by the entry of a significant number of new middle-class con-
sumers from the global South, who are unlikely to be more inclined than existing 
middle-class consumers to pay extra for responsible attributes.
In all, one might conclude that the rise of China mainly poses a threat to en-
hancing responsible production in Africa. However, such a conclusion hides more 
than it reveals. The real issue is to further specify in which situations, for what 
sectors, for which types of activities, the rise of China is to be seen as a threat or 
an opportunity, and what might be done to alleviate specific threats and make 
use of particular opportunities. This chapter has provided a modest point of de-
parture for such an endeavour. It has provided an analytical device to position 
various experiences with responsible production in Africa, and it has illustrated 
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how the approach of Chinese actors may well differ by type of sector and activity. 
Finally, it has revealed how preciously little we really know about these important 
processes at this point in time.
 Notes
 An earlier version was presented at an AEGIS European Conference on African Studies, 
- July , African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands. Parts of this chapter 
are drawn from Knorringa, P. () Asian Drivers and the Future of Responsible Pro-
duction and Consumption: Exploring A Research Question and Hypotheses for Future 
Research, ISS Working Paper No. . 
 Especially in non-food products it is often impossible to actually pay a premium. For a 
recent study on Fair Trade in the Netherlands, see Knorringa (). 
 McWilliams, Siegel and Wright, as guest editors of a Special Issue on CSR in the Journal 
of Management Studies, one of the top business school journals, define CSR as “actions 
that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which 
is required by law” (, p ).
 These three situations are: ) “pernicious CSR”, where profits increase but social benefits 
decrease (this is where governments have failed to appropriately regulate the economy), ) 
“borrowed virtue CSR”, where profits decrease and social benefits increase (this is where 
shareholders fail to control managers who spend excessively on social programs), and ) 
the worst case scenario is both a reduction in profits as well as social benefits which The 
Economist labels as “delusionary CSR”.
 An alternative way to unpack CSR is to distinguish between modes of implementation 
(Moon, ; Chapple and Moon, ): philanthropy, partnerships, foundations, and 
codes. Philanthropy has the longest history as a way of expressing concern for one’s 
environment, and the scanty existing literature on this point seems to indicate that, for 
example, Nigerian (Amaeshi et al., ) as well as Chinese businesses (Driscoll, ) 
are most used to operationalize CSR as “giving back to the community” through philan-
thropy. In contrast, European and also American brand names nowadays increasingly 
work with codes, foundations and partnerships as modus operandi for their CSR activi-
ties. 
 This model was developed originally in the context of analyzing state behavior.
 A particularly vivid description of both the inevitability of including private sector ac-
tors and of how they are perceived is given in the opening paragraph of John Sayer’s very 
informative editorial introduction to a recent special issue on the role of the private sec-
tor: “No reasoned discussion of equitable growth, the attainment of rights, the effect of 
globalization on poor people, or the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
can properly take place without considering the role of the private sector. Yet it is surpris-
ing how much of the debate on poverty, both at conferences and in publications, focuses 
on the roles and responsibilities of governments, NGOs, and international aid bodies. In 
such discussions, the world of business lurks in the shadows, acknowledged uneasily like 
a tattooed man at a tea party” (Sayer, : ). 
 Next to South Africa , also Ghana (), Kenya (), Malawi (), Mauritius 
(), Nigeria (), Tanzania (), Uganda (n.d.), Zimbabwe (n.d.) and Zambia 
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() have adopted national codes of corporate governance, while Botswana, Egypt , Mo-
rocco and Sierra Leone are in the process of developing such codes (Rossouw, ).
 The phrase was initially coined by Bhagwati in , and further developed in Bhagwati 
().
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10 Conclusions from China ’s activities in Africa
Meine Pieter van Dijk
 Introduction
In this last chapter a number of conclusions concerning China ’s presence in Af-
rica will be drawn. Not everybody may agree with them. This has to do with the 
delicate nature of the subject and the normative framework used. It is also due to 
the lack of data on a number of the deals between the Chinese government and 
African countries and with a number of contradictions. Our point of departure 
is that China’s new presence in Africa has created new opportunities for Afri-
can countries (if only because of the higher investments, more trade and aid and 
higher prices for raw materials) and new challenges (if only to find an adequate 
African reaction to China’s presence), which will be listed below. Our conclusions 
are listed here and correspond with the ten sections of this chapter:
1. China has several, sometimes conflicting objectives
2. At least four different levels of involvement can be distinguished
3. The roles of the main Chinese actors change over time
4. The activities of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) still 
compare favorably to those of China in Africa
5. China benefited from globalization but does not allow the same benefit to 
African countries
6. The Chinese way of providing development cooperation is not transparent, 
nor new
7. The Chinese economic and political model is no real alternative for Africa
8. China ’s presence in Africa implies specific opportunities and threats for Africa
9. There is a need for responsible production by Chinese enterprises in Africa
10. There are a number of contradictions in the eyes of a Western researcher
 Meine Pieter van Dijk
Finally, some lessons will be drawn from China ’s own successful economic de-
velopment and from its more recent commercial and political activities in Africa.
1.  China has several, sometimes conﬂ icting objectives
China ’s presence in Africa is very visible. The year 2006 is sometimes mentioned 
as the year that China departed from its traditional foreign policy of keeping a 
low-key profile abroad. In terms used by the Commerce Gazette (Zambia , No-
vember, 2007: 4):
China was no longer willing to watch from the sidelines. China’s politics 
have primarily been deﬁ ned by the needs for economic development. Fi-
nally in 2006 Beijing is acknowledging its status as a major player in the 
international system. President Hu Jiantao has even developed a theory 
of international relations.
Not surprisingly, his concept of international relations is that of a harmonious 
world. However, China ’s strategy is still primarily defined by the need for eco-
nomic development at home. China requires imported raw materials and overseas 
markets for its final products.1 In due course the country has become more aware 
of the international dimension of its economic development strategy and that 
this has meant a more visible presence abroad and not only in Africa.2
In Chapter 1 we distinguished eight objectives for China ’s presence in Africa 
(see Box 10.1). We will now discuss the evidence collected with respect to each of 
these objectives and show the conflicts between them.
Box 10.1 Diff erent objectives for China ’s presence in Africa
1. Assure the supply of raw materials for China , including agricultural products
2. Create a market for Chinese products and services
3. Obtain land for agricultural purposes
4. Promote migration of Chinese to Africa
5. Gain diplomatic support from African countries
6 Provide an alternative to the Western development model
7.  Present an alternative for the Western approach to development cooperation
8. Emphasize China ’s status as a superpower
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1.1 Assure the supply of raw materials for China 
The Chinese are very present in Africa to obtain raw materials, including agricul-
tural products like cotton and to sell their products. On the surface it may seem 
that Chinese businessmen are only in Africa to acquire raw materials. However, 
in a globalizing world, obtaining raw materials and selling products requires more 
than a good marketing agent. Hence China got involved in military and political 
conflicts, in migration and sovereignty issues, in the problem of acquiring land 
and of building up diplomatic relations with 54 different countries, and wants to 
be accepted as a new superpower.
1.2 Create a market for Chinese products and services
The Chinese have been very successful in creating a market for Chinese prod-
ucts and services in Africa as measured by the steep increase of the volume of 
exports to Africa. China is successful because of product differentiation and by 
building the physical infrastructure and necessary marketing networks. The Chi-
nese product-differentiation strategy has contributed a lot to the success. The 
products China offers are tailored to the local market, which means the supply 
of relevant and cheap products to poor African consumers. The Chinese have 
also successfully developed their own marketing channels deep into the interior 
of many African countries. At the same time this makes China a serious rival for 
local industries and Chinese imports have forced many local factories to close 
down, resulting in job losses as a direct result.
1.3 Obtain land for agricultural purposes
China has obtained land for agricultural purposes in a number of African coun-
tries. Obtaining land has become the official Chinese policy and China’s suc-
cesses were booked in countries such as Senegal and Zambia .
China is not the only country that needs land abroad for its production of 
agricultural produce. All kinds of formulas are tried in the world for obtaining 
additional agricultural products. They range from investing in local agriculture 
and getting a return by dedicating part of the harvest for the investing country 
(the Saudis in Indonesia, see Wall Street Journal, 11 July, 2008) to actually obtain-
ing the land and growing products for exports to the buyers’ country (China in 
the case of Senegal ). It can be expected that the discussion about sovereignty will 
flare up in the near future, in particular in countries where land is scarce and in 
cases where there are local food shortages. However, there are all kinds of prece-
dents of foreign companies or individuals owning land in other countries to grow 
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food, fruits or other cash crops and, if this is an issue, African countries should 
develop a policy, preferably in the framework of a regional trade organization or 
under the auspices of the African Union.
1.4 Promote migration of Chinese people to Africa
About a million Chinese citizens have moved to Africa and are part of “China 
incorporated”. They serve Chinese objectives (if only because they are employed 
now) but China also feels a responsibility to protect them. We showed that this 
may even mean a Chinese military presence in Africa. After the killing of 70 staff 
members in an oil field in Ethiopia , China considered the need for a military 
presence in Africa. The more China becomes engaged as a major economic actor 
and becomes a political player as well in Africa, the more its interests get inter-
twined with the internal political situation in its partner countries. As Van Ho-
eymissen (2008) rightly notes, this makes it more difficult for China to maintain 
its non-interventionist stance.
1.5 Gain diplomatic support from African countries
The Chinese also try to mobilize political support in Africa, emphasizing on the 
one hand that China is also a Third World country. On the other hand, they 
want to be a superpower. The Third World character gives Chinese diplomats an 
advantage when pursuing Chinese interests in international organizations, where 
African countries can constitute a powerful voting block (International Herald 
Tribune, IHT, 3 November, 2006).
An example of political support was the vote concerning the choice of Beijing 
as the organizer of the Olympic Games in 2008. In many fora, African countries 
make up an important voting block, counting almost one-third of all votes in the 
UN. However, if China wants to be the voice of the developing countries in inter-
national organizations, it will have to really offer something to African countries. 
One may note that China is not very successful in selling its policies, at least not 
to Western media, where a negative undertone dominates the debate. Finally, it 
needs political support to avoid Taiwan being recognized as an independent state 
by too many countries.3
1.6 Provide an alternative development model
Moeletski Mbeki, the brother of the previous South Africa n president, noticed: 
“China has offered Africa a new model that focuses on straight commercial rela-
tions and fair market prices without the ideological agenda” (IHT, 3 November, 
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2006). The Chinese claim not to interfere in local politics. However, we have seen 
examples of Chinese political interference in Sudan (where they used some lever-
age in Darfur), Zambia (where the Chinese were against a certain presidential 
candidate) and Zimbabwe (where they supported President Mugabe until the 
very end).
China can present itself in Africa as a non-colonial power, which has been 
the victim of colonialism itself at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Economically, it is now very successful and hence it can 
teach other countries how to achieve economic development while not following 
the World Bank /IMF recipe. The economic success of China offers Africa not 
only an alternative for the Western development model, but also a picture of the 
hard labor that is needed. The African people get an impression of how hard the 
Chinese workers work, because they see them in many countries constructing 
roads and buildings and in all kinds of factories. We do not consider the Chi-
nese economic and political model an alternative for Africa and will provide the 
arguments in section 7 below. President Hu, however, presented the Chinese ap-
proach to economic development, during the Forum on China-Africa Coopera-
tion in 2006, as an alternative: not democracy, but stable leadership is important 
for economic development. This may provide an excuse to leaders of regimes in 
Ethiopia , Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe to seek re-election after serving more 
than two turns as a head of state.
1.7 China provides an alternative for the Western approach to 
development cooperation
There are a number of examples of China being an alternative solution for 
African countries, in particular for those countries that can no longer get un-
conditional support from Western countries, or the Bretton Woods institu-
tions (the World Bank and the IMF ), or not on the right terms. In Chapter 8, 
the examples of Angola , Congo and Ethiopia were discussed to illustrate this 
phenomenon.
We have shown, particularly in the case of Sudan, that Chinese aid is not given 
for altruistic reasons and that the contracts signed can be very disadvantageous 
for the African partner. In general, the Chinese development cooperation to Afri-
ca has enormous consequences for African countries and traditional donor coun-
tries and organizations active in Africa may wonder why they do not have the 
same impact. One reason is that Chinese development cooperation and economic 
collaboration are not separated, but presented as a package, as was very clear in 
the case of Congo ’s deal of the century. Secondly, the Chinese government calls 
certain types of assistance development “cooperation”, but certain loans would not 
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be classified as such by the Development Assistance Committee (or DAC) of the 
OECD . Finally, since China does not provide systematic data on its development 
cooperation, the whole process is not transparent and it does not allow a fair 
evaluation of Chinese development cooperation and a realistic comparison with 
Western development cooperation.
1.8 Emphasize China ’s status as a superpower
China needs raw materials and markets, but there is another factor that ex-
plains why China is so present at the moment. China is implementing a strat-
egy concerning its role in the world. African countries have a contribution to 
make to achieve this more important role. The country wants to become, even-
tually, the second or even the first superpower in the world. This strategy is 
partially economic and partially political. Economically, China wants to control 
a greater part of different value chains (between the raw material and the final 
product). Buying IBM Computers (without IBM IT consulting services) was 
an example of launching the Chinese computer company Lenovo on the world 
scene, without trying to build up a name itself through years of advertising and 
supplying cheap and good-quality computers. Politically, it is not always pos-
sible to buy companies, particularly not if they have a strategic interest to the 
country where the activity is currently based. Superpower status also needs 
to be obtained by playing an active and constructive role in international con-
flicts, which is currently not really the case, as was discussed in the chapter on 
Sudan.
Becoming a superpower also means receiving more exposure and critique. 
There have been several protests against China ’s role in Africa and examples of 
this were given in Chapter 6 for Zambia and in Chapter 8 for South Africa . In the 
latter case, the minister of labor commented on the behavior of Chinese employ-
ers. Other examples are given in Box 10.2. The Zambian case has clearly shown 
that the relations between China and this non-oil exporting country, where Chi-
na is most engaged, have become very antagonistic; from the presidential can-
didate Michael Sata, who wanted to kick the Chinese out, to the mine-workers 
demonstrating against Chinese management. Other examples concern villagers 
harassing a Chinese construction firm and critique on China’s labor, safety and 
environmental standards in mining towns in Zambia where Chinese companies 
are active.
Conclusions from China’s activities in Africa
Box 10.2 Other examples of critique on China ’s presence in Africa
1. Touareg rebels: No China in Niger (Volkskrant, 28 June, 2007)
2. US and China fall from global favor (Financial Times, 28 June, 2007)
3.  Concerns that cheap Chinese goods will swamp local manufacturing (Financial Times, 8 
February, 2007)
4. China mistreats and exploits local workers in Zambia (Financial Times, 8 February, 2007)
5. Are the Chinese on Kenya ’s side? (Nation, March 2008)
6.  The South Africa n president said that China behaved as a colonial power and the people 
were complaining about the harsh labor conditions in Chinese enterprises, where, for 
example in Zambia , the legal minimum wage was not paid (IHT, 12 February, 2007).
China not only has a difficult time in Zambia , its citizens have been attacked and 
abducted also in Ethiopia , Nigeria and Sudan. Wissenbach (2008) has a good 
point when he stresses that a superpower can also be very weak, for example when 
it comes to protecting its citizens abroad. It is a positive step that the Chinese 
government has become more aware of the above-mentioned critique and that 
it nominated a special envoy for Sudan, for example. It also reassures developing 
countries that the country looks for win-win situations and not for dominance.
China is determined to become a global power. Just like any other global 
power, we cannot afford to neglect the question of whether it will be a peaceful 
or a threatening actor in the global arena. There are many indications that China 
also wants to be a military superpower (Colijn, 2008)! The principle of non-
interference is eroding. The country may consider a military presence in certain 
African countries and is now considering building warships carrying planes to 
be able “to defend its territory”, but which can, of course, be used for other pur-
poses as well.
2. At least four diﬀ erent levels of presence or involvement can be 
distinguished
From the cases presented in this book we conclude that there are different levels 
of intervention in Africa. At least four levels of intervention can be distinguished, 
taking the aid provided and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI ) as criteria (see Ta-
ble 10.1). Table 10.1 shows clearly that aid is the instrument used in the first stages 
of involvement, while investments gradually start playing a more important role. 
This distinction leads to four levels of involvement and each time an example is 
given of a country which seems to fit in that category.
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Table 10.1 Examples of Chinese involvement in Africa through aid and FDI 
Degree of involvement Aid Foreign Direct 
Investment 
1.  China is hardly playing a role Some aid is given, like in 
some smaller countries in 
West Africa
Not yet
2.  Countries where China is 
building up political credit
More aid is provided, for 
example in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania
Some local investments 
are starting
3.  Because of historical reasons, 
lots of Chinese investments
Also, but less important Starting real FDI: for 
example in Zambia and 
South Africa 
4.  Deeply involved in at least 
one strategic sector, for 
example in energy
Also, but less important Substantial investments: 
Angola and Sudan
We can deduce from Table 10.1 the importance of historical relations (phase 3) 
and of specific raw materials (phase 4). Secondly, there is clearly an intervention 
strategy behind the activities, starting with aid, developing economic activities as 
the second step and assuring the supply of raw materials and the sales of Chinese 
manufacturing products, which happen in stages 3 and 4.
The table also mentions two countries where China is deeply involved in the 
energy sector and where the assistance of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF ) is less important (Angola and Sudan).4 Secondly, there 
are countries mentioned in Table 10.1 that are under the dominant Western de-
velopment model, the so-called Washington consensus, but which for historical 
reasons have a lot of Chinese investments (Zambia and South Africa ). In the 
third place, there are countries where China is building up political credit and in-
tends to become more active (Ethiopia and Tanzania). Finally, there are a number 
of countries where, currently, the Chinese hardly play an important role. In some 
of the smaller West African countries for example, its role is limited to providing 
some development cooperation and exporting some basic cheap products from 
China.
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3. Roles of Chinese actors change and the Chinese central 
government loses control
Different Chinese actors are involved and the role they are playing changes over 
time. Chinese people are living in Africa, accompanying services (like translators, 
banks and shops for Chinese people and Chinese restaurants) are going there, 
Chinese investments are made and Chinese development aid arrives.
Historically, Chinese state-owned enterprises have played an important role 
in the increased presence of China in Africa. The role of state-owned enterprises 
in China itself has seen different stages over the last twenty years. In 1995, there 
were 104,000 state-owned enterprises in China, which formed the backbone of 
the socialist economy (Van Dijk, 1996). They accounted for 43 percent of the gross 
value of industrial output and employed about 110 million people. But at least 31 
percent was losing money, so reforms were necessary.5 After 1997, the state-owned 
enterprises were allowed to privatize. Around 2000, the state-owned enterprises 
were turned into multinationals, through incentives from the government. After 
saving the state-owned enterprises from bankruptcy and giving them an impor-
tant role as multinational companies, the next stage in the Chinese model was to 
use them as agents of China’s foreign policy.
The point is that through China ’s “go out” policy, the roles of Chinese actors 
also changed over time. What was the strategy the Chinese government wanted 
to achieve with their “go out” policy? It is quite similar again to the approach of 
Western nations. China selected this continent that contains a large number of 
small countries, which were often confronted with no alternative for what has 
been coined the Washington consensus and the Western dominance, once the 
USSR had been dissolved. China has offered the continent an alternative at a 
moment when a number of countries were longing for it.
Th e Chinese government wanted to use these former state-owned companies 
for the supply of energy and other resources. Th is was, in the ﬁ rst instance, the role 
of the state-owned enterprises, but they are more and more diﬃ  cult to control be-
cause they have grown, they have been relatively autonomous, and they sometimes 
have other shareholders as well. Central government in Beijing may have good 
intentions concerning its policies with Africa, but the Financial Times (23 April, 
2007) notes that not all lending institutions in China are under Beijing’s control: 
“A lot of the provincial Chinese governments are active in Africa and they basically 
just want to grab the minerals and go”. Th is means that the initiatives in Africa are 
not always coordinated and some may even violate the state level policies.
Also, Chinese private enterprises have become more active in Africa and can 
create problems. They sometimes do not comply with the local environmental 
and labor laws in most African countries. The Chinese firms have a tradition 
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of not respecting environmental and wage regulation in China , where ironically 
the trade unions serve to keep the wages low, rather than defending the workers-
rights. These employers try to play the same game in Africa. Once private Chi-
nese and state-owned enterprises have invested in an African country, stability in 
these countries is also in the interest of the Chinese government. For the reason 
of stability, Chinese firms are instructed to comply with the local laws, as the Chi-
nese ambassador in Congo mentioned in Chapter 8. And finally, for that reason, 
the Chinese government was maybe also willing in 2007 to put some pressure on 
the Sudanese government, regarding the UN presence in Darfur.
With this proliferation of actors, the question is to what extent the Chinese 
state can still control them and to what extent they will continue to pursue their 
own interests. In fact the Chinese state at the national level is becoming less im-
portant in a capitalist economic development model. The private Chinese sector 
is becoming increasingly important and tends to move away from the control by 
the Chinese state. For example, many small Chinese enterprises in Africa are not 
under the direct influence of the Chinese state anymore and may increasingly 
pursue their own interests. Hence the conclusion that the roles of Chinese actors 
have changed and will change over time and the different actors do not always 
comply with China ’s central government’s strategies with respect to Africa.
4. Th e EU and US still compare favorably to China in Africa
The presence and activities of the EU and US still compare favorably with what 
China is doing in Africa. Development cooperation is often judged in terms of 
whether it succeeded or not in alleviating poverty. There is no reason to assume 
that the Chinese do a better job than the Europeans or the Americans, if only 
because the Chinese aid does not have poverty eradication by job creation and 
the provision of basic services as an overriding objective like European and US 
development cooperation. Alleviating poverty also depends on local policies and 
using local tax revenues for that purpose. If governments do not give priority to 
poverty alleviation, donors (China included) can do very little to correct that. In 
this respect China is not a good example to follow. Don’t forget, China itself is 
facing the problem that the income distribution is very unequal, which is a poten-
tial bomb under its own political stability (Van Dijk, 2006b).
Since the fall of the wall between East and Western Europe in 1989, an old di-
vide in Africa has disappeared. Now there is a risk that a new gap will come into 
existence between countries that use Western support and countries that favor the 
Chinese development model. Th at last model is characterized by less attention for 
democracy and more support for authoritarian regimes, such as the governments 
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of Ethiopia , Sudan and Zimbabwe. In these countries a lot of money is wasted 
on civil conﬂ icts or wars with neighboring countries, which is at the expense of 
economic development. Collier (2007) rightly points out that conﬂ icts and poor 
governance increase the number of people at the bottom of the world system.
5. Africa can beneﬁ t from globalization
China has really benefited from globalization. Van Dijk (2006b) argues that Chi-
na has benefited more from globalization than, for example, India. China received 
more FDI , exported more and obtained the latest technology in different ways, 
playing the globalization card to its service. However, now other countries should 
also benefit. What is the impact of China’s presence? In the first place, one notes 
higher commodity prices, which have been positive for most African countries. 
Secondly, China gives a new content to the globalization process. So far, many re-
searchers have considered Africa to be excluded or marginal in the globalization 
process. In this book it is shown that the continent is very much the next frontier!
China could now help Africa to benefit more from globalization. That will 
not happen if too many strict conditions are imposed on African countries (for 
example, the low fixed prices for oil exports from Angola and Sudan), or when in-
stead of allowing African countries to increase their agricultural exports it wants 
to take agricultural production in its own hands by buying or leasing land and 
sending Chinese farmers. China has always globalized on its own terms, which 
was possible in developed countries. However, in the case of Africa, the interests 
of the African countries need to be taken into account as well.
It is clear that China is more and more present in Africa to develop its own 
economy and to boost its status as a superpower. It is less clear who finally ben-
efits from this presence. It is certainly China but African countries could also gain 
more from China’s increased presence. African countries may often be too small 
to deal with China on an equal footing and for that reason regional trade blocks 
(like SADC and the EAC) and the African Union should promote regional trade 
and defend Africa’s interest vis-à-vis competing nations.
6. Th e Chinese way of providing development cooperation is not 
transparent
The examples of Congo and Sudan have shown that the Chinese way of provid-
ing development cooperation is not transparent and does not necessarily create 
a win-win situation. The fact that development cooperation, investment policies 
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and political agreements are all part of one deal may seem an innovation, but also 
mean that if one of the three goes wrong, the other instruments used are at risk 
as well. When the presidential candidate, Michael Sata, would have been elected 
in Zambia , the Chinese government threatened to withdraw from the country. 
This would not only have affected political relations, but also the development 
cooperation, trade relations and the investments in the mining industry in Zam-
bia. Similarly, the Congolese government now wants to renegotiate its “deal of 
the century”, as explained in Chapter 8. Finally, Nigeria is trying to end some 
contracts because it does not consider them as beneficial to Nigeria (Financial 
Times, 2008). These are signs that China is facing more and more problems with 
its approach to development cooperation.
China has created new opportunities for African countries to receive support. 
The real question is who finally benefits from this Chinese presence in Africa. 
Will African countries be better able to compete in the world markets, or are 
their products pushed out of these markets by Chinese products? Many develop-
ments influence industrial development in the world. This makes it extremely 
difficult to ascertain which changes in Africa’s industrial performance are caused 
by China, but the presence of all these cheap industrial products certainly makes 
it more difficult for a number of African countries to develop their own industrial 
sector. The fact that the Chinese development aid does not even pass through the 
budget of the receiving African country makes controlling whether the money 
is used properly easier for the Chinese government. However, this may be good 
governance on the Chinese side, but does not promote ownership of the project 
in the receiving country.
7. Th e Chinese model is not an alternative for Africa
China ’s presence is through its aid, trade and investments. Chinese companies 
and workers can be observed in a large number of African countries. The physi-
cal presence is through hard-working Chinese labor, but China’s presence is also 
noticed when people are buying cheap industrial products like shoes, textiles and 
watches. The Chinese government would like to provide an alternative economic 
and political model to the Washington consensus by emphasizing an important 
role for the state in the economy, but with an important role for the market and 
the private sector as well.
We do not think the Chinese model is an alternative for Africa and will try 
to substantiate this claim by first discussing the economic part of the model and 
then the political part. There are many theories why Africa is relatively low de-
veloped (Easterly, 2006). Some claim that it is poor since it still specializes in ex-
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porting primary products, while suffering from the resource curse (Collier, 2007). 
Others blame the lack of Fair Trade opportunities (Stiglitz, 2006). It is certainly 
not a question of lack of entrepreneurship (Van Dijk, 2005), nor any single vari-
able explaining its slow development. Factors sometimes mentioned are: lack of 
democracy, lack of good governance, lack of leadership, etc. These explanations 
are all too simple for a complex historical reality.
The most important political aspects of the Washington model are democracy 
and good governance and loans are only granted under strict conditions. The so-
called Beijing model is a welcome alternative for many African countries because 
in this model the government can play an important role in the economy. The 
World Bank and the IMF would not favor that. The Beijing consensus also de-
mands few conditions for the provided loans. A third difference lies in the use of 
Chinese workers and technology. The Chines de-emphasize the need for a trans-
fer of knowledge and experience. This is not in line with the Western approach, 
which has high ideals of teaching Africans how to fish, rather than giving them a 
fish, and emphasize the need to transfer knowledge and know-how.
China ’s economic success provides Africans with a new example, if African 
leaders want to see successful development experiences elsewhere. Finally, China 
has become a source of finance for a number of developing countries. However, 
is easy finance undermining good governance or does it help to create the neces-
sary infrastructure? China’s presence has also provoked debate about whether 
China is the latest in a line of exploiters of Africa’s rich natural resources, or does 
China’s engagement enable African countries “to free themselves from the tyranny 
of the neo-liberal policies”? (Manji and Marks, 2007). This statement seems to 
be beside the point. In a globalization process, a level playing field is created and 
all countries will have to compete or remain marginal. China is a good example 
of how a country can also benefit from liberalization policies. There seems to be 
little space for alternative models of economic development in a global economy. 
Countries have to compete in the world market. They can only try more social 
policies at home, if they can afford this and the government gets public support 
for it.
The “Chinese” economic development model is one that may have been most 
appropriate in China from 1978 to 2008, but it is conditioned by China’s his-
tory, its culture and the possibility to quickly absorb the technology developed 
in other parts of the world in the post Second World War period. The model is 
a combination of historical realities and cultural characteristics and cannot just 
be transplanted to other countries. Strategic thinking, hard work and seizing op-
portunities are the main elements that would also apply elsewhere. We do not 
consider the Chinese model an alternative to the Washington consensus. In the 
first place it is not a coherent economic strategy and no conditions are formulated 
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to make it a success. Secondly, some of the elements of the Beijing consensus are 
specific to China’s situation and not necessarily relevant for African countries. 
Finally, small African countries cannot play the same role as China in the global 
economy and will have to specialize in some specific products, where they may 
have a competitive advantage.
8. China ’s presence in Africa implies opportunities and threats for 
Africa
Another way of looking at the effect of China ’s presence in Africa is in terms of 
what is an opportunity for Africa and what is threatening the continent? We will 
conclude that China’s presence in Africa implies not only opportunities but also 
threats for Africa, that need to be dealt with.
 What are the opportunities?
For most African countries getting trade finance, loans on soft terms, and buying 
industrial products at a low price provides an opportunity which is greatly appre-
ciated. China also provides development assistance and gives the example of what 
hard working and strict discipline can achieve. Contradictory to its jargon of state 
control, the Chinese are also in favor of the market and private sector develop-
ment and show how a country can benefit from globalization.6
Rising prices of raw materials, due to increased demand for raw materials by 
emerging economies like China , are helpful for most African countries and the 
increased prices have stimulated growth rates of a number of African countries, 
for example Tanzania (Van Dijk, 2009). The Chinese contributed and still con-
tribute to the development of a good infrastructure in many African countries. 
This is one of the preconditions for successful economic development. Most of 
the points mentioned are positive. There are however also a number of threats, 
although not all countries see these phenomena as such.
 What is threatening?
In the first place Chinese labor replaces local labor. Secondly, Chinese compa-
nies compete with local companies causing losses of jobs and closure of local 
factories. Their imports also go at the expense of traditional European contrac-
tors and suppliers. More importantly, China provides support to and is some-
times legitimating African regimes which are violating human rights in their 
country.
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Finally, the country puts no conditions on its loans in a part of the world where 
many countries have just overcome the debt crisis. In this way it undermines the 
Washington consensus achieved by the World Bank , IMF and a number of donors 
and may undermine their eﬀ orts to promote good governance. Th e Bretton Woods 
organizations have raised concerns that China ’s unrestricted lending undermines years 
of painstaking eﬀ orts to arrange conditional debt relief (IHT, 3 November, 2006).
9. Socially responsible production in Africa
There is a need for responsible production by Chinese enterprises, as argued in 
the previous chapter, but Chinese companies still have a long way to go, if only 
because they are not really used to this approach in China . This is again a topic 
where the African Union could play an important role. The requirements and 
incentives should not only concern the Chinese companies, but also apply to EU, 
US and African companies.
10. Th ere are a number of contradictions in the eyes of Western 
researchers
The perception of issues sometimes differs between Western and Chinese re-
searchers. Croll et al. (2008) emphasize that different scientific disciplines tend 
to look differently at China ’s role in Africa. The economists are concerned:
about China ’s grabbing for Africa’s energy resources and cite unfair trade 
practices and rising global prices. Representatives of fair trade and labour 
groups are keeping a critical eye on social and environmental standards in 
Chinese factories abroad.
 What are the lessons from China ’s activities in Africa?
What are the lessons from China ’s activities in Africa? A lot can be learned from 
China, not least from the examples of what a strategic vision and hard work can 
achieve. Somewhat unexpectedly, China promotes the role of the market and the 
private sector abroad, and it shows developing countries that they can benefit 
from globalization (Van Dijk, 2006b). The first concern of the Chinese govern-
ment is to create employment in China; they achieve this by stimulating Chinese 
industries to export and by bringing a number of their people to Africa.
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The different chapters in this book have raised a number of critical questions 
about China ’s presence in Africa, which have not all been fully answered:
1. Will African countries be able to compete with China and, in particular, with 
Chinese products in African and European markets?
  They have to, but will find it difficult if they do not develop a common strat-
egy in their regional trade organizations or in the framework of the African 
Union.
2. What will be the long-term effect of China ’s presence in Africa?
  This is difficult to say; Africa, on the one hand, benefits from the invest-
ments and the increased economic activities. On the other hand, Africa does 
not want to be exploited by a new colonial power and hence has to put the 
conditions in place to avoid this. By preference that should happen at the pan-
African level.
3. Is China really still a developing country or only trying to win favors by posing 
as a developing country?
  China is clearly playing the card of being a developing country and to some 
extent it is a developing country. However, in its undertakings with Africa it 
acts just like any other developed superpower.
4. Is China ’s aid really unconditional and can you still claim China is not inter-
vening in local politics?
  On these two points the book has been very clear. China ’s aid is not uncon-
ditional and China has intervened in local politics a number of times.
5. Can Chinese companies afford not to pay the legal minimum wage abroad, if 
there is a free trade movement, which fights for better labor conditions?
  Of course they cannot neglect local labor and environmental laws, but en-
trepreneurs may try and hence they need to be supervised closely, but not all 
African countries have the institutions capable of doing that.
6. Will China use Africa to export its products duty-free to Europe?
  It would certainly try to do so if the European trade policies would allow 
them. That is why the rules of origin for trade, described in Chapter 5, are so 
complex and not easy to change. Unfortunately they rule out many possibili-
ties for export from African enterprises as well.
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7. Can China produce in an environmentally friendly way in Africa if it does not 
do so at home?
  Th is issue was raised in Chapter 9, and although Knorringa was not very op-
timistic about the corporate social responsibility of Chinese entrepreneurs, he 
also indicated that there is no alternative for this and that Chinese and African 
governments have to push Chinese and other enterprises in this direction.
8. Why do the Chinese workers do the work that local people could have done?
  This is unacceptable and an African-wide policy will need to be developed 
to avoid this.
  On the positive side we have also learned from the history of China that 
development may start with educating the poor and providing the necessary 
basic health care and a basic infrastructure. Once at that level of development, 
it is free trade and competition in the global economy. We learned that in 
China local governments can fruitfully compete with each other to attract for-
eign direct investments, or local investments, which would then contribute to 
employment, local revenues and development in general. Van Dijk (2006a) 
analyzes the role of districts (small administrative units) in big cities as an 
example of good urban management, because they compete with each other to 
attract economic activities.
 Conclusions
China can be considered an opportunity and a threat for Africa. We do not expect 
Africa is going to make it just with agriculture and mining, although these sectors 
can generate the money necessary for the development of the rest of the economy. 
Also, in Africa the adagio applies: cities are the engines of growth, rather than the 
old adagio: rural development first (Van Dijk, 2007). However, other sectors like 
tourism, horticulture, agriculture and agro-based industries should be developed 
as well.
The conclusion must be that China has a highly political past in Africa, al-
though at an early stage China’s political interests were largely trying to persuade 
African governments not to recognize Taiwan as a separate country. Its increased 
presence makes it much more difficult for China to refrain from interfering in 
local circumstances. China’s interests have increased because of the investments 
made and the number of Chinese people living in Africa.
Now that the presence of China has become much more multi-faceted, it could 
not possibly be positive in all respects. There are contradictions that cannot be 
solved. Some have been listed in Box 10.3. The image of being a developing coun-
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try is difficult to reconcile with one of a superpower. The Chinese government 
knows its economic interests, but likes to present its activities as a sign of solidar-
ity between developing countries. At the same time they want to play a more im-
portant role in the world and prevent Taiwan being recognized as an independent 
country. However, some of the Chinese policies go against helping Third World 
countries. One of the questions often raised is about the Chinese companies and 
projects bringing lots of Chinese workers to Africa. If China is reluctant to trans-
fer technology, or if it uses mainly its own management and workers, there is no 
transfer of technology and there is no building up of local capacity.
In the same way, the principle of non-interference is difficult to combine with 
protecting one million Chinese living in Africa. Finally, China has concluded 
long-term contracts with Sudan and Angola for the purchase of oil. However, if 
these are contracts with prices far below the world market prices these deals do 
not benefit Angola, Congo or Sudan, and then China is behaving just like a neo-
colonial power.
Box 10.3 Contradictions concerning China ’s presence in Africa
1.  Being a developing country and at the same time wanting to be a superpower
2.  Having to defend a million citizens (and important investments) in Africa and China ’s 
policy of non-intervention
3.  Going for long-term fi xed and stable low prices for African commodities and assuring 
that the country concerned also benefi ts from price increases in the future
4.  Going for a strong role of the government and an important role for the (private) 
enterprise sector
5.  China still receives aid itself and is becoming a major donor in Africa
The debate about China ’s role in Africa is a normative debate focusing on issues 
like: what really motivates the Chinese to play such an active role in the continent 
and who really benefits from it? The conclusion of this book is that China is not 
very different from the other superpowers in the sense that it is looking after its 
own interests first. That means it needs Africa’s raw materials to keep its indus-
trial sector going and it needs markets for its final products. It is different, how-
ever, in the way it provides its aid and links its aid, trade and investment policies 
and negotiates as a government on behalf of Chinese companies and individuals.
China ’s presence in Africa is not without problems. From the cases studied, it 
turns out to be important to analyze the history of the relationship to understand 
what has happened. The impact of China’s presence depends, among other fac-
tors, on the type of activities and the number of Chinese involved. The analysis 
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of Sudan and Zambia showed the importance of raw materials (oil in Sudan and 
copper in Zambia) and the political consequences of an important presence. The 
case of Sudan even threatened the Olympic games in 2008, while in the case of 
Zambia, political interference of the Chinese contradicts China’s claim that it 
does not want to get involved in local politics.
There is another side to the coin. Since the fall of the wall in 1989, the old 
East-West divide has disappeared in Africa. It is no more socialist versus capital-
ist inclined countries.7 Now, through China ’s activities in Africa, a new divide 
may come into existence, between countries relying on Western support versus 
those favoring the Chinese approach to development. The latter would then be 
characterized by:
1. Less attention to democracy, and more focus on political stability, which may 
mean keeping regimes in place that make their population suffer
2. Promoting an authoritarian type of leadership, as, for example, in Ethiopia , 
Uganda, Sudan and Zimbabwe
3. Stressing an important role for the government in the economy, but alongside 
a role for the market in general and the private sector in particular
4. A preference for development cooperation coming with no strings attached, to 
the extent that this is possible
5. No interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, and no interventions, even 
if human rights are violated systematically (Sudan) or if elections are fraudu-
lent (several countries)
China is suffering the costs of its image because of a number of incidents which 
were mentioned in this book. It may want to limit these costs in the future, but 
that will require playing the game by the rules, instead of trying to determine the 
rules, or just using the rules Chinese companies are used to at home. To some 
extent, China suffers from the fact that because it is considered as a commu-
nist monolithic state, everything that happens in Africa by Chinese citizens or 
Chinese companies is considered the direct responsibility of the Chinese gov-
ernment, which of course is more and more difficult to defend if the number of 
actors and their independence is growing as we have been arguing.
The real issue is to what extent Africa itself will eventually be able to benefit 
from China ’s presence and be able to compete with China in sectors like leather, 
textiles and food processing. The benefits depend on the negotiations, and small-
er countries may find it more difficult to get a fair deal. They could take advice 
from international organizations or other countries, but much also depends on 
the transparency of the negotiations and the possibility of introducing real com-
petition between interested parties.
 Meine Pieter van Dijk
The competition between Chinese and African industries will not only take 
place in Africa, but also in other markets. Much will depend on whether Africa 
as a continent will be able to develop a common stand to China ’s advance and 
whether African countries are ready to design common economic policies to de-
fine their relations with their major partners: the EU, the US and China. The 
African Union could be instrumental in this respect and has already changed 
its name to express the ambition of creating one big Union of African countries, 
something somewhat similar to what Europe has achieved over the past 50 years.
How do the Africans themselves see this active role of China in their conti-
nent? We have learned in this book that they are quite aware of what is happen-
ing, but some stress the advantages (Tegegne, 2006) and some warn of the risks 
(President Mbeki). The spirit seems to be that we have had the Arabs, the Euro-
peans, the US, the Japanese, and now let us benefit from the Chinese. Foreigners 
come and go! For example, during the current financial crisis we see signs that 
China is retreating from Africa, but we do not know how long this will last.
 Similarities with European and American policies with respect 
to Africa
The EU as well as the US and China will try to build up good relations with 
Africa, in particular with oil- and mineral-supplying countries. However, the ac-
tual negotiations in the case of the US and EU are happening through private oil 
or mining companies. In the case of China it is often the Chinese government 
that negotiates with an African government to hammer out a deal. The often 
painful negotiations between Europe and developing countries concerning the 
Partnership Agreements show that Europe wants more from African countries 
than just economic partnerships. The EPAs failed to convince the ACP countries 
that this was a new form of partnership with the EU and only a limited number 
of countries signed them in Lisbon at the end of 2007. Europeans consider free-
trade agreements a win-win situation for every country. They argue that these 
agreements should also lead to further integration of the countries concerned, in 
the world economy in general and between countries participating in the FTA in 
particular. The EU itself started as an effort to integrate economically and was 
very successful in this respect. Now the challenge is to also become a monetary 
and eventually a political union.
These Western companies usually have to go through a process of competitive 
bidding, which allows the country to select the best offer. Such an opportunity 
was not given to Angola and Sudan when Chinese state-owned enterprises start-
ed to play a role in the exploration of their natural resources.
Conclusions from China’s activities in Africa
 Finally, Western companies can be held accountable. They usually have 
critical shareholders and face governments and NGOs in their home country, 
whether they like it or not. The EU and the US should think about making the 
model they offer more attractive to African countries. The EPA trade offer will 
need to be rethought.
 Notes
 Different researchers define the strategy differently. Wissenbach () gives as the short 
summary of China ’s strategy three words: revival, recognition and re-unification.
 For example, Ellis (), who analyzes the rapidly expanding ties between China and the 
Latin American region.
 The Chinese insistence on support for its one China policy is eroding. China now also 
supports some African countries that also deal with Taiwan .
 Recently Sudan is trying to come to terms with the IMF . See Chapter .
 Before  it was not allowed to use the word “privatization” in China ; the correct term 
would be “restructuring the state-owned enterprises”.
 According to The Financial Times ( September, ) one should be careful with the 
classifications private or public in China . Different sources suggest that many enterprises 
are still under public control. Chinese sources suggest that , foreign-funded enter-
prises produce  percent of China’s total industrial output and  percent of its exports 
(China Daily,  January, ). Van Dijk () suggests that the private sector has 
become more important in China and is now responsible for three-quarters of economic 
output and employment.
 There may still be something like a divide between countries with important Islamic ac-
tivists (Somalia and Sudan) versus countries where religion does not play an important 
role or is currently suppressed.
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